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The aim of the thesis is to examine the leverage and debt maturity levels and the 
determinants of capital structure and debt maturity of firms in developing countries. 
We use World Bank Enterprise Survey data covering 10,839 firms in 24 countries 
located in five regions. The survey provides information about balance sheet and 
income statements items allowing us to examine whether capital structure theory is 
portable to small firms in developing countries. We find that the leverage and debt 
maturity levels of small and large firms are different. Leverage and debt maturities 
are lower for small firms despite their high asset tangibility and profitability ratios. 
We attribute this to the economic and financial environment of the country. Small 
firms do not consider profitability when making external financing decisions. Firm 
level determinants are important for large firms regarding capital structure and debt 
maturity decisions. However, most of the economic and financial environment 
variables become insignificant. Therefore, the main difference between small and 
large firms is derived from the impact of the economic and financial environment of 
a country. Most of the economic and financial environment variables do not have 
statistically significant effects on the leverage and debt maturity decisions of large 
firms. We attribute this to large firms’ easy access to both domestic and international 
financial markets. Hence, if local governments provide better fiscal and monetary 
policies and a friendly business environment, small firms can amplify their leverage 




AFR   African region 
Civil   Civil law legal system 
Dbacba  Deposit money bank assets to central bank assets 
EAP   East Asia and Pacific region 
GDP/Cap  Gross domestic product per capita 
Growth  Growth of GDP 
Interest  Lending interest rate 
Large   Large companies (more than 500 employees) 
LCR   Latin America and Caribbean region 
Leverage  Total liabilities to total assets 
Listed   Publicly held firms 
LTD/TA  Long-term Liabilities to total assets 
LTD/TD  Long-term liabilities to total liabilities 
MNA   Middle East and North Africa region 
Nrbloan  Offshore bank loans to GDP 
Offdep   Offshore deposits to domestic deposits 
Sale    Total Sales 
SAR    South Asia region 
Small   Small companies (less than 50 employees) 
SMEs   Small and medium size enterprises 
STD/TA  Short Term Liabilities to Total assets 
Stockmrk  Stock market dummy 
Tax   Corporate tax rate 
Turnover  Stock market turnover 






The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the leverage and debt maturity levels and 
the capital structure and debt maturity choices of companies in developing countries. 
We use firm level survey data for 24 countries in different stages of financial 
development from different regions. We analyse the impact of leverage and debt 
maturity levels on the size and listing status of the firms. Moreover, we investigate 
how small firms have access to financing and how this access affects their capital 
structure and debt maturity decisions. We also discuss the differences between the 
financing decisions of small and large firms. Previous literature has mainly focused 
on large listed firms in both developed and developing countries (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999; Booth et al., 2001). 
Work on small and medium sized firms are limited to some European countries 
where the economic and financial environments are more or less alike. There are a 
number of studies that examine the capital structure decisions of small and medium 
size enterprises (Ang, 1991; Holmes and Kent, 1991; Cosh and Hughes, 1994; Acs 
and Isberg, 1996; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008). But 
they are either examining a small number of countries (see Hall et al., 2004; 
Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008 for cross country 
studies) or a single country in Europe (see Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Sogorb-
Mira, 2005; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2005 for single country studies). Since the 
wealth of the countries is very low in the sample, the economic and financial 
environments are different from the European countries and some of the emerging 
markets covered in previous work. Specifically, some of the countries in the sample 
do not have a stock market. Therefore, it could be misleading to generalise the 
results of these studies. 
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The main focus of the thesis is to examine the determinants of capital structure and 
debt maturity decisions and access to financing for small firms in developing 
countries. Small firms are important in developing countries. They are more 
productive and labour intensive; therefore, their expansion enhances employment 
more than large firms. For instance, the workforce employed in SMEs for our 
sample varies between 27.60% and 86.50% (Ayyagari et al., 2005). We use a very 
rich database that specifically examines the financing decisions of small firms. 
About 90% of our private companies are small and medium sized, while about 70% 
of the listed firms in our sample are small and medium sized. We are looking for the 
answers to the following questions. Do the leverage and debt maturity levels 
indicate differences based on the size and listing status of firms? Is there a size 
effect on the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms? Are the 
determinants of capital structure and debt maturities different for small firms? Does 
the economic environment have an impact on the financing decisions of firms? Does 
the financial environment have an effect on the capital structure and debt maturity 
decisions of firms? 
 
By using the World Bank Enterprise survey, we investigate the leverage and 
maturity levels and the determinants of capital structure of firms from 24 developing 
countries covering all regions including Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. We 
demonstrate that capital structure theories hold in developing countries. We 
conclude that small firms are less levered than large firms and capital structure 
theories are portable to small firms, except Pecking order. Small firms are more 
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sensitive to the changes in the economic and financial environment than large firms. 
Large firms have higher leverage and longer debt maturity. We attribute this to their 
easy access to international financial markets. 
 
In the following, we first explain the motivation of the thesis. In Section 1.3, we 
outline the structure of the thesis. Section 1.4 defines the objectives. The last section 
summarizes the main findings of the empirical chapters. 
 
1.2. Motivation of the thesis 
The databases used in previous studies provide firm level information on large listed 
companies in both developed and developing countries. For instance, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) use the Global Vantage database. Their dataset includes large listed 
companies in G-7 countries. Booth et al (2001) focus on the developing countries. 
They collect the data from the International Financial Corporation (IFC) database 
for the largest listed companies in ten developing countries. Both databases only 
provide firm-level variables for large publicly listed firms. Alternatively, some 
studies focus on small and medium size enterprises. For example, both Bartholdy 
and Mateus (2008) and Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) use the Amadeus database 
and collect data for SMEs. Amadeus provides firm level data for SMEs and large 
companies, but the database only contains firms from European countries. For 
instance, Bartholdy and Mateus (2008) analyze large and SMEs for 16 developed 
countries in Europe. Alternatively, Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) present the results 
for SMEs in four developed countries including Greece, France, Italy, and Portugal. 
Yet all of these databases provide firm level data for either publicly listed companies 
in developed and developing countries or SMEs and privately held companies for 
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developed countries in Europe. Therefore, it is not possible to investigate SMEs in 
developing countries using those databases. 
 
The determinants of capital structure and debt maturity of firms have been analyzed 
in developed and developing countries in previous studies (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999; Booth et al., 2001). Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) investigate capital structure decisions of large listed firms for the G-
7 countries, while Booth et al. (2001) examine the financial leverage decisions of 
listed firms for ten developing countries. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
analyze the relation between financing choices of firms and the level of financial 
market development in 30 developed and developing countries. However, those 
studies only include the large listed companies. Even if Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) examine the financing choices for both large and small firms, 
the firms included in the study are publicly listed companies. This implies that the 
small firms contained in their sample are relatively large, especially for developing 
counties. Since most large listed firms from any country are also one of the players 
in international trade, they can easily access international financial markets and 
institutions. However, this is not the case with SMEs. 
 
The studies on SMEs are limited due to data limitations. There are some studies that 
examine the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of SMEs in European 
countries (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Gianetti, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; 
Bartholdy and Mateus, 2005, 2008; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 
2008). Yet the countries included in those studies are European countries where the 
economic and financial environments of countries are similar. Therefore, it could be 
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misleading to generalize their results for other countries, especially for developing 
countries, around the world. 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explains the capital structure and debt 
maturity theories, and the empirical literature regarding capital structure and debt 
maturity. It also contains hypothesis development for the leverage and debt maturity, 
and firm level economic and financial environment factors. Chapter 3 presents the 
data and methodology. We explain the data and variables and discuss the 
methodology applied in the thesis and present the empirical evidence that we will 
use for Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
 
Chapter 4 shows the preliminary analysis of the dataset and stylized facts on the 
leverage, debt maturity and firm-level factors in developing countries. We discuss 
the leverage and debt maturity levels of firms in developing countries. We 
investigate whether the leverage and maturity levels of small and large firms are 
different. We do the same analysis for privately held and listed companies. 
Moreover, we examine the effect of the presence of a stock market on leverage and 
the debt maturity levels of firms. We conclude that small firms and privately held 
firms are less levered than large and listed companies. The difference is greater in 
the countries without a stock market. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of the determinants of capital structure in developing 
countries. We empirically investigate the effect of firm level economic and financial 
environment variables on the leverage decisions of firms, specifically small firms. 
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We conclude that capital structure theories are portable to small firms, except 
pecking order, and the main difference between small and large firms is due to the 
economic and financial environment of the country. 
 
Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of debt maturity structures of firms in developing 
countries. We investigate the effect of firm level economic and financial 
environment variables on the long-term debt to total assets, short-term debt to total 
assets, and long-term debt to total debt, especially for small firms. We find that the 
debt maturity decisions of small firms are more sensitive to economic and financial 
environment changes than large firms. Chapter 7 provides our conclusion of the 
thesis. 
 
1.4. Objectives of the thesis 
In Chapter 4, we will discuss the World Bank Enterprise Survey and present the 
preliminary analysis of the dataset and stylized facts on the leverage, debt maturity 
and firm-level variables. We analyze the impact of the size and listing status on the 
leverage and debt maturity levels of firms. We also examine the existence of a stock 
market on the debt financing decisions of firms. At first, we explain the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey and then examine whether there is a difference between the 
leverage and debt maturity levels of small and large firms. We apply this same 
analysis to privately held and listed companies. As small firms, privately held 
companies are closed in nature. They are not as transparent as publicly listed 
companies. Therefore, it is easier for publicly listed companies to access both local 
and international financial markets. As a result, the leverage and maturity levels 
might indicate differences between privately held and listed companies. As some of 
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the countries in the sample do not have a stock market, we examine whether the 
presence of a stock market has an impact on the leverage and maturity levels of 
firms. We split our sample based upon countries with and without a stock market 
and then investigate this difference on the firms’ leverage and maturity. We do 
identical analyses for small and large firms. 
 
In Chapter 5, we investigate the determinants of capital structure for firms in 
developing countries. We initially analyze the firm level economic and financial 
environment determinants of capital structure for all of the firms in the sample. 
Then, we examine whether the determinants are different for small firms. 
Additionally, we apply various robustness tests. We consider the robustness of our 
results by using different definitions of size. Finally, since the majority of the 
previous studies investigate the determinants of capital structure for publicly listed 
companies, we divide the sample into two groups based on the listing status and 
examine whether the determinants are the same for privately held and listed firms. 
 
In Chapter 6, we explore the determinants of the debt maturity structure of firms in 
developing countries. We analyze whether the determinants of debt maturity are 
different for small firms by analysing firm level economic and financial 
environment determinants. Then, we apply robustness tests using different 
definitions of size. We investigate whether the debt maturity structures of privately 
held firms are same as that of small firms since most SMEs are private companies. 
 
1.5. Summary of the findings 
Our main findings are as follows. The leverage and debt maturity levels of firms 
demonstrate differences based on the size, listing status, and the presence of a stock 
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market. We compare the leverage and debt maturity levels of small and large firms 
and privately held and listed companies. We conclude that small and privately held 
firms have lower leverage and shorter maturity of debt when compared to large and 
publicly listed companies. We also find that the existence of a stock market has an 
impact on the leverage and debt maturity levels of firms. Firms in a country with a 
stock market can use more leverage and longer maturity than those firms in 
countries without a stock market. This difference becomes significantly greater for 
small and privately held firms. 
 
In Chapter 5, we analyze the determinants of capital structure in developing 
countries. We find that both firm level economic and financial environment 
determinants have an impact on the leverage decisions of firms. The capital structure 
theories are also portable to small firms, except the pecking order theory. We find 
that small firms are more sensitive to changes in the economic and financial 
environment than larger firms. We confirm the robustness of our results by using 
different definitions of size. As small firms, private firms are more affected by 
changes in the economic and financial environment in their capital structure and 
debt maturity decisions than publicly listed companies. 
 
In Chapter 6, we investigate the determinants of the debt maturity structure. We find 
that firm level economic and financial environment determinants have an impact on 
the debt maturity decisions of firms. We conclude that theories are portable to small 
firms. The main difference between small and large firms is due to the effects of the 
economic and financial environment. When compared to large firms, small firms are 
more sensitive to the changes in the local economic and financial environment. As 
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small firms, the economic and financial environment influences the debt maturity 
decisions of privately held companies. 
 
In conclusion, the main obstacle in the external financing decisions of small firms is 
driven by the economic and financial environment of the country. Since small firms 
do not have access to the international financial markets, their demand for funding 
has to be met in the local environment. Therefore, the alterations in the economic 


































The purpose of this chapter is to review the previous literature regarding the external 
financing decisions of firms and develop our hypotheses accordingly. Firms have 
two kinds of external financing options: debt and equity. This combination of debt 
and equity illustrates the capital structure of a firm. The external financing decisions 
of firms depend upon the firm characteristics, as well as the economic and financial 
environment of a country. As analysed in the previous literature, firm characteristics 
have an impact on the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms. We also 
explore the effect of the economic and financial environment of a country on the 
external financing decisions of firms. 
 
The theory of capital structure begins with Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) 
irrelevance theorem. They propose that in perfect capital markets, the capital 
structure decision, the debt-equity ratio, does not affect the firm value. Based on this 
theory, three main capital structure theories emerged in the literature: Trade-off, 
pecking order, and agency theories. Each theory explores the choice between debt 
and equity. 
 
Trade-off theory proposes that a firm’s optimal debt ratio is determined by a trade-
off between the tax benefits of debt and the cost of bankruptcy. Alternatively, 
according to the pecking order theory, firms follow a pecking order to finance new 
investments. Firms first prefer internal financing, then low risk debt, and, finally, 
equity financing. The agency theory suggests that agency costs (those costs created 
by the conflict of interest between shareholders, managers, and debt holders) 
determine the capital structure. The maturity matching principle proposes that the 
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length of loans should be matched to the length of the life of assets used as 
collateral; therefore, the longer the asset life, the longer the maturity of the debt. 
Based on these theories, we discuss the determinants of capital structure and debt 
maturity and develop the hypotheses. 
 
The empirical literature regarding capital structure discusses the determinants of 
both developed and developing countries. For instance, Titman and Wessels (1988) 
examine the factors for the U.S. companies, while Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
investigate the determinants of capital structure for G-7 countries. Booth et al. 
(2001) analyse the capital structure decisions of firms for ten developing countries. 
Still, all of these studies focus on large listed companies. There are few studies in 
the literature that focus on the financing decisions of SMEs. Hall et al. (2004) 
investigate the cross county differences in SME financing decisions for eight 
European countries, while Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) examine the determinants 
of SMEs in Greece and France. Finally, Bartholdy and Mateus (2008) analyze the 
financing decisions of SMEs for sixteen European countries. However, the main 
focus of these studies is on the SMEs in developed countries, which provide an 
economically and financially developed environment. 
 
The main difference in the financing choices of small and large firms comes from 
their ability to access the external financing. Small firms have limited access to 
external financing due to information asymmetries and agency problems. When 
compared to large firms, it is difficult for creditors to assess the quality and value of 
the small firms’ investment opportunities due to information asymmetries. Small 
firms have a close nature as they have fewer disclosure requirements and are not 
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required to provide audited financial statements (Pettit & Singer, 1985). Another 
issue is the agency problem between managers and creditors. In general, managers 
and owners are the same person in the small firms; therefore, managers may be 
inclined to act in their own interest and misallocate funds as opposed to focusing on 
the interests of creditors (Denis, 2004). Thus, information opacity and agency 
problems limit small firms’ access to external financing. 
 
As small firms, privately held firms also have a closed structure. Unlike publicly 
listed companies, they do not have to provide information to stock exchanges and 
credit agencies. They are not required to disclose as much information as publicly 
listed companies. As such, they are not as transparent as publicly listed companies. 
When compared to listed companies, privately held companies have limited and 
more costly access to external financing due to information opacity. 
 
In addition to the characteristics of small and privately held firms, external financing 
decisions are not solely dependent upon firm choice. There are external factors that 
limit the availability of external financing in a country, especially for developing 
countries. This limited availability of external financing may be due to the scarcity 
of external funds in developing countries due to unstable macroeconomic policies. 
Since SMEs do not have access to international financial markets, local instabilities 
may limit access to financing for those firms in developing countries. In addition to 
macroeconomic policies, the previous literature also discusses the impact of the 
financial environment on the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999; Fan et al., 2011). The financial 
environment of a country is important since the quality and efficiency of this 
 26
environment influences the availability of external financing. Since developing 
countries are not as economically and financially as developed as developed 
countries, the external financing decisions of firms may be different than firms in 
developed countries. Therefore, we examine the determinants of capital structure 
and debt maturity decisions of firms, focusing not only the impact of firm level 
determinants, but also on the effect of the economic and financial environment of a 
country. 
 
The determinants that we apply are grouped under three headings including firm 
level, economic environment, and financial environment determinants. Firm level 
variables used are asset tangibility, profitability, and size. We explain them in 
accordance with each of the theories. We also discuss their effect on small and large 
firms. Economic environment variables include GDP per capita, growth, inflation, 
interest, and tax. Financial environment determinants consist of corruption, legal 
systems, financial institutions, and financial globalization. 
 
In this chapter, we review the literature regarding capital structure. First, we explain 
capital structure theory including trade-off theory, pecking order theory, and agency 
theory. As a second step, we discuss the determinants of capital structure based on 
previous empirical literature both for developed and developing countries. We also 
review the empirical literature on SMEs and their capital structure decisions. Then, 
we explain how the economic environment of a country impacts the financing 
decisions of firms. Finally, we present the factors of financial environment and their 
effects on the financing decisions of firms. 
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2.2. Capital Structure Theory 
Capital structure demonstrates how a firm finances its assets through some 
combination of equity and debt. The firm’s capital structure is actually the structure 
of its liabilities, mix of debt, and equity. The properties of debt and equity illustrate 
some differences. Debt is a contract between lenders and borrowers. By a debt 
contract, borrowers accept to pay a fixed amount contingent upon not defaulting.  
This property makes debt insensitive to firm performance. The returns of debt 
financing for lenders do not fluctuate with changes in a company’s profit level; it is 
fixed. Therefore, lenders do not face financial risk. The debt is a low cost contract 
that permits a large degree of control by the borrower, while it provides little 
incentive to lenders for selecting and monitoring the projects ultimately financed. 
This makes debt contracts accurately priced when compared to equity in situations 
involving asymmetric information. Moreover, interest paid for debt is tax deductible 
decreasing the effective cost of debt. Conversely, debt has some disadvantages. A 
higher debt ratio makes firms appear risky. Therefore risky firms must pay higher 
interest rates increasing the cost of their debt. Since debt contracts are binding, it 
may drive the firm to bankruptcy. This bankruptcy cost limits the amount of debt 
financing. 
 
The theory of capital structure begins with the capital structure irrelevance 
proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958). They explain that in perfect capital 
markets, the financing decisions of firms have no effect on their value. They confirm 
that in the absence of bankruptcy costs, corporate income taxation, or other market 
imperfections, firm value is independent of its financial structure in competitive 
capital markets. They have two propositions under these conditions. First, they infer 
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that the value of a company is not dependent upon its capital structure. Additionally, 
the cost of a leveraged firm is the same as the cost of equity for an unleveraged firm. 
Therefore, according to them, the debt-to-equity ratio has no impact on the total 
value of a firm. However, based on this theory, within the literature there are three 
main theories of capital structure: the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and 
the agency theory. In the following sections, we first explain the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) theorem, and then discuss the trade-off, pecking order, and agency 
theories, respectively. 
 
2.2.1. Modigliani and Miller theorem 
The Modigliani and Miller theorem (1958), also known as the capital structure 
irrelevance principle, states that in perfect capital markets, firm value is not affected 
by financing decisions surrounding it. According to this theory, the value of a firm is 
not dependent upon its capital structure in competitive capital markets in the absence 
of bankruptcy costs, corporate income taxation, or other market imperfections. Thus, 
the financing choice of a firm, either debt or equity, does not make any difference in 
the firm’s value. They have two propositions under these conditions. According to 
Proposition I, the value of a company is not dependent on its capital structure. They 
came to this conclusion by using the following assumptions:  
• Capital markets are perfect; there are no transaction costs and taxes  
• Bankruptcy cost does not exist 
• Firms and individuals can borrow at the same rate 
• Debt is risk free and the interest rate on debt is risk free debt 
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• Financing decisions do not affect investing decisions 
Let’s suppose that we have two identical firms, but their capital structures are 
different. Firm U is financed strictly by equity, while the Firm L is financed by a 
mix of equity and debt. According to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, the 
value of these two firms (Firm U and L) is equal. Hence:  
 
Proposition I: VU = VL where VU is the value of Firm U, financed solely with equity, 
and VL is the value of Firm L, financed partly by equity and partly by debt. The cost 
of a leveraged firm is the same as the cost of equity for an unleveraged firm. The 
debt-to-equity ratio has no impact on the total value of the firm. Consequently, 
according to Proposition I, the capital structure of a firm does not have an impact on 
the value of the firm. 
 
Proposition II, a derivation of Proposition I, proposes that the return on equity has a 
linear relationship with leverage. In this proposition, the return on equity capital is 
an increasing function of leverage. The required rate of return increases as the firms’ 
debt to equity ratio boosts. This is because debt financing raises the riskiness of the 
firm. Therefore, the equity holders demand higher required return on equity due to 
the higher risk involved in a company with debt. 
 
Proposition II: 
0 0/ ( )e dk k D E k k= + −  
ke is the required rate of return or cost of equity 
k0 is the company unlevered cost of capital (i.e., assume no leverage) 
kd is the required rate of return on borrowings or cost of debt 
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D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio. 
Thus, according to Proposition II, the cost of equity for a leveraged firm is the same 
as the cost of equity for an unleveraged firm, plus an added premium financial risk. 
 
In conclusion, by assuming perfect capital markets, Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
propose that the value of a company is independent of its capital structure. However, 
in the real world, capital markets are not perfect and capital structure matters in the 
financing decisions of firms. The Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem is important 
as it indicates where to look for determinants of capital structure. Beginning with 
this theory in the literature, there are three main theories of capital structure (i.e., the 
trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and the agency theory). Each has tried to 
provide an explanation for the choice between debt and equity finance. 
 
2.2.2. Trade-off theory 
The trade-off theory claims that a firm’s optimal debt ratio is determined by a trade-
off between the losses and gains of borrowing, holding the firm’s assets and 
investment plans constant (Brennan & Schwartz, 1978; DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980; Bradley et al., 1984). The goal is to maximize firm value. For that reason, debt 
and equity are used as substitutes. The starting point of the trade-off theory is the 
debate over the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem. If corporate income tax was 
included in the irrelevance proposition of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) model, it 
would produce an advantage for debt in terms of tax shields. Since there is no 
offsetting cost of debt and the objective function of the firm is linear, firms can be 
financed by 100% debt. Due to this extreme situation, bankruptcy costs are used to 
offset the cost of debt. According to this argument, optimal leverage is defined as a 
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trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and bankruptcy costs (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1977). Firms could choose debt because it is tax 
deductible, even though it increases the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress. 
Basically, bankruptcy costs increase with the degree of leverage. 
 
Trade-off theory is divided into two parts: static trade-off theory and dynamic trade-
off theory. Static trade-off theory assumes that firms target their capital structure. 
Firms determine their financing needs based on the optimal capital structure. If the 
leverage ratio departs from the optimal choice, the firm will alter its financing 
attitude back to the optimal level. Unlike the static trade-off theory, the dynamic 
trade-off theory considers the expectations and adjustment costs. The correct 
financing decision depends upon the financing margin that the firm predicts in the 
next period. The optimal capital structure choice today is based on what is expected 
to be optimal in the next period. The optimal capital structure in the next period 
could be either generating new funds or paying them out. If new funds are 
generated, they may be in the form of debt or equity. In each case, the optimal 
capital structure in the next period will aid in pinning down a relevant comparison 
for the firm in the current period. 
 
In the literature, to test the trade-off theory, different proxies are used such as asset 
tangibility, profitability and firm size. The trade-off theory assumes that these three 
proxies, asset tangibility, profitability, and firm size, increase the leverage of firms. 
Tangible assets can be used as collateral. Therefore, the higher the collateral, the 
higher the leverage that firms may have. Consequently, this theory expects a positive 
relation between debt financing and tangibility. Profitability and firm size are also 
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expected to be positively related to leverage. Profitable firms should prefer debt to 
benefit from tax shields. Also, in many asymmetric information models such as Ross 
(1977), profitable firms are suggested to have higher leverage. Firm size is accepted 
as a proxy for bankruptcy cost. The probability of bankruptcy for large firms is 
lower as compared to small firms since they have higher fixed assets. Thus, large 
firms have more debt than small firms as firm size is positively related to leverage. 
 
2.2.3. Pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and states that 
capital structure is driven by a firm's desire to finance new investments, first 
internally, then with low risk debt, and finally, if all else fails, with equity. Unlike 
the trade-off theory, this theory does not offer optimal capital structure. However, it 
demonstrates the preference of firms’ use of internal financing as opposed to 
external financing. The pecking order theory begins with asymmetric information, 
asserting that firm managers or insiders have more knowledge about the company’s 
value, prospects, and risks than outside investors. The theory discusses the 
relationship between asymmetric information and investment and financing 
decisions. Asymmetric information has an effect on the choice between internal and 
external financing; in other words, the choice between use of debt or equity. 
According to this theory, informational asymmetry increases the leverage of the firm 
to the same extent. Firms are likely to have funding with the lowest degree of 
asymmetric information. Since outside lenders do not have complete information 
about the borrower, they will increase the cost of borrowing. Therefore, to minimize 
the cost of borrowing, firms prefer to use internal funds first, then debt, and, only as 
a last resort, outside equity. The pecking order appears as managers do not prefer to 
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dilute existing shareholders’ claims. As such, only overvalued securities are issued. 
External investors, by considering this possibility, reduce the firm’s value to show 
adverse selection costs.  
 
The standard pecking order theory demonstrates a particular case of the adverse 
selection discussion regarding external financing. Akerlof (1970) proposes adverse 
selection and discusses the reasons for the significant decrease in the price of used 
cars as compared to new cars. The seller of the used car has more information about 
the performance of the car than the buyer. Therefore, the buyer’s best guess of the 
performance of the car would be the average. The buyer expects that if the car is 
proposed in the market, the performance of the car must be below the average. 
Hence, the price of used cars drop and cars that are proposed for sale are the ones 
that are not well made or maintained. Buyers look for discounts to compensate for 
the possibility that they might purchase an Akerlof (1970) lemon. In this case, the 
seller knows about any problems with the car, but the buyer does not. This is true for 
companies, as well. In a firm, managers have better knowledge about the true value 
of the company than outsiders do. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) find that the adverse 
selection cost of debt arises when lenders know the mean, but not the variable of the 
borrowers’ investment. Myers and Majluf (1984) confirm that adverse selection 
costs are always higher for equity than debt issues. As such, issuing equity is never 
optimal. There is a wedge between the cost of internal and external finance. Since 
markets are imperfect, information problems result in adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems for external financing. This wedge also results from adverse 
selection problems and the associated lemons premium. Among the three sources of 
funding, retained earnings is the only one that does not have adverse selection 
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issues. Debt has only minor adverse selection problems, while equity exposes a firm 
to significant adverse selection issues. Outside investors see equity as riskier than 
debt because the adverse selection risk premium is high on equity. Therefore, 
outside investors request higher returns on equity than debt. Alternatively, for 
managers or insiders, retained earnings are a better source of financing than debt and 
debt is better than equity. 
 
In contrast, Ross (1977) argued that capital structure could be used as a signal of 
private information. Therefore, the capital structure choice of a firm is taken as a 
signalling factor by outsiders about the information of insiders. High debt levels 
signal good firm quality. When bankruptcy costs are low enough, managers are able 
to issue debt and commit to higher cash flow. For lower quality firms, since their 
expected bankruptcy costs are high at any debt level, it is not possible for their 
managers to imitate higher quality firms by issuing more debt. However, due to the 
asymmetric information and signalling problems associated with external financing, 
the financing choices of firms follow an order, with a preference for internal over 
external finance and for debt over equity. As a result, the main point of this theory is 
financial market imperfections. Transaction costs and asymmetric information link 
the firm's ability to undertake new investments to its internally generated funds. 
 
In the previous literature, some proxies are used to test the pecking order theory, 
such as asset tangibility, profitability, and firm size. The trade-off theory also 
assumes a positive relation between asset tangibility and leverage. Since tangible 
assets can be used as collateral and collateral mitigates information asymmetry 
problems, we expect positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. 
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Profitability is expected to be negatively related to leverage. As Myers and Majluf 
(1984) proposed that firms follow the pecking order, they prefer to use internal 
funds first. That’s why we expect a negative association between profitability and 
leverage. Firm size is expected to be positively related to leverage. Large firms are 
generally more diversified and have less volatile earnings. Lower earnings volatility 
mitigates the asymmetric information problem. Large firms have been on the 
markets for a while and they are better known. They have better reputations in the 
debt markets as they face lower information costs when borrowing as compared to 
small firms. 
 
2.2.4. Agency theory 
Agency theory focuses on the costs that are created due to conflicts of interest 
between shareholders, managers, and debt holders. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), capital structures are determined by agency costs. They find that 
optimal capital structure is the result of the trade-off between the benefit (discipline 
of management) and cost (excess risk-taking by shareholders) of debt financing. 
Following the Jensen and Meckling model (1976), other models, such as Harris and 
Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990), emerge based on agency costs. In their models, the 
conflicts between managers and shareholders occur due to disagreements over 
operating decisions. Harris and Raviv (1990) infer that even if shareholders or debt 
holders prefer liquidation of the firm, managers always choose to continue the firm's 
business. This model provides rights to shareholders to force liquidation if cash 
flows are poor. Alternatively, Stulz (1990) assumes that managers always prefer to 
invest all usable funds even if paying out cash is better for shareholders. However, 
debt constrains the amount of free cash flow available for profitable payments. 
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Therefore, according to these models, capital structure is determined by the conflicts 
of interest between inside and outside investors. The nature of the firm's assets and 
growth opportunities are crucial factors in the importance of these agency costs. 
 
Asset tangibility may also be a proxy for agency theory. Agency theory proposes 
that a higher amount of collateral reduces the risk of lenders who suffer the agency 
costs of debt, like risk shifting. Large amount of tangible assets or collateral reduce 
the risk shifting problem; therefore, firms can increase their borrowing capacity. 
Moreover, it also eliminates the moral hazard issue caused by the shareholder and 
lenders conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, this theory expects a positive 
relation between asset tangibility and leverage. Firm size has a positive impact on 
leverage. Since larger firms are more mature firms, they have reputation in debt 
markets; as such, they face lower agency costs of debt. 
 
Although the theories try to explain the choice between debt and equity, there is still 
no clear cut definition. There is still no single model available to test all the theories, 
as well as the differences among theories. As demonstrated above, the variables that 
are used as proxies are included in the models to test the theories, but the same 
proxy can explain more than one theory. However, it is still not clear which theory 
firms should follow in their capital structure decisions. 
 
2.3. Empirical Literature on Capital Structure 
The related empirical literature has discussed the determinants of capital structure 
for both developed and developing countries. The factors that affect the firms' debt-
equity choice have been empirically discussed based on the attributes that different 
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capital structure theories propose. For developed countries, the determinants of 
capital structure are analysed both within a country and across countries (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales 1995; Gianetti, 2003). Titman and Wessels (1988) 
consider the factors that affect the financing decisions of firms in the U.S. They 
define the factors as assets structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, 
industry classification, size, earnings volatility, and profitability.1 They find that 
leverage is positively related to size, but negatively related to uniqueness and 
profitability; whereas, asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, industry 
classification, and earnings volatility have no effect on leverage. They note a 
negative association between profitability and leverage due to the transaction costs 
This finding is consistent with the pecking order theory that firms prefer internal to 
external financing. Across countries, Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine the 
determinants of capital structure across G-7 countries by studying four factors: asset 
tangibility (the ratio of fixed to total assets), the market-to-book ratio, firm size, and 
profitability. They note a negative relationship between leverage and market-to-book 
and profitability, while they find positive relation between leverage and asset 
tangibility and size. 
 
Alternatively, some studies examine the variables that affect capital structure 
decisions in developing countries (Booth et al., 2001; Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996; 1998). Booth et al. (2001) analyse the financial leverage 
decisions of listed companies from 1980-1990 across 10 developing countries 
including India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, 
Jordan, and Korea. Their variables are chosen based on the theoretical models of 
                                                 
1  Uniqueness defined as research and development expenditures. 
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capital structure: the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and the agency 
theory. They find that size has a positive effect on leverage, while the average tax 
rate, asset tangibility, the return on assets, or profitability have negative effects on 
leverage. For market-to-book and business risk, they could not find any overall 
significance.2 
 
Previous empirical studies in capital structure have focused more on large listed 
firms. The literature on SMEs is limited due to the unavailability of data. There are a 
number of studies that examine small and medium size enterprises (Ang, 1991; 
Holmes and Kent, 1991; Cosh and Hughes, 1994; Acs and Isberg, 1996; Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008). 
Some of these studies have discussed only the applicability of the capital structure 
theories (e.g., trade-off, pecking order, and agency theories) to the small firms. 
Other studies analyse the economic and financial environment of a country, in 
addition to the applicability of the capital structure theories. 
 
Few studies have examined the applicability of the capital structure theories to small 
firms. Based on these studies, the capital structure decisions of SMEs are in 
accordance with the pecking order theory (Ang, 1991; Holmes and Kent, 1991; Cosh 
and Hughes, 1994), but in contrast to the trade-off theory (Pettit and Singer, 1985). 
According to the trade-off theory, higher profitability decreases the expected costs 
of distress and allows firms to increase their tax benefits by raising leverage. 
Therefore, firms should prefer debt financing because of the tax benefit. This theory 
may be applicable for large firms, which are more likely to generate high profits. 
                                                 
2 Business risk is measured as the standard deviation of the return on assets. 
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But for small firms, because they are less likely to have high profits, they may not 
have the option to choose debt financing for the tax shields advantage (Pettit and 
Singer, 1985). 
 
In contrast, small firms’ financing decisions are expected to be in accordance with 
the pecking order theory. As the theory explains, firms prefer internal over external 
financing and debt over equity. Since small firms are opaque and have important 
adverse selection problems that are explained by credit rationing, they bear high 
information costs (Psillaki, 1995). These costs are very high when issuing new 
capital, but for internal funds, the costs are nonexistent. Alternatively, for debt 
financing, the costs are in an intermediate position between equity and internal 
funds. Therefore, small firms prefer debt over equity to finance their new 
investments. Another reason for this preference may be the control over the firm. 
Since small firms are run by a few managers, they may not want to lose or reduce 
their control and decision-making power of the firm (Hamilton and Fox, 1998). 
They perceive debt financing as a lower level of intrusion with lower risks of losing 
control and decision making power than equity. 
 
Agency and asymmetric information problems are also more complex for small 
firms (Pettit and Singer, 1985). As managers are largely the owners in small firms, 
there are no or very few agency costs of equity. However, agency conflicts between 
shareholders and lenders can be particularly severe (Van der Wijst, 1989; Ang, 
1992). Small firms may face agency problems as the managers may have an 
incentive to misallocate their funds and to behave contrary to the interest of creditors 
(Denis, 2004). Also due to asymmetric information, outside investors have difficulty 
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in analysing the quality and value of the firm’s investment opportunities. Insiders 
have more information about the prospects of the firm. One of the reasons for this 
information asymmetry is that small firms have fewer disclosure requirements; 
therefore, they generally have a close nature (Pettit and Singer, 1985). Additionally, 
the quality of information provided by small firms varies. Small firms are not 
required to provide audited financial statements to external investors (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). Even though investors may prefer audited financial statements, small 
firms may want to avoid these costs or the small firm’s managers or staff may not be 
able to come up with useful information (Ang, 1991). This information opacity is 
seen as the main reason for small firms’ inability to issue publicly traded securities 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). When compared to large firms, they have different 
problems, such as shorter expected life, presence of estate tax, intergenerational 
transfer problems, and prevalence of implicit contracts (Ang, 1992). As a result, 
small firms have a higher probability of insolvency than large firms. They are seen 
as risky (Berryman, 1982). Capital structure choices of SMEs are expected to 
demonstrate greater variability as compared to large firms (Hall et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the applicability of the theory to small firms can be different. 
 
As small firms, the external financing decisions of privately held companies might 
display differences when compared to publicly listed companies. Publicly listed 
companies are obliged to provide information to the stock exchange. Additionally, 
newspapers observe them on a regular basis as opposed to privately held firms who 
only present an annual report once a year. Listed firms must provide accessible, 
credible information to the public. They also prepare information for the credit 
agencies. Moreover, they incur the high fixed costs of being listed. Therefore, this 
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disclosure makes listed companies more transparent, so that they incur lower costs 
of debt than privately held firms. That may be one of the reasons why privately held 
firms borrow from a bank rather than financial markets and for listed firms to easily 
access financial markets. Therefore, because of these factors and fixed transaction 
costs of long-term debt, privately held firms would be expected to have more 
problems accessing long-term debt and financial markets. Consequently, we can 
expect that small firms and privately held companies would have more short-term 
debt than large firms and publicly listed companies. 
 
Previous studies indicate that country specific factors have an impact on the external 
financing decisions of firms. The studies demonstrate the challenges faced by SMEs 
while accessing outside financing and find that country specific factors, such as 
creditor rights and legal efficiency, have an impact. Beck et al. (2008) find that 
small firms are the most credit constrained due to underdeveloped financial and 
legal systems and higher corruption. Bushman et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2001) 
confirm that firms in common law countries are more transparent than firms in civil 
law countries. Morck et al. (2000) find that markets in countries with poorer investor 
protection and less developed financial systems have higher volatility. Following 
Morck et al. (2000), Jin and Myers (2006) propose a new theory by expanding 
Myers’ (2000) to conditions where firms have opaqueness. They report that a lack of 
transparency is inclined to boost the cost of raising equity and lessens the cost of 
financial distress. Hence, this lack of transparency forces firms to depend more 
heavily on internal funds or debt capital to meet their financing needs. Alternatively, 
Brush and Chaganti (1998) find that ownership structure and creditors’ rights 
protection have a significant positive impact on the size and performance of SMEs. 
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Moreover, borrowing and lending decisions and the attitude of business decision 
makers toward outsiders may demonstrate variation between countries. Lending is 
also related to the attitudes of financial institutions towards SMEs which are driven 
by risk considerations. Basically, information opacity is the major reason for small 
firms’ inability to access to external financing, especially equity financing. Small 
firms are much more dependent upon bank financing. Since banks are able to 
examine the quality of small business by using tools, such as screening, contracting, 
and monitoring, they are able to address agency and information asymmetry 
problems (Berger and Udell, 1995, 1998). 
 
Thus far, the capital structure decisions of SMEs have been studied for a single 
country (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Bartholdy and 
Mateus, 2005) or using cross country comparisons (Hall et al., 2004; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008). Hall et al. (2004) examine the cross 
country differences in SMEs capital structure for eight European countries including 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK. They 
infer that the reason for cross country differences in SMEs capital structure is due to 
the firm specific, rather than country specific, effects. In accordance with Hall et al. 
(2004), Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) support the effect of firm specific factors in 
the capital structure determinants of SMEs for France and Greece. The firms 
included in both studies are only small and medium size companies that have less 
than 250 employees. In contrast, Bartholdy and Mateus (2008) investigate the 
capital structure decision of SMEs for the period 1994-2004 for sixteen Western 
European countries. As opposed to the other studies, they conclude that country 
specific factors, such as law, regulation, and macroeconomic factors, have also an 
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impact on leverage decisions. Additionally, they find that the traditional financing 
theories (trade-off and pecking order) seem to hold for SMEs in an international 
setting. In addition to the above mentioned studies, they also include unlisted large 
companies. Yet, as in previous studies, their main focus is on privately held firms. 
 
Most studies on the capital structure decisions of SMEs have focused on the 
developed countries in Europe. Those studies only concentrate on unlisted SMEs, 
with the exception of Bartholdy and Mateus (2008). Bartholdy and Mateus (2008) 
also take unlisted large companies into consideration, but their study is limited to 
privately held firms. Moreover, those studies discussed above consider only 
European countries. Alternatively, there have been other studies that have examined 
the capital structure decisions of firms for both developed and developing countries 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). Rajan and Zingales (1995) study the 
capital structure decisions of large listed companies for G-7 countries, while Booth 
et al. (2001) analyse the financial leverage decisions of listed companies for ten 
developing countries. But those studies only include large listed companies (public 
companies). Since most large listed firms from any country are also one of the 
players in international trade, they may easily have access to international financial 
markets and institutions. Therefore, it could be misleading to generalize the results 
of these studies for each firm, especially for SMEs. However, the studies for SMEs 
only consider those specific countries that are similar in their economic and financial 
environment. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish the economic and financial 
environment effects. In the light of this, we will first examine the leverage and debt 
maturity levels of firms and then investigate the capital structure decisions of firms 
for both small and large firms. The countries that we include in the sample are 
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emerging market countries from different regions. The countries included have 
different levels of financial development. Therefore, we can observe more 
accurately whether firm-specific or economic and financial environment factors 
have an impact on the capital structure decisions of firms. 
 
Therefore, we examine these determinants and develop our hypotheses. First, we 
investigate the impact of size and listing status on leverage and the debt maturity 
levels of firms. Next, we discuss firm level determinants and their relationship to 
capital structure and debt maturity, including the separation between small and large 
firms. Then, we analyze the relation between the economic environment and the 
capital structure and debt maturity of firms. Finally, we look into the association 
between the financial environment of a country and the leverage and debt maturity 
structures of firms. While developing the hypotheses, we focus on the related 




Since some firms are more transparent and provide more reliable information, 
lenders are more willing to finance them. In contrast, when some firms have 
information asymmetry and adverse selection problems due to their opaqueness, it 
becomes difficult for them to access external financing. Therefore, some firms enjoy 
greater financing through external resources when compared to others. This 
difference may be due to the size of the firms and their listing status. Hence, we 
expect that: 
Hypothesis 1: Small firms are less levered than large firms. 
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Hypothesis 2: Privately held companies have lower leverage than listed 
firms. 
The difference in leverage levels of the firms might come from the financial 
environment of the country. For instance, the existence of a stock market in a 
country has an effect on the external financing decisions of firms. Since the stock 
market is another provider of external financing, it increases the availability of 
external financing in that country. Therefore, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms in countries with a stock market will be more levered 
than the firms in countries without a stock market. 
 
2.3.2. Debt maturity 
For debt maturity, we use three proxies: long-term debt to total assets, short-term 
debt to total assets, and long-term debt to total debt. Maturity of the debt depends on 
the riskiness of the firm. Lenders do not prefer to offer long-term debt if the firms 
carry high risk. This is especially applicable to small firms. Small firms are mostly 
owned and run by the owner of the company, so the agency conflict between 
shareholders and lenders is expected to be severe (Van der Wijst, 1989; Ang, 1992). 
Moreover, due to their opaqueness, they have higher levels of information 
asymmetry and adverse selection problems. Therefore, their maturity would be 
shorter. Hence, we expect: 
  
 Hypothesis 4: Small firms have shorter maturity than large firms. 
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Publicly listed companies have to provide information regularly to the stock 
exchange. They are more transparent and they have better information disclosure 
making it easier to get information about the prospects of listed companies. As a 
result, lenders are more willing to provide longer maturities to them as compared to 
privately owned firms. Hence, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Privately held companies have shorter maturity than publicly 
listed companies. 
 
The financial environment of a country might also have an impact on the debt 
maturity of firms. For example, the existence of a stock market increases the 
availability of financing in that country; therefore, more external financing becomes 
available for firms. Thus, the maturity may be longer. We expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Firms in a country with a stock market have longer maturity 
than firms in a country without a stock market. 
 
2.3.3. Firm level factors 
In this section, we explain the firm level proxies used in relation to the capital 
structure theory. The firm level proxies that we use are asset tangibility, 
profitability, and size. Previous literature discusses other firm level proxies, but in 
this study, we could not include them due to the unavailability of data. For that 
reason, in this section, we only focus on the factors that we will apply and their 
possible differential impact on small versus large firms and publicly listed 
companies versus privately held firms. 
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2.3.1.1. Asset Tangibility 
As discussed by capital structure theories, the type of asset a firm owns in some way 
has an impact on the capital structure choice of that firm. Scott (1977) proposes that 
debt, secured by property with known values, allows firms to increase their equity 
value by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured creditors. Alternatively, 
according to Myers and Majluf (1984), issuing securities may be costly as firms' 
managers have better information than investors. Thus, by issuing secured debt, they 
can avoid these costs. For this reason, firms that can use their assets as collateral 
may be expected to issue more debt. Since fixed assets are used as collateral, firms 
with a large amount of fixed assets should have greater borrowing capacity and, 
therefore, can maintain higher debt levels while decreasing expected bankruptcy 
costs. 
 
Tangible assets are important since they are used as collateral making it easier for 
firms to reach debt financing. Collateral becomes vital when firms are opaque and 
managers have more information about the prospects of the company than investors 
or debtors. Since debtors want to secure their debts, they ask for higher amounts of 
collateral. Therefore, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Small firms have more tangible assets than large firms. 
 
As small companies, privately held companies are not as transparent as publicly held 
companies and the information about the prospects of the company are not as readily 
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available as in the case of listed companies. Therefore, debtors might ask for higher 
collateral to be able to secure the debt. Hence, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 10: Privately held companies have higher levels of tangible 
assets than publicly listed companies. 
 
The financial environment of the country might also have an effect on the level of 
tangible assets that a firm has. For instance, if a country does not have a stock 
market, the only external financing source would be debt financing for these firms. 
Firms in those countries without a stock market should have higher levels of 
tangible assets to be able to borrow. Hence, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 11: Firms in countries without a stock market have higher 
tangible assets than firms in countries with a stock market. 
 
According to the trade-off theory, firms would prefer debt over equity until the point 
where the probability of financial distress becomes important. The type of assets that 
a firm has determines the cost of financial distress. For instance, if a firm invests 
largely in land, equipment, and other tangible assets, it will have smaller costs of 
financial distress than a firm relying on intangible assets. Therefore, when a firm 
possesses more tangible assets, lenders should be more willing to extend them credit 
and leverage should be higher (Scott, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1990). Furthermore, 
according to the agency theory, a greater amount of collateral decreases the risk of 
the lender suffering agency costs associated with debt, like risk shifting. Through 
collateral, lenders are protected from the moral hazard problem caused by the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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Consequently, firms with a high ratio of fixed assets should have greater borrowing 
capacity. Most empirical studies have found a positive relationship between asset 
tangibility and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Ozkan, 2002). Therefore, we expect positive correlation between asset tangibility 
and leverage for all firms. Alternatively, firms with large holdings of tangible assets 
may already have a constant source of return, offering them more internally 
generated funds and discouraging them from turning to external financing. As such, 
we would expect a negative relationship between leverage and asset tangibility as 
firms with more tangible assets appear to prefer using internal funds generated from 
these assets. Moreover, according to the maturity matching principle, the length of 
the loans should be matched to the length of the life of the assets used as collateral 
(Myers, 1977). Thus, long-term assets should be financed with long-term debt 
(Booth et al., 2001). We would expect debt maturity to increase with asset 
tangibility. 
 
The previous empirical literature finds a positive correlation between asset 
tangibility and leverage and debt maturity for large firms. The limited literature on 
small firms also supports this positive relationship between asset tangibility and 
leverage and debt maturity (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Michaelas et al., 1999; 
Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Therefore, we expect positive association 
between asset tangibility and leverage and debt maturity for both large and small 
firms and publicly listed and private firms in accordance with the trade-off, pecking 
order, and agency theories. 
 
Hypothesis 12a: Leverage is positively related with asset tangibility. 
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a. Leverage of large firms is positively related with asset tangibility. 
b. Leverage of small firms is positively related with asset tangibility. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with asset 
tangibility. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with asset 
tangibility. 
Hypothesis 12b: Debt maturity is positively related with asset tangibility. 
a. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with asset 
tangibility. 
b. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with asset 
tangibility. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with asset 
tangibility. 




The profitability of the firms is important since it is another source of funding. 
Profitable firms can use their own internal sources to finance themselves. 
Furthermore, it is easier to access debt financing for profitable firms since the 
bankruptcy risk of those firms is lower. Therefore, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 13: Large firms are more profitable than small firms. 
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We do not expect any significant difference between privately held and publicly 
held firms. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 14: The profitability of publicly held firms is the same as 
publicly listed firms. 
 
The profits level might also be different for firms in countries with a stock market 
and firms in countries without a stock market. Since countries that have a stock 
market are more financially developed, the efficiency and profitability of the firms 
operating in those countries should be higher. Therefore, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 15: Firms in countries with a stock market have higher 
profitability than firms without a stock market. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms prefer financing their new investment 
from retained earnings first, from debt second, and from issuing new equity third. 
Firms choose to follow this order due to either asymmetric information or 
transaction costs. In both cases, the past profitability of a firm and their retained 
earnings should be an important determinant in the firm's capital structure. Since 
firms prefer internal to external financing, one would expect a negative correlation 
between profitability and leverage (Harris and Raviv 1991; Rajan and Zingales 
1995; Booth et al. 2001). On the other hand, according to the trade-off theory, 
leverage and profitability are expected to be positively related. Higher profitability 
lowers the expected costs of distress; therefore, firms increase their leverage to take 
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advantage of tax benefits. As such, the sign of the relationship will help distinguish 
which theory is supported. 
 
Most studies have noted a negative relationship as proposed by the pecking order 
theory, including Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et 
al. (2001). The studies about SMEs also confirm the pecking order relationship (Van 
der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Since the managers of small firms 
are also the owners of the company, they would prefer to maintain control over their 
firms (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998) and do not want to accept 
new shareholders. Therefore, they prefer to utilize internal financing to finance firm 
activity. Hence, we would expect to find a negative correlation between profitability 
and leverage and debt maturity for all types of firms in accordance with the pecking 
order theory. 
 
Hypothesis 16: Leverage is negatively related with profitability. 
a. Leverage of small firms is negatively related with profitability. 
b. Leverage of large firms is negatively related with profitability. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is negatively related with 
profitability. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is negatively related with 
profitability. 
 
Hypothesis 17: Debt maturity is negatively related with profitability. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is negatively related with profitability. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is negatively related with profitability. 
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c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is negatively related with 
profitability. 




Size may be inversely related to the probability of bankruptcy as well as to the cost 
of issuing debt and equity. Large firms are comparatively more diversified and fail 
less often. This suggests that large firms should be highly leveraged. In contrast, 
when compared to large firms, small firms pay much more for issuing equity (Smith, 
1977) and long-term debt. Therefore, small firms may have more short-term debt 
than large firms. They may choose to borrow short-term rather than long-term debt 
due to the lower fixed costs of short-term debt. Thus, we can expect a positive 
correlation between long-term debt and size; whereas, short-term debt would be 
inversely related to size (Hall et al, 2004). 
 
According to the trade-off theory, firm size may be an inverse proxy for the 
probability of bankruptcy costs. Larger firms are likely to be more diversified and 
fail less often. They can lower costs (relative to firm value) in the occasion of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, size has a positive effect on leverage. The pecking order 
theory also expects this positive relationship. Since large firms are diverse and have 
less volatile earnings, the asymmetric information problem can be mitigated. Size is 
expected to have positive impact on leverage and debt maturity. We expect small 
firms to be negatively related with leverage and debt maturity, while large firms are 
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positively related to leverage and debt maturity in accordance with both the trade-off 
and pecking order theories. 
 
Hypothesis 18: Leverage is positively related with size. 
Hypothesis 19: Debt maturity is positively related with size. 
 
2.3.2. Economic environment factors 
In the previous section, we discuss the impact of firm level variables on the capital 
and debt maturity structures of firms in accordance with the theories. However, the 
financing decision is not only dependent upon the firms’ decision. There are external 
factors, such as the economic environment, that have an effect on the availability of 
external financing in a country. The economic environment of a country plays a 
significant role in the firms’ financing decisions, especially for developing countries. 
It is well known that external financing in developing countries is scarce when 
compared to developed countries due to unstable macro policies. Therefore, a 
government’s decisions regarding fiscal and monetary policies have a direct impact 
on the economic environment of the country and, as a result, on the capital and debt 
maturity decisions of firms. By using fiscal policy, governments influence the level 
of aggregate demand in the economy in an effort to achieve the economic objectives 
of price stability and economic growth. Alternatively, governments may use 
monetary policy to stabilize the economy by controlling interest rates and the supply 
of money. Thus, fiscal policy decisions have an effect on the tax rates, while 
monetary policy decisions influence the rate of inflation and interest rates. For 
instance, changes in corporate tax rates have a direct effect on the capital and debt 
maturity structure decisions of firms due to the tax shields (Modigliani and Miller, 
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1963; Miller, 1977). Moreover, interest rates are determined by monetary policies 
that have a direct impact on the cost of borrowing and, therefore, on the capital and 
debt maturity decisions of firms. High inflation in developing countries may have an 
effect on the scarcity of debt financing, especially in the long term. Hence, the 
economic development of a country affects the capital and debt maturity structure 
decisions of its firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). 
 
Previous studies also confirm that capital and debt maturity structure decisions are 
not only dependent upon firm specific factors, but also on country specific variables. 
Gaud et al. (2007) examine the capital structure decisions of listed firms in Europe 
and conclude that the trade-off and pecking order theories are not sufficient to 
explain the capital structure decisions in Europe. They demonstrate that the national 
environment does matter in capital structure decisions. Fan et al. (2011) investigate 
the capital and debt maturity choices for listed firms in 39 countries and conclude 
that the country in which the firm is located has a greater impact on capital structure 
decisions than the industry in which it operates. Hall et al. (2004) analyze the capital 
structure decisions of SMEs for European countries and find that even though firm 
level determinants explain the capital structure decisions of SMEs, these firm level 
determinants indicate differences among countries. Hence, country specific factors 
have an effect on the capital and debt maturity decisions of firms. We use the 
following macroeconomic variables to investigate the impact of country specific 
factors on the capital and debt maturity decisions of firms: GDP per capita, growth 
rate of GDP, inflation rate, interest rate, and tax rate (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1996, 1999, Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008). 
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2.3.2.1. GDP per capita 
GDP per capita provides the income level of countries (Beck et al., 2008). It is a 
broad indicator that describes the differences in wealth in each country, and is 
accepted as a general measure of economic development (Morck et al., 2000). As 
countries getting richer and economically more developed, more financing becomes 
available. Also, the economy of the country becomes more developed. As a result, 
we expect GDP per capita to be positively related with leverage and debt maturity 
for all firms. 
 
Hypothesis 20: Leverage is positively related with GDP per capita. 
a. Leverage of small firms is positively related with GDP per capita. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with GDP per capita. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with GDP per 
capita. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with GDP per 
capita. 
 
Hypothesis 21: Debt maturity is positively related with GDP per capita. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with GDP per 
capita. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with GDP per 
capita. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with GDP 
per capita. 
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Growth rate of the economy is included as a measure of the growth opportunities 
available to firms in the economy. On an individual firm level, the growth rate is a 
proxy for the investment opportunity set faced by firms (Smith and Watts, 1992) and 
its effect on the optimal financing of projects (Myers, 1977). Therefore, we expect 
economic growth to be positively related with leverage and debt maturity for all 
firms. Alternatively, high growth in developing countries may encourage firms to 
list and issue equity (Glen and Pinto, 1994). Finance theory proposes that for growth 
options, firms should not prefer debt financing (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1996). Thus, we would expect an inverse relation between growth and leverage and 
debt maturities. 
 
Hypothesis 22: Leverage is positively related with growth. 
 
a. Leverage of small firms is positively related with growth. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with growth. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with growth. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with growth. 
Hypothesis 23: Debt maturity is positively related with growth. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with growth. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with growth. 
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c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with 
growth. 




Inflation indicates the government’s management of the economy and provides 
evidence regarding the stability of the local currency. Countries with high inflation 
are associated with high uncertainty about future inflation (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1996). Since debt contracts are generally nominal contracts, the rate of 
inflation may influence the riskiness of debt financing. Lenders are more likely to 
avoid providing debt under high inflation reducing the availability of debt financing. 
We expect inflation to be negatively related to leverage and debt maturities for all 
firms. In contrast, Taggart (1985) suggests a positive correlation between debt and 
inflation due to the properties of the tax code. Firms may benefit more from tax 
deductions on debt if inflation is high. Therefore, the trade-off theory supports this 
positive relationship between debt and inflation. Frank and Goyal (2007) find the 
same positive association. If managers can time their debt, they can use debt 
financing when inflation is higher than interest rates. 
 
Hypothesis 24: Leverage is negatively related with inflation. 
a. Leverage of small firms is negatively related with inflation. 
b. Leverage of large firms is negatively related with inflation. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is negatively related with inflation. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is negatively related with inflation. 
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Hypothesis 25: Debt maturity is negatively related with inflation. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is negatively related with inflation. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is negatively related with inflation. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is negatively related with 
inflation. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is negatively related with 
inflation. 
 
2.3.2.4. Interest rate 
Interest rates have a direct impact on borrowing decisions. As interest rates increase, 
firms are less willing to finance new investments by debt due to this increase in the 
cost of borrowing (Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008). In addition to the firms’ reaction to 
the changes in interest rates, creditors may also have preferences. Increases in debt 
financing also boost the risk of a firm. Based on the risk of the firm, creditors adjust 
their interest rates by increasing them or refusing to lend to the firms that are highly 
leveraged (Glen and Pinto, 1994). For small firms, lenders might wish to charge 
higher interest rates in order to compensate for any additional costs, such as 
contracting costs and monitoring costs they incur due to the agency and asymmetric 
information problems of small firms. Thus, interest is expected to be inversely 
related with leverage and debt maturity for all firms. 
 
Hypothesis 26: Leverage is negatively related with interest. 
a. Leverage of small firms is negatively related with interest. 
b. Leverage of large firms is negatively related with interest. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is negatively related with interest. 
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d. Leverage of privately held firms is negatively related with interest. 
Hypothesis 27: Debt maturity is negatively related with interest. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is negatively related with interest. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is negatively related with interest. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is negatively related with 
interest. 




Debt financing provides firms tax advantages in terms of interest deductibility. 
While interest payments associated with debt can be deducted from taxes, payments 
paid to equity holders, such as dividends, are not. By assuming that personal income 
is tax exempt, debt has a tax advantage. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) find that 
firms with large non-debt tax shields employ less debt. The large amount of non-
debt tax shields, such as depreciation and investment tax credits, allow firms to have 
higher probability of negative taxable income. Therefore, we can expect a negative 
relationship between firms with large non-debt tax shields and leverage. The 
measure used to proxy non-debt tax shields is total depreciation divided by total 
assets. 
 
According to the trade-off theory, firms prefer debt financing because debt is tax 
deductible. This tax benefit of debt allows firms to borrow more in accordance with 
increases in the tax rate. Hence, we expect tax to be positively related with leverage. 
The tax advantage of borrowing can be applied to large firms, which are more likely 
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to generate high profits. Since small firms are less likely to post high profits, this tax 
advantage may not be reason enough to choose debt financing for the tax shields 
advantage (Pettit and Singer, 1985). We expect tax to have a positive correlation 
with leverage for large firms, while we expect no such relationship with small firms. 
 
Hypothesis 28: Leverage is positively related with tax. 
a. There is no relationship between leverage of small firms and tax. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with tax. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with tax. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with tax. 
Hypothesis 29: Debt maturity is positively related with tax. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with tax. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with tax. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with tax. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is positively related with tax. 
 
2.3.3. Financial Environment factors 
This section explains the effect of the financial environment on the capital and debt 
maturity structures of firms. Previous studies focus on firm level variables and the 
financing decisions of firms. Yet there is a growing literature that focuses on the 
impact of legal systems and financial institutions on the external financing decisions 
of firms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; 1999; Fan et al., 2011). The aim 
of firms, both in developed and developing countries, is to minimize the cost of 
capital. However, the environment of these firms often varies noticeably from that 
found in most developed countries. The efficiency and development of the financial 
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environment affects the availability of external funding and, as such, the capital 
structure and debt maturity decisions of firms. We will discuss the effect of the 
financial environment on the external financing decisions of firms. First, we analyze 
the effect of corruption and the legal system. Then, we will focus on financial 




Corruption is defined as the misuse of public office for private gain (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). There must be three elements for corruption to exist (Jain, 2001). 
The first is discretionary power, which is related to regulations (Rose-Ackerman, 
1978). This power incorporates the authority to design regulations. as well as to 
govern them. Therefore, we would expect to find larger discretionary powers, and 
more corruption, in regulated and controlled economies in contrast to market 
economies. Additionally, there must be economic rent related to this power. For 
instance, these rents could be held by a particular group. Finally, there must be a 
weak legal or judicial system. As a result, there will be a low probability of 
detection or penalties for wrongdoing (Lee and Ng, 2006). Thus, corruption has an 
impact on the level of investment, entrepreneurial incentives, and the plan or 
implementation of rules or regulations in relation to access to resources and assets 
within a country. 
 
Corruption increases the cost of borrowing both for governments and firms 
(Ciocchini et al., 2003). If a firm operates in a corrupt country, investors oblige a 
considerably greater return on debt. Also, corruption can create agency problems. 
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Managers might choose to involve and accept the projects where they can take 
bribes instead of analyzing the economic benefits of the projects. Poor legal 
enforcement makes it easier for managers to divert resources from the firm to their 
own private accounts, at the expense of bondholders. As managers, government 
officials also may try to create obstacles for firms to be able to obtain bribes. But all 
of these attitudes cause waste and increase the transaction costs in the economy. 
Therefore, the greater the corruption, the higher the cost of borrowing is on the 
markets, especially in international markets for both the firms and governments of 
those countries. 
 
As debt markets, corruption has an impact on the equity markets. By using firm 
level data from 43 countries, Lee and Ng (2004) analyze the correlation between 
corruption and international corporate values. They find that corruption significantly 
lessens equity values. They document that firms in more corrupt countries have 
lower market multiples. They conclude that corruption has significant economic 
consequences for shareholder value. Since corruption causes a weak regulatory and 
legal environment, corporate governance may become worse resulting in a boost in 
the cost of equity. 
 
While corruption has a negative impact on the cost of borrowing, some studies have 
focused on the benefits of corruption (Leff, 1964; Lui, 1985; Kaufmann and Wei, 
2000). They support the efficient grease hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that 
firms that pay more bribes should have better access to cheaper credit. Therefore, 
cost of capital must be lower (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000). It expects a negative 
relationship between bribes and effective wasted time. Firms that pay bribes can 
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save time getting the officials to certify compliance with regulations or securing 
licenses. Some studies have found that some corruption can be enviable (Leff, 
1964). First, government officials may become more helpful when they are paid. 
Additionally, corruption enables entrepreneurs to overcome troublesome 
regulations. 
 
On the whole, corruption boosts the cost of borrowing (Ciocchini et al., 2003). Since 
corruption makes the regulatory and legal environment weak, investors expect a 
greater return on debt to provide credit to firms in corrupt countries. Therefore, the 
lower the corruption, the better the governance and the more debt firms can have. 
We expect positive correlation between better governance and leverage for all types 
of firms. In a more corrupt environment, long-term debt is easier to expropriate, so 
that short-term debt is expected to be used more often (Fan et al., 2011). Debt 
maturity increases in the countries with better governance. Therefore, we expect a 
positive relationship between better governance and debt maturity. 
 
Hypothesis 30: Leverage is positively related with better governance. 
a. Leverage of small firms is positively related with better governance. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with better governance. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with better 
governance. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with better 
governance. 
Hypothesis 31: Debt maturity is positively related with better governance. 
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a. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with better 
governance. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with better 
governance. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with better 
governance. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is positively related with better 
governance. 
 
2.3.3.2. Legal System 
The legal system has an impact on the financial decisions of firms because finance 
can be seen as a set of contracts. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), debt 
and equity are legal claims on the cash flow of firms. Moreover, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) point out that the types of contracts, which are used to address 
agency problems, are shaped by the statutory laws and the degree to which courts 
enforce those laws. Thus, the country’s contract, company, bankruptcy, and 
securities laws and the enforcement of these laws fundamentally determines the 
rights of securities holders and the operation of financial systems. The legal system 
is important because it provides protection to shareholders and creditors. 
 
Legal systems have significant differences and alter systematically across countries 
(La Porta et al., 1997). The reason for this systematic difference is its legal origin, 
which is mainly divided as common law and civil law. Common law is English in 
origin and is made by judges who have to resolve specific disputes. Moreover, 
precedents from judicial decisions form common law. The main point of this system 
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is its judicial independence from both the executive and legislature. Alternatively, 
civil law includes French, German, and Scandinavian laws that are three major 
families within the civil law tradition. Civil law originates in Roman law, uses 
statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material, and 
relies heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate rules (Merryman, 1969).  
 
Legal origin is important as it influences ownership structure, dividend payout, 
availability and costs of external financing, and market valuations. When compared 
to French and German civil law countries, investor rights tend to be stronger in 
Anglo-Saxon common law countries (La Porta et al., 1999). Countries with strong 
investor rights tend to have lower ownership concentration and increase the 
willingness of investors to provide financing thereby decreasing the cost of external 
financing. Moreover, the legal system has also influenced the type of external 
financing that firms can have access to. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) 
find that an effective legal system is important to be able to obtain long-term 
financing by controlling opportunistic behaviours of corporate insiders. Thus, firms 
in countries with strong legal systems in which property rights and, in particular, the 
rights of investors are enforced are likely rely on equity and long-term debt as types 
of external financing. Consequently, firms in common law countries have greater 
access to bank and equity financing; whereas, firms in civil law countries are more 
likely to use debt financing. 
 
Since common law legal systems provide better protection to external investors than 
civil law legal systems, firms in common law countries can use more outside equity 
and longer-term debt (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999). 
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Therefore, we expect that civil law is positively correlated with leverage and short-
term debt, while it is negatively related with long-term debt for all types of firms. 
 
Hypothesis 32: Leverage is positively related with civil law. 
a. Leverage of small firms is positively related with civil law. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with civil law. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with civil law. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with civil law. 
Hypothesis 33: Debt maturity is negatively related with civil law. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is negatively related with civil law. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is negatively related with civil law. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is negatively related with civil 
law. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is negatively related with civil 
law. 
 
2.3.3.3. Financial institutions 
Financial systems are vital in providing information ex ante about possible 
investments and capital allocation. They mobilize and pool savings. Therefore, they 
make trading, diversification, and management of risk easier. After providing 
financing, they monitor investments and exert corporate governance. They facilitate 
the exchange of goods and services. These financial functions are provided by all 
financial systems. Yet how well these financial systems enable those functions 
varies among countries. Financial development takes place when financial 
intermediaries and markets improve the effects of information, enforcement, and 
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transaction costs and do a correspondingly better job at providing those functions 
(Levine, 2004). 
 
Information acquisition for investment decisions is costly, especially for individuals. 
It is not possible for individuals to collect, process, and produce information on each 
possible investment and to assess firms, managers, and market conditions. 
Therefore, financial intermediaries facilitate and decrease the costs of information 
acquisition and process, thereby ameliorating the allocation of resources. 
 
By financial intermediaries, we mean banks and stock markets. Banks decrease the 
costs of acquiring and processing information and thereby improve resource 
allocation. Without intermediaries, each investor would face large fixed costs 
associated with evaluating firms, managers and economic conditions (Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 2008). Therefore, intermediaries have an important role for firms 
to provide external funding. Previous studies indicate that firms in countries with 
weak financial systems obtain less external financing (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). As such, we expect a positive 
relationship between bank development and leverage and debt maturity. 
 
Banks play a leading role in terms of monitoring borrowers. Banks have economies 
of scale in gaining information (Diamond, 1984). As a result, they are more likely to 
use the collected information to discipline borrowers as compared to small investors 
depending on free rider problems. Hence, we expect developed banking sectors to 
ease external financing, especially for small firms. 
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The other financial institution is stock markets. We discuss the impact of the 
presence of a stock market in a country and then the development of a stock market 
on available funding. There are two main theoretical arguments that discuss the 
effect of the existence of a stock market on available funding. The first one is the 
level effect (Levine, 1997). The existence of a stock market increases liquidity; 
therefore, it provides sources of funding that can be used for investment. The 
presence of a stock market also provides improved financial reporting standards and 
amplifies investor confidence. By providing information transmission, which is 
especially valuable to creditors, the existence of a stock market makes lending to 
listed firms less risky (Grossman, 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). It boosts the 
ability of firms to obtain long-term debt. The second theory is the efficiency effect 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990 and Obstfeld, 1994). The existence of a stock 
market, by providing better diversification and increased liquidity, improves 
investment allocation directed toward higher return, riskier projects. Therefore, the 
occurrence of a stock market is expected to boost the amount of investment 
available in a country and to improve the efficiency with which it is allocated. 
 
Most empirical research has focused on the development of a stock market on the 
external financing decisions of firms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996, 1998, 
1999; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Stock market 
development is important in the sense that they can improve information quality, 
monitoring, and corporate control. In larger and more liquid markets, information is 
cheaper and firms have incentives to provide more information about the firms. 
Also, liquid stock markets facilitate trading. As a result, liquidity risk also decreases. 
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Hence, those improvements make more funds available in the financial system to 
finance firms. 
 
Stock markets may also complement banks. In countries with underdeveloped stock 
markets, firms’ debt level increases, as well as equity, with developments in the 
stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Stock market development 
indicates greater use of equity markets in raising capital and also encourages greater 
use of bank financing (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996). Countries with better 
developed stock markets also have better developed banks and nonfinancial 
intermediaries. The developments in the stock market actually increase the quantity 
of bank loans. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) find a negative relationship 
between the level of stock market development and the ratios of both long-term and 
short-term debt to total equity and a positive correlation between bank development 
and leverage. 
 
For financial institutions, we use three proxies: deposit money bank assets to central 
bank assets, stock market dummy, and stock market turnover. The ratio of deposit 
money bank assets to central bank assets is used as a proxy for the financial 
development or the size of the commercial banks in relation to the central bank. If 
deposit money banks in a country have a larger role than the central banks in the 
banking system, it indicates that this country has higher levels of financial 
development (Beck et al., 2009). Moreover, if the number of commercial banks is 
high, the competition among banks is high. This competition may end up lowering 
lending interest rates encouraging firms to borrow. A high number of commercial 
banks or a financially developed banking system makes more funds available to 
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firms. We expect positive relationship between deposit money bank assets to central 
bank assets and leverage and debt maturity for all types of firms. 
 
Hypothesis 34: Leverage is positively related with deposit money bank assets 
to central bank assets. 
a. Leverage of small firms is positively related with deposit money bank 
assets to central bank assets. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with deposit money bank 
assets to central bank assets. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with deposit 
money bank assets to central bank assets. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with deposit 
money bank assets to central bank assets. 
Hypothesis 35: Debt maturity is positively related with deposit money bank 
assets to central bank assets. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with deposit money 
bank assets to central bank assets. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with deposit money 
bank assets to central bank assets. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with 
deposit money bank assets to central bank assets. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is positively related with 
deposit money bank assets to central bank assets. 
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Stock market dummy is included as a proxy for the presence of a stock market or an 
active stock market. Since some of the countries in our sample do not have either a 
stock market or an active stock market, we use a dummy variable to analyze the 
effect of the stock market. As banks, stock markets provide funds to firms. In 
accordance with the efficiency effect, the existence of a stock market helps to 
increase the amount of investment available in a country and to improve the 
efficiency with which it is allocated. Therefore, countries with an active stock 
market provide more funds into the financial system. As such, we expect a positive 
correlation between the occurrence of a stock market and leverage and debt maturity 
for all types of firms. 
 
Hypothesis 36: Leverage is positively related with stock market dummy 
a. Leverage of small firms is positively related with stock market 
dummy. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with stock market 
dummy. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with stock 
market dummy. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with stock 
market dummy. 
Hypothesis 37: Debt maturity is positively related with stock market dummy. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with stock market 
dummy. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with stock market 
dummy. 
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c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with stock 
market dummy. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is positively related with stock 
market dummy. 
 
Stock market turnover demonstrates the activity or liquidity of a stock market 
relative to its size (Beck et al., 2009). The higher the turnover ratio, the more active 
the market is, while the lower the turnover ratio, the less liquid the market. The 
liquidity of the stock market is important in the sense that it facilitates trading. As a 
result of that liquidity, risk reduces. Additionally, high turnover eases the external 
monitoring of firms by encouraging investors to become informed. A liquid stock 
market indicates higher use of equity markets in raising capital (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1996). Therefore, firms prefer equity financing over debt financing. As 
such, we expect an inverse relationship between stock market turnover and leverage 
and debt maturity for all types of firms. 
 
Hypothesis 38: Leverage is negatively related with stock market turnover 
a. Leverage of small firms is negatively related with stock market 
turnover. 
b. Leverage of large firms is negatively related with stock market 
turnover. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is negatively related with stock 
market turnover. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is negatively related with stock 
market turnover. 
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Hypothesis 39: Debt maturity is negatively related with stock market 
turnover 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is negatively related with stock market 
turnover. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is negatively related with stock market 
turnover. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is negatively related with stock 
market turnover. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is negatively related with stock 
market turnover. 
 
2.3.3.4. Financial Globalization 
Financial globalization demonstrates how a country’s financial system is engaged 
with international financial markets. This engagement provides firms from countries 
with underdeveloped financial systems to gain access to developed financial 
markets. This engagement has the following benefits. First, firms in a country do not 
have to bear all the risks related to the economic activities of that country. On the 
other hand, they have to bear the risks of other countries at the same time. However, 
both of these type of risks equalize each other as a result of diversification (Stulz, 
1999). Additionally, with financial globalization, firms have to meet the disclosure 
requirements in the global market in order to raise funds. As such, monitoring of 
management is increased and information and agency costs will be diminished. 
Moreover, with this integration, domestic financial systems are developed (Fischer, 
1998; Mishkin, 2003). As a result, the cost of capital lessens and financing 
constraints are loosened (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Edison and Warnock, 2003; 
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Lins et al., 2005; Stulz, 1999). Hence, attendance of the global markets signifies 
lower costs of capital since firms that enter the global capital markets have access to 
a greater amount of funding opportunities. 
 
We proxy financial globalization with two variables, offshore bank loans to GDP 
and offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. The ratio of offshore bank 
loans to GDP is used as a proxy for financial globalization as an increase in offshore 
loans makes more funding available in the country. Therefore, increases in the 
availability of funds enables firms to borrow more. We expect a positive relationship 
between leverage and debt maturity and offshore loans to GDP for all types of firms. 
 
Hypothesis 40: Leverage is positively related with offshore bank loans to 
GDP. 
a. Leverage of small firms is positively related with offshore bank loans 
to GDP. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with offshore bank loans 
to GDP. 
c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with offshore 
bank loans to GDP. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with offshore 
bank loans to GDP. 
Hypothesis 41: Debt maturity is positively related with offshore bank loans 
to GDP. 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with offshore bank 
loans to GDP. 
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b. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with offshore bank 
loans to GDP. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with 
offshore bank loans to GDP. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is positively related with 
offshore bank loans to GDP. 
 
The other proxy is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits 
demonstrating the proportion of deposits held by a country’s citizens in off-shore 
banks relative to deposits in domestic banks (Beck et al., 2009). A lack of 
confidence and trust in the domestic banking system causes households and firms to 
prefer offshore banks. Increases in offshore bank deposits cause decreases in the 
available funds of the country. Therefore, limited funding indicates less firm 
borrowing. However, we include this variable as a proxy for financial globalization. 
This variable reports the integration of domestic financial systems into the 
international financial system. Therefore, we would expect a positive correlation 
between the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits and leverage 
and debt maturity. 
 
Hypothesis 42: Leverage is positively related with offshore bank deposits to 
domestic bank deposits 
a. Leverage of small firms is positively related with offshore bank 
deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
b. Leverage of large firms is positively related with offshore bank 
deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
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c. Leverage of publicly listed firms is positively related with offshore 
bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
d. Leverage of privately held firms is positively related with offshore 
bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
Hypothesis 43: Debt maturity is positively related with offshore bank 
deposits to domestic bank deposits 
a. Debt maturity of small firms is positively related with offshore bank 
deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
b. Debt maturity of large firms is positively related with offshore bank 
deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
c. Debt maturity of publicly listed firms is positively related with 
offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
d. Debt maturity of privately held firms is positively related with 
offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we explained the capital structure theories and empirical literature on 
capital structure and debt maturity and developed the hypotheses that we will test in 
the empirical Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Capital structure presents firms’ combination of 
debt and equity financing. Capital structure theories, such as trade-off, pecking 
order, and agency theories, try to explain the choice between these two financing 
options. In accordance with these theories, we define the determinants and develop 
the hypotheses. We use three sets of variables: firm level variables, economic 
environment variables, and financial environment variables. 
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The previous literature discusses the determinants of capital structure both for 
developed and developing countries (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001). Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) examine capital structure decisions of large listed companies 
for G-7 countries, while Booth et al. (2001) analyse the financial leverage decisions 
of listed companies for ten developing countries. However, those studies only 
include large listed companies. Since most large listed firms from any country are 
also players in international trade, they can easily access international financial 
markets and institutions. It could be misleading to accept and generalize the results 
of these studies for each firm, especially for SMEs. Alternatively, work on SMEs 
has been limited due to the unavailability of data. Some studies have discussed the 
capital structure decisions of SMEs for a single country (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 
1993; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2005) or on a cross country-
comparisons (Hall et al., 2004; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Bartholdy and 
Mateus, 2008). Hall et al. (2004) examine the cross country differences in SMEs 
capital structure for eight European countries including Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK. They explain that the cross 
country differences in SMEs’ capital structure is due to firm specific rather than 
country specific effects. In accordance with Hall et al. (2004), Daskalakis and 
Psillaki (2008) support the effect of firm specific factors in the capital structure 
determinants of SMEs for France and Greece. The firms included in both studies are 
only small and medium size companies having less than 250 employees. 
Alternatively, Bartholdy and Mateus (2008) investigate the capital structure decision 
of SMEs from 1994-2004 for sixteen Western European countries. As opposed to 
other researchers, they conclude that country specific factors also have an impact on 
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leverage decisions. They also find that the traditional financing theories (trade-off 
and pecking order) seem to hold for SMEs in an international setting. 
 
The previous studies on SMEs are mainly focus on the European countries where 
the economic and financial environment is similar. As a result, it could be 
misleading to generalize the results of these studies. Only Beck et al. (2008) have 
examined small firms for a number of both developed and developing countries. 
However, their data provide limited firm level financial information, which did not 
allow them to replicate the firm level controls used in capital structure papers. In the 
light of those, we are going to investigate the capital structure and debt maturity 
decisions of firms specifically for SMEs.  
 
In Chapter 4, we will discuss whether leverage and debt maturity levels alter 
according to the size and listing status of firms. We will also analyse the impact of 
the presence of a stock market on the leverage and maturity levels of firms. In 
Chapter 5, we will investigate the determinants of capital structure in developing 
countries. We will analyze whether capital structure theories are portable to small 
firms and whether the economic and financial environment of a country has an 
effect on the capital structure decisions of firms. In Chapter 6, we will look at the 
answers to these questions in regard to the debt maturity decisions of firms. 
 
In the next chapter, we present the sources of data that we use to collect our 
information. We discuss the methodology and the empirical models that we apply. 
The countries that we include in the sample are developing countries from different 
regions. The countries included have different levels of financial development. 
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Therefore, we can observe more accurately whether firm-specific or economic and 
financial environment factors have an impact on the capital structure and debt 



























The main focus of this chapter is to provide information about the data and 
methodology that we apply for the empirical Chapters 4, 5, and 6. We use various 
databases including the World Bank Enterprise Survey for firm level variables, the 
World Development Indicators for macroeconomic variables, the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, and the Financial Development and Structure database for 
financial environment variables. By combining these different databases, we try to 
present the leverage and debt maturity levels and explain the determinants of capital 
structures and debt maturity for firms in developing countries. We have a huge 
dataset containing 24 developing countries from five regions from 1999-2004. In 
total, we have 10,839 firms with up to three years of data for a total of 27,738 
observations. 48% (41%) of the observations are from the small (medium) firms, 
while only 11% is for large firms. 
 
In this chapter, we define variables that we will use in the empirical chapters. We 
have four main sets of variables: leverage and debt maturity, firm level variables, 
economic environment variables, and financial environment variables. The firm 
level variables include asset tangibility, profitability, and size. The economic 
environment variables are included to proxy the economic environment of the 
country. Those variables are GDP per capita, growth, inflation, interest, and tax. 
Additionally, the financial environment variables report the financial environment of 




This chapter also presents the empirical model that we will apply for the empirical 
chapters and the methodology that we will use. Since we have different firms among 
various years, we elect to apply static panel data analysis. We estimate our empirical 
models used in Chapter 5 and 6 by applying the fixed effects method based on the 
results of Hausman tests. Unlike recent studies, we could not apply the dynamic 
model due to the unavailability of the data. This is one of the limitations of this 
thesis. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the data 
that we use to collect the variables. In the Section 3.3, we describe the variables that 
we use. Section 3.4 presents the correlation coefficient of the variables. In Section 
3.5, we discuss the methodology that we apply to estimate our models. Section 3.6 
demonstrates the model that we will apply in the Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In the last 
section, we provide our chapter conclusions. 
 
3.2. Data 
The dataset used in this thesis is gathered from various databases. The data for firm 
level variables are collected from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, economic 
environment variables are derived from World Development Indicators, and 
financial environment variables are from Worldwide Governance Indicators and the 
Financial Development and Structure database (Beck et al., 2009). Legal origin of 
the countries is collected from La Porta et al. (1998, 1999). In our dataset, we 
include 24 developing countries from 5 different regions including Ethiopia, 
Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia from the African region; Cambodia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines from the East Asia and Pacific region; Brazil, Chile, 
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Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru from the 
Latin America and Caribbean region; Morocco, Oman, and the Syrian Arab 
Republic from the Middle East and North African region; and Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka from the South Asian region. The dataset includes 15,201 
firms from the above mentioned countries for up to three years. Firms are omitted 
from the sample if they do not have both total liabilities and total assets. We also 
exclude firms if their leverage ratio is higher than one.3 Therefore, we end up with 
10,839 companies and a total of 27,738 observations. Firm level variables in the 
database are based on local currencies, so we convert them to U.S. dollars using the 
rate from the World Development Indicators. 
 
We use the 2002 version of the survey because it provides information about 
balance sheet items such as fixed assets, current assets, total liabilities including 
short-term and long-term debt, and equity-share capital. It also includes sales and 
expenses in local currency units for three years. An important feature of the survey 
is that it covers small and medium size enterprises. The survey includes three types 
of firms. Firms are defined as small if they have less than 50 employees. Medium 
firms employ 51 to 500 employees, while large firms are defined as those with more 
than 500 employees. Only 20% of the database includes large companies and 80% 
of it contains small and medium firms in equal proportions. Therefore, most of the 
firms are privately held companies. 
 
A distinguishing feature of the World Bank Enterprise Survey is its coverage of 
small and medium enterprises. By using this database, we examine the leverage and 
                                                 
3 If a firm’s leverage ratio is higher than one, it means that the firm goes bankrupt. That’s why we 
excluded firms which have already gone bankrupt. 
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maturity levels of firms and determinants of the capital structure and debt maturity 
decisions of firms. To our knowledge, this is the first study that uses the Enterprise 
Survey for that purpose. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995) use the Global 
Vantage database that contains accounting data for the largest listed companies in G-
7 countries, while Booth et al (2001) use the International Financial Corporation 
(IFC) database that includes abbreviated balance sheets and income statements for 
the largest companies in ten developing countries. Both papers only consider large 
companies. Beck et al. (2008) focus on small firms and use the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) 1999, which had limited firm level financial 
information. They investigate flows of external finance as a proportion of 
investment expenditures. They use the total amount of internal and external 
resources used in a particular year rather than the ratio of external total financing to 
total assets. In contrast, our rich database allows us to investigate whether the 
leverage and debt maturity levels of firms are different based on the size and listing 
status of firms and whether their capital structure and debt maturity decisions are 
affected by the same theoretical determinants of capital structures and debt maturity 
used in developed countries. 
 
The data for our economic environment variables, GDP per capita, growth of GDP, 
inflation, interest rate, and tax rates, are collected from World Development 
Indicators (April 2008) by World Bank. We use annual data for macroeconomic 
variables since our firm level variables are end of the year accounting data and the 
macroeconomic variables are based on the U.S. dollars. 
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For financial environment variables, we use two databases: the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators and Financial Development and Structure database. We use 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2008 by Kaufmann et al. (2009) for 
corruption of countries data. The corruption indicator is measured in units ranging 
from -2.5 to 2.5. The higher values correspond to better governance and less 
corruption in the country. Since the survey does not include the years 1999-2001, we 
take the averages for the years 1998-2000 for 1999 and 2000-2002 for 2001. 
 
We use legal origin data from La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) to proxy for the legal 
system. The data for financial institutions and financial globalization is collected 
from the Financial Development and Structure database (Beck et al., 2009). As a 
financial globalization proxy, we use the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to 
GDP and the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits as they are 
the only variables available for all of the countries in the dataset. 
 
Thus, our sample includes 27,738 observations that contain 48% of small firms, 
41% of medium size firms, and 11% of large firms. For privately held and listed 
firms, the total number of observations in the sample is 25,729 including 92% of 
private and 8% of publicly listed companies. 
 
3.3. Variables 
In this section, we define the variables that we used in our empirical models. First, 
we explain leverage and debt maturity. Additionally, we present the firm level 
variables, asset tangibility, profitability, and size, and define them. After the firm 
level variables, we focus on the economic environment of a country by explaining 
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GDP per capita, growth, inflation, interest, and tax variables. Finally, we consider 
the financial environment of a country by discussing corruption, the legal system, 
financial institutions, and financial globalization. 
 
3.3.1. Leverage 
We define leverage (Leverage) as total liabilities to total assets (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996; Booth et al., 2001; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008). This ratio can be seen as a proxy for what is left for shareholders in 
the case of liquidation. The data for leverage is collected from the Enterprise Survey 
Questions 81 and 82. 
 
3.3.2. Debt maturity 
We use three proxies for debt maturity: long-term debt to total assets, short-term 
debt to total assets, and long-term debt to total debt. Long-term debt to total assets 
(LTD/TA) is defined as long-term liabilities divided by total assets, while short-term 
debt (STD/TA) is short-term liabilities to total assets (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999). Long-term debt to total debt is expressed as long-term liabilities 
to total liabilities (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Maturity of debt 
depends upon the riskiness of the firm. Lenders do not prefer to offer long-term debt 
if the firms carry high risk. 
 
3.3.3. Firm level variables 
We use three different ratios to proxy for firm level variables: asset tangibility, 




Asset tangibility (Tangibility) is defined as total assets minus current assets (fixed 
assets) divided by total assets. (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al. 2001) (Survey 
Question 81).  
 
3.3.3.2. Profitability 
Profitability (Profitability) is calculated as earnings before interest and tax divided 
by total assets (Survey Questions 74 and 81).4 
 
3.3.3.3. Size 
We measure size in three different ways. First, the number of employees the firm 
has is used to define the size (Survey Question 62). A firm is classified as small if it 
has less than 50 employees, medium size if it has between 51 and 500 employees, 
and large if it has more than 500 employees. Size is a dummy variable for small and 
large firms (Beck et al., 2008). The second size measure used is calculated as the 
logarithm of total sales (Survey Question 74) (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et 
al., 2001). The last measurement for size is the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Harvey et al., 2004). 
 
3.3.4. Economic environment variables 
We use five macroeconomic variables to proxy the economic environment of a 
country: GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP, inflation rate, interest rate, and tax 
rate (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996, 1999). 
 
                                                 
4Earnings is calculated as total sales minus the sum of direct raw material costs, consumption of 
energy, manpower costs, interest charges, and financial fees, other costs. 
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3.3.4.1. GDP per capita 
GDP per capita (GDP/Cap) is the gross domestic product per capita of the country.  
 
3.3.4.2. Growth 
The Growth (Growth) is the GDP growth rate of the country. It is included as a 
measure of the growth opportunities available to firms in the economy. 
 
3.3.4.3. Inflation 
Inflation (Inflation) is the inflation rate of the country. Inflation is measured based 
on the GDP deflator, which is the ratio of GDP in local currency to GDP in constant 
local currency. 
 
3.3.4.4. Interest rate 
Interest rate (Interest) is the lending interest rate of the country. 
 
3.3.4.5. Tax  
Tax variable (Tax) is the country’s highest marginal corporate tax rate (Bartholdy 
and Mateus, 2008). 
 
3.3.5. Financial Environment variables 
We use four variables to proxy the financial environment of a country including 




Corruption (Corruption) is measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5. Higher 
values mean better governance and, therefore, lower levels of corruption. Different 
survey questions are combined to measure corruption, so the range of questions 
includes the frequency of “additional payments to get things done” to the effects of 
corruption on the business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the 
political arena or in the tendency elite forms to engage in “state capture” (Kaufmann 
et al., 2009). 
 
3.3.5.2. Legal system 
For legal system, we use dummy variable for legal origin (La Porta et al., 1998). If 
the legal origin of a country is based on the civil law, it is equal to one, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
3.3.5.3 Financial institutions 
Three variables, deposit money bank assets to central bank assets, stock market 
dummy and stock market turnover are used to proxy the financial institutional 
environment of a country. 
 
3.3.5.3.1. Deposit money bank assets to central bank assets 
Deposit money bank assets to central bank assets (Dbacba) is the ratio of deposit 




3.3.5.3.2. Stock market dummy 
Stock market dummy (Stockmrk) is a dummy variable used to proxy for the presence 
of a stock market or an active stock market. If a country has a stock market or an 
active stock market, it is equal to one and zero otherwise. 
 
3.3.5.3.3. Stock market turnover 
Stock market turnover (Turnover) is the ratio of the value of total shares traded to 
market capitalization (Beck et al., 2009). 
 
3.3.5.4 Financial globalization 
We use two variables, offshore bank loans to GDP and offshore bank deposits to 
domestic bank deposits, as a proxy for financial globalization of a country. 
 
3.3.5.4.1. Offshore bank loans to GDP 
Offshore bank loans to GDP (Nrbloan) is the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to 
GDP (Beck et al., 2009). 
 
3.3.5.4.2. Offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits 
Offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits (Offdep) is the ratio of offshore 
bank deposits to domestic bank deposits indicating the proportion of deposits held 
by a country’s citizens in off-shore banks relative to deposits in domestic banks 
(Beck et al., 2009). 
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3.4. Correlation coefficients 
Table 3.1 presents the correlation coefficients among variables. Panel A reports the 
correlations among firm level variables. Panel B is provides economic environment 
data, while Panel C illustrates the financial environment variables. Panel D presents 
the results for economic and financial environment variables. Firm level variables 
are not highly correlated among each other and among the variables for economic 
and financial environment. In contrast, some high correlation exists among the 
macroeconomic variables. The correlation between GDP per capita and tax is -
71.87%, while the correlation between interest and tax is -61.04%. The variables for 
financial environment are not highly correlated, except for civil and turnover. The 
relation between civil and turnover is -63.22%. There are some high correlations 
between the variables for the economic and financial environment. GDP per capita 
is positively correlated (69.34) with corruption. Interest and deposit money bank 
assets to central bank assets are negatively correlated at 69.17%. Tax is also highly 
related with the civil law legal system dummy at -68.57%, deposit money bank 
assets to central bank assets at 73.86%, and stock market turnover with 64.43%. 
There some correlation exists among the variables. To assess the problem of 
multicollinearity, a variance inflation factor (VIF) test is performed among the 
independent variables. This analysis is useful to determine which independent 
variables may be involved in multicollinearities (Maddala, 1992). Table 3.1 Panel E 
presents the results for the VIF analysis. The VIF values for all variables are lower 
than 10, so collinearity is not a problem for our analysis. Dependent variables, 
leverage, long-term debt to total assets, short-term debt to total assets, and long-term 
debt to total debt are not highly correlated to firm level variables, economic, and 
financial environment variables. 
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Table 3.1 Correlation Matrix among variables 
This table reports the Pearson correlation statistics for firm level, macroeconomic, and financial environment variables. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets. LTD/TA is the ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets. STD/TA is the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets. LTD/TD is the ratio of long-term 
liabilities to total liabilities. Tangibility is measured as net fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before tax divided by total assets. 
Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 employees, small takes a value of one, and zero otherwise. 
Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 500 employees, and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth 
rate of GDP. Inflation is measured based on the GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to 
the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has civil 
law legal systems, and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets plus central bank assets. 
Stckmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has an active stock market; and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market 
capitalization. Nrbloan is the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of Firm level variables 
  Leverage LTD/TA STD/TA LTD/TD Tangibility Profitability Small Large 
Leverage 1.0000               
LTD/TA 0.5651*** 1.0000             
STD/TA 0.7486*** -0.1205*** 1.0000           
LTD/TD 0.1176*** 0.7688*** -0.5090*** 1.0000         
Tangibility -0.2315*** 0.0244*** -0.3029*** 0.1666*** 1.0000       
Profitability -0.0349*** -0.0310*** -0.0177*** -0.0232*** -0.0189*** 1.0000     
Small -0.2734*** -0.2127*** -0.1617*** -0.1163*** 0.1037*** -0.0556*** 1.0000   





Panel B: Correlation matrix of Economic Environment variables 
  GDP/Cap Growth Inflation Interest Tax 
GDP/Cap 1.0000         
Growth -0.5160*** 1.0000       
Inflation 0.0376*** -0.3670*** 1.0000     
Interest 0.4161*** -0.4489*** 0.2385*** 1.0000   
Tax -0.7187*** 0.4618*** 0.0061 -0.6104*** 1.0000 
 
 
Panel C: Correlation matrix of Financial Environment variables 
 
  Corruption Civil Dbacba Stockmrk Turnover Nrbloan Offdep 
Corruption 1.0000             
Civil 0.2109*** 1.0000           
Dbacba -0.4458*** -0.3970*** 1.0000         
Stockmrk 0.1874*** -0.2519*** 0.0286*** 1.0000       
Turnover -0.2690*** -0.6322*** 0.2558*** 0.2299*** 1.0000     
Nrbloan -0.0114* 0.2947*** 0.3330*** 0.0641*** -0.1139*** 1.0000   
Offdep -0.2913*** 0.0533*** 0.0144** -0.0669*** -0.0706*** 0.1202*** 1.0000 
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Panel D: Correlation Matrix for Economic and Financial Environment variables 
 
  GDP/Cap Growth Inflation Interest Tax Corruption Civil Dbacba Stockmrk Turnover Nrbloan Offdep 
GDP/Cap 1.0000                       
Growth -0.5160*** 1.0000                     
Inflation 0.0376*** -0.3670*** 1.0000                   
Interest 0.4161*** -0.4489*** 0.2385*** 1.0000                 
Tax -0.7187*** 0.4618*** 0.0061 -0.6104*** 1.0000               
Corruption 0.6934*** -0.0945*** -0.1867*** 0.0595*** -0.5245*** 1.0000             
Civil 0.4898*** -0.4489*** -0.1534*** 0.2786*** -0.6857*** 0.2109*** 1.0000           
Dbacba -0.5006*** 0.4313*** -0.1694*** -0.6917*** 0.7386*** -0.4458*** -0.3970*** 1.0000         
Stockmrk 0.3273*** -0.1315*** 0.1569*** 0.1052*** 0.0656*** 0.1874*** -0.2519*** 0.0286*** 1.0000       
Turnover -0.3952*** 0.3965*** 0.2168*** -0.2592*** 0.6443*** -0.2690*** -0.6322*** 0.2558*** 0.2299*** 1.0000     
Nrbloan 0.1613*** -0.2539*** 0.0583*** -0.4852*** 0.1264*** -0.0114* 0.2947*** 0.3330*** 0.0641*** -0.1139*** 1.0000   
Offdep -0.0433*** -0.1961*** 0.2027*** 0.0061 0.0153** -0.2913*** 0.0533*** 0.0144*** -0.0669*** -0.0706*** 0.1202*** 1.0000 
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Panel E: VIF test 



















In this section, we discuss the methodology that we apply to estimate our models in 
the empirical Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In Chapter 4, we present the summary statistics 
of variables for each country. Since our sample includes 24 countries, we first 
investigate whether the differences among variables in each country are statistically 
significant by applying an F-test. Then, we examine whether the leverage and debt 
maturity levels show differences based on the size of the firm or listing status. 
Moreover, we will analyse the differences in levels for firms in countries with and 
without a stock market. We will apply a t-test to see whether the differences in 
levels are statistically significant. By applying these significance tests, we can verify 
the truth or falsify our hypothesis (Gujarati, 1995). 
 
For Chapters 5 and 6, we apply panel data analysis. We have 10,839 companies over 
                                                 
5 Most of this section is based on Baltagi 2008. 
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two or three year time periods across 24 countries. Since the time period for each 
firm is different, we have an unbalanced panel. We apply the panel data analysis as 
this gives us the opportunity to analyze our firm level data across countries and time. 
Panel data analysis provides regression analysis with both spatial and temporal 
dimension. The spatial dimension presents to a set of cross section observations, 
such as countries and firms. In contrast, temporal dimension relates to periodic 
observations of the variables describing these cross sectional units over a particular 
time period. Therefore, panel data refers to the pooling of observations on a cross 
section of firms over several time periods. Panel data proposes that firms are 
heterogeneous, whereas, cross-section and time series data cannot control for this 
individual heterogeneity that may cause biased results. Therefore, panel data can be 
considered a better method to account for the heterogeneity of firms. Since panel 
data combines cross-section and time series models within the same model, it 
provides more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the 
variables, more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency. When compared to cross-
section data, panel data improves the accuracy of econometric estimates by 
diminishing collinearity among the explanatory variables. Additionally, time series 
models have problems with multicollinearity. However, in the panel data, since 
more variables were present in a cross section basis we added, this problem is less 
likely to occur. By adding more informative data, panel data provides more reliable 
parameter estimates. Furthermore, panel data is better able to study the dynamic of 
adjustment when compared to other models. For instance, it is not possible with 
cross-section data to observe how the firms’ capital structures change during 
financial development. Panel data enables us to relate those changes from one point 




The most widely used panel data models are the pooled regression model, the fixed 
effects model, and the random effects model. The pooled regression model is the 
simplest model and it proposes constant coefficients. This means that intercepts and 
slopes are the same for all the firms and periods. This method implies that estimated 
cross section is identical and it is better under the hypothesis that the data set is a 
priori homogeneous (e.g., if we have a sample of only high income countries) 
(Asteriou and Hall, 2007). 
 
The fixed effects model is more general than the pooled model, in the sense that the 
fixed effects enable us to analyse the differences from one country/firm and/or 
period to another. The model permits for different intercepts for each country/firm 
and/or period. The fixed effects estimator is also known as the least-square dummy 
variables estimator. It contains a dummy variable for each group; therefore, it 
permits for different constants for each group. Thus the model is: 
                 (3.1) 
i = 1, 2, ...,10,839; t = 1999,…,2004 
 
Where Di,t/Vi,t is the leverage or one of the debt maturity ratios for the ith firm at time 
t. Fi,j,t reports the firm level variables, while Ei,k,t is the economic environment 




To decide whether the fixed effects method is applicable or not, we should apply a 
test to see whether fixed effects (i.e., different constants for each group) should be 
included in the model. To do so, a standard F-test can be used to check fixed effects 
against the pooled method. The null hypothesis is that all the constants are the same 
(homogeneity), and if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the pooled method is 
applicable. 
 
H0 = 1 = 2 = 3 =……….= 6 
The F statistic is: 
 (3.2) 
 
where is the coefficient of determination of the fixed effects model and is the 
coefficient of determination of the pooled model. If F-statistical is bigger than the F-
critical, then we reject the null hypothesis (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). 
 
We use period fixed effects rather than country- or firm-specific fixed effects. First, 
as in Booth et al. (2001), we try to include the country fixed effects since we have 
24 countries in the sample. When we include both macroeconomic variables and 
country dummies, the macroeconomic variables become insignificant. The country 
dummies take the impact of the macroeconomic variables as Lemmon et al. (2008) 
predicted. 6  Therefore, we omit the country dummies since the macroeconomic 
variables can show the differentiation among countries. We could not apply firm-
specific fixed effects either since the firms included in the sample have observations 
                                                 
6 Please see the Appendices Tables 2-4 for the results for country fixed effects. 
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for only two or three years. The firm fixed effect takes the effect of firm specific 
variables. Lemmon et al. (2008) support these arguments. They conclude “the 
majority of variation in leverage in panel of firms is time invariant.” In addition, 
including firm or country specific fixed effects increases the model fit, but at a cost 
of fewer degrees of freedom and a loss of generality of the model. Hence, too many 
dummy variables prevent us from reaching a general conclusion. That’s why we use 
period fixed effects. 
 
The loss of degrees of freedom can be avoided by using a random effects model. 
Unlike the fixed effects model, the random effects model assumes that the intercept 
is a random variable. This model explains differences in Di,t/Vi,t across firms as 
omitted variables captured by a random error term. The model is: 
                    (3.3) 
i = 1, 2, ...,10,839; t = 1999,…,2004 
 
The difference between the fixed effects and random effects method is that the 
random effects method handles the intercepts for each section not as fixed, but as 
random variables. The random effects model contains two types of random 
disturbances ut and i,t, such as firm specific and time specific. The time specific 
effects are considered as random over repeated samples, while in the fixed effects 
model, these effects are considered as fixed. Thus, the random effects model 
contains two types of random disturbances, whereas the fixed effect model is just 




When compared to the fixed effects model, the random effects model has fewer 
parameters to estimate. The random effects model allows for additional explanatory 
variables, which have equal value for all observations within a group (e.g., it permits 
the use of dummies). Alternatively, one disadvantage of the random effects model is 
that it requires specific assumptions about the distribution of the random component. 
Also, if the unobserved group-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables, then the estimates will be biased and inconsistent. Overall, the difference 
between the fixed effects and random effects models is that the fixed effects model 
supposes that each period varies in its intercept term, whereas the random effects 
model assumes that each period differs in its error term (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). 
 
To decide which method to use, we apply the Hausman test. The Hausman test is a 
specification test proposed by Hausman (1978) which is based on the correlations 
between the regressors and the unobserved or individual effect. The Hausman test is 
important to test the assumption of whether unobserved and observed explanatory 
variables are correlated. The fixed effect estimator is consistent even when the 
estimators are correlated with the individual effect. If they are correlated, the fixed 
effect is consistent, but the random effect is not consistent. Therefore, we actually 
test in the null hypothesis (H0) that the random effects are consistent and efficient, 
versus alternative hypothesis (H1) that the random effects are inconsistent (as the 
fixed effects will be always consistent). The Hausman test uses the following test 
statistic: 




If the Hausman statistic is small, we cannot reject the null hypothesis; therefore, the 
random effects model is consistent. On the other hand, if it is large, the fixed effects 
estimator is more appropriate. 
 










Table 3.2 presents the results for the Hausman test. We apply the test for each model 
that we use in Chapters 5 and 6. According to the test, we reject the null hypothesis 
that the random effecst model is consistent in each case. Therefore, in accordance 
with our test results, we apply the fixed effects model. 
 
The model that we apply is the static panel model. But most of the recent studies 
apply the dynamic models. For instance, Antoniou et al. (2006) use the dynamic 
model to estimate debt maturity due to the presence of a substantial autocorrelation 
in the residuals. They conclude that current leverage or maturity may depend upon 
the past leverage or maturity; therefore, they propose that the dynamic model is 
Leverage for Chapter 5       
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 841.37 15.00 0.00 
      
LTD/TA for Chapter 6       
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 348.44 15.00 0.00 
      
STD/TA for Chapter 6       
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 1021.40 15.00 0.00 
    
LTD/TD for Chapter 6    
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 676.05 16.00 0.00 
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more appropriate than static. Due to data limitations, as we have only two or three 
years of firm level observations, we could not apply the dynamic model. As such, 
this is one of the limitations of this thesis. 
 
3.6. Empirical Models 
In this section, we explain the models that we use to examine our research questions. 
In Chapter 4, we investigate the significance of differences in leverage and the debt 
maturity levels of firms. In Chapter 5, we analyze the effect of determinants of 
capital structure on leverage decisions of firms. In Chapter 6, using the same 
determinants, we examine the debt maturity structure decisions of firms including 
long-term debt to total assets, short-term debt to total assets, and long-term debt to 
total debt. 
 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to analyse the leverage and debt maturity levels of firms 
in developing countries. First, we will apply an F-test to examine whether the 
differences in variables among the countries are statistically significant. Then, by 
conducting a t-test, we will compare the significance of differences in leverage, debt 
maturity, tangibility, and profitability levels of small and large firms. We will do the 
same comparison for privately held and listed companies. Finally, we will examine 
the effect of a stock market on the leverage and maturity decisions of firms, 
including small vs. large firms. We will conduct a t-test to examine the significance 
of the differences for the firms in countries with and without a stock market. 
  
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to investigate the determinants of capital structure in 
developing countries. The basic empirical model that we apply in Chapter 5 of this 
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study is a regression of the measure of firm’s total liabilities to total assets (leverage) 
against the firm’s tangibility of assets, profitability, and size, macroeconomic factors 
including GDP/Cap, growth, inflation, interest, and tax and financial environment 
factors such as corruption, legal system, financial institutions, and financial 
globalization. In Chapter 6, we examine the impact of firm level, the economic 
environment, and the financial environment on the debt maturity decisions of firms. 
This refers to: 
Leverage/Debt maturity = f(firm level variables, economic environment factors, 
financial environment factors) 
 
The functional form of our model is as follows:                 (3.5) 
i = 1, 2, ...,10,839; t = 1999,…,2004 
 
For the Chapter 5, Di,t/Vi,t presents the leverage as total liabilities to total assets for 
the ith firm at time t. Fi,j,t provides the jth firm level variables such as asset tangibility, 
profitability, and size, while Ei,k,t represents the kth economic environment variables 
including GDP per capita, growth, inflation, interest, and tax at time t. Fini,l,t 
presents the lth financial environment variables, which are corruption, legal system, 
deposit money bank assets to central bank assets, stock market dummy, stock market 
turnover, offshore bank deposits to GDP, and offshore bank deposits to domestic 
bank deposits at time t. 
 
For the Chapter 6, we apply the same model by changing the dependent variable. 
Di,t/Vi,t presents the debt maturity for the ith firm at time t. For debt maturity, we use 
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three proxies, such as long-term debt to total assets, short-term debt to total assets, 
and long-term debt to total debt. We use the same independent variables that we 
apply for empirical Chapter 5. Only when we use long-term debt to total debt as the 
dependent variable, we also include leverage as one of the firm-level variables. Fi,j,t 
demonstrates the firm level variables, Ei,k,t represents the economic environment 
variables, and Fini,l,t presents the financial environment variables at time t. 
 
In both Chapters 5 and 6, we first estimate the above equations for leverage and debt 
maturity. Then, we divide the sample based on the size of a firm as small, medium, 
and large. We repeat each estimation for each group. After that, we test the 
robustness of our results by using different definitions of size, such as logarithm of 
sales and logarithm of assets. Finally, we distinguish firms based on their listing 
status and estimate the above models for privately held and publicly listed firms. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we explained the data and methodology that we apply in the thesis. 
First, we discuss our data sources and define the variables that we generate. We 
gathered the variables from various databases, the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 
World Development Indicators, Aggregate Governance Indicators, and Financial 
Development and Structure Database. In the sample, we have 10,839 companies 
with a total of 27,738 observations that contain 48% of small firms, 41% of medium 
size enterprises, and 11% of large firms. Moreover, 92% of the firms are private 




We are using four sets of variables. The first is leverage and debt maturity. The 
second group is firm level variables including asset tangibility, profitability, and 
size. The economic environment variables are GDP per capita, growth, inflation, 
interest, and tax. The financial environment variables are corruption, legal system, 
financial institutions, and financial globalization.  
 
Then, we examined the methodology to find the appropriate one for our analysis. 
Unlike recent studies, we will use the static model and apply the fixed effects 
method. We could not apply the dynamic model due to the unavailability of data. 
Finally, based on the appropriate method that use, we constructed the models for 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
In Chapter 4, we will analyse the leverage and debt maturity levels of firms in 
developing countries. We will examine whether the leverage and maturity levels 
indicate differences based on the size and listing status. Moreover, we will 
investigate the impact of the presence of a stock market on the leverage and maturity 
levels of firms. In Chapter 5, we will discuss the determinants of capital structure by 
analysing the effects of firm level, economic, and financial environment variables on 
leverage. We will employ robustness tests and additional analysis to investigate the 
determinants of leverage for different types of firms. In Chapter 6, we will examine 
the determinants of the debt maturity structure by using long-term debt to total 
assets, short-term debt to total assets, and long-term debt to total debt and 
demonstrate the effect of firm level, economic, and financial environment variables 
on them. We also apply additional analysis to examine the differences between 










The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in depth discussion about the databases 
that we use and provide the preliminary analysis on leverage, debt maturity, and the 
determinants of capital structure across countries. The distinguishing feature of the 
World Bank Enterprise Survey is its coverage for small and medium enterprises. By 
using this database, we analyze the impact of size on the leverage and debt maturity 
levels of firms and make comparisons with those of developed countries. Since this 
is the first thesis to use the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the discussion of the 
dataset is an original empirical contribution. In this chapter, we also explain other 
data sources in addition to the World Bank Enterprise Survey. As we previously 
mentioned in Chapter 3, in addition to the World Bank Enterprise Survey, we also 
use the World Development Indicators for the economic environment variables and 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators and Financial Development Structure 
database for the financial environment variables. Both the World Development 
Indicators and the Financial Development Structure database are provided by World 
Bank, whereas the Worldwide Governance Indicators are combined by using various 
data sources by Kaufmann et al. (2009). By merging those different databases, we 
create a huge dataset containing 24 developing countries from five regions. In total, 
we have 10,839 firms up to three years. As a result, we have a total of 27,738 
observations. 48% (41%) of the observations are from small (medium) firms, while 
only 11% is large firms. 
 
Additionally, we present the summary statistics of leverage and debt maturity, firm-
level variables, economic environment, and financial environment variables for each 
country in the sample. Since our sample includes 24 different countries, we examine 
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whether there is a difference in the leverage and debt maturity, firm-level 
determinants, and economic and financial environments. To see whether these 
differences among countries are statistically significant, we apply an F-test. 
 
Moreover, we investigate the impact of size on the leverage and debt maturity 
decisions of firms in developing countries. The previous literature documents the 
leverage and debt maturity levels of large listed companies in both developed and 
developing countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). There are few 
studies that focus on the leverage and debt maturity decisions of small companies 
(Michaelas et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008). However, the main focus of all studies for small companies is based 
on the European countries. Since the economic and financial environments of 
developing countries are not similar to European countries, it could be misleading to 
generalize their results for all countries. Therefore, by using the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey, we find the leverage and debt maturity levels of small and 
privately held firms. To our knowledge, this is the first thesis to use this database to 
present the debt and maturity levels of small firms in developing countries. We 
compare the averages of leverage and debt maturity levels, as well as firm level 
determinants of small and large firms. Furthermore, we investigate the leverage and 
maturity levels of privately held and publicly listed companies. Finally, we examine 
how the presence of a stock market affects the external financing decisions of firms. 
We compare the leverage and debt maturity levels of small and large firms in 
countries with and without a stock market and investigate whether the differences in 
leverage and maturity levels are statistically significant by conducting a univariate 
analysis. Hence, we are looking to answer the following questions: 
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• Are the leverage and debt maturity levels of small and large firms 
different in developing countries? 
• Do the leverage and debt maturity levels show differences between 
privately held and listed companies in developing countries? 
• Does the presence of a stock market have an impact on the leverage and 
debt maturity levels of firms? 
 
By using the World Bank Enterprise survey data, we find that small firms are less 
levered and have shorter maturity when compared to large firms in developing 
countries. Firms in a country with a stock market can use more leverage and longer 
debt maturity than firms in a country without a stock market. This difference is 
higher, especially for small firms. In contrast, the average leverage of large firms in 
countries with an active stock market is close to the average leverage in developed 
countries. Therefore, the presence of an active stock market is important for the 
external financing of firms in developing countries. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the 
databases that we use to collect the variables. Section 4.3 presents the descriptive 
statistics for each individual country, while Section 4.4 provides the stylized facts. 
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. Data Sources 
The dataset used in the thesis is gathered from various databases. The data for firm 
level variables are collected from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, economic 
environment variables are from the World Development Indicators and the financial 
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environment variables are from the Worldwide Governance Indicators and Financial 
Development and Structure database. In addition to that, we use legal origin data 
from La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) to proxy the legal system. In our dataset, we 
include 24 developing countries from 5 different regions including Ethiopia, 
Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia from the African region; Cambodia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines from the East Asia and Pacific region; Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru from the 
Latin America and Caribbean region; Morocco, Oman, and the Syrian Arab 
Republic from the Middle East and North African region; as well as Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka the from South Asian region. The sample includes 
10,839 firms and 27,738 observations. In the following section, we will first explain 
the World Bank Enterprise Survey. Then, in Section 4.2.2, we will discuss the 
World Development Indicators. Section 4.2.3 explains the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators by Kaufman et al. (2009). Section 4.2.4 describes the Financial 
Development and Structure database. 
  
4.2.1. World Bank Enterprise Survey 
The World Bank Enterprise Survey is a major cross-sectional survey conducted in 
developing countries and emerging markets. It is a firm level survey that provides a 
sample of an economy’s private sector. The survey aims to collect information about 
the business environment in the country including access to finance, corruption, 
infrastructure, crime, and competition. It also provides data for some of the 
performance measures, such as fixed assets, current assets, total liabilities including 
short-term and long-term debt to total assets and equity-share capital, as well as 
sales and expenses. The survey sample represents the whole non-agricultural private 
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economy. The overall sample involves selected manufacturing industries, service 
industries, and other relevant sectors of the economy. The service companies 
included in the survey are construction, retail, wholesale, hotels, restaurants, 
transport, storage, communications, and IT. Rarely, in a few countries, companies in 
other sectors, such as education or health related businesses, are included. In each 
country, companies in the cities or regions of major economic activity are chosen 
and the firms with five or more employees are aimed for interview. Companies that 
are 100% owned by the government/state do not take part in the survey. 
 
The number of interviews that will take place is decided based on the size of the 
economy. In larger economies, 1,200-1,800 interviews have been made, 360 
interviews occur in medium-sized economies, and 150 interviews in smaller 
economies. The size of the economy is measured based on the Gross National 
Income (GNI). The country is accepted as large economy if its GNI is more than 
$500 billion, a medium-sized economy if it is between $100 to $500 billion, and 
small if it is between $15 and $100 billion. 
 
The survey is performed by private contractors on behalf of the World Bank. 
Government agencies or organizations connected to government are not included in 
the data collection since some questions in the survey are related to business and 
government relations and bribery. But the surveys are done in collaboration with 
business organizations and government agencies for the record of eligible firms. 
Mainly, the list of eligible firms is obtained from the country’s statistical office. 
However, in some cases, the master list of firms is acquired from other government 
agencies, such as tax or business licensing authorities or sometimes taken from 
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business associations or marketing databases. If the list of firms is not approachable 
in one of those ways, then a sample of firms is created via block enumeration by the 
World Bank. First, a country’s cities of major economic activity are divided into 
clusters and blocks. Then, a subset of blocks is selected and enumerated. In that 
way, World Bank creates an eligible list of firms manually. In any case, the 
confidentiality of the survey respondent is never compromised since it is important 
to have the highest number of participants and integrity and confidence in the 
quality of the data.  
 
The survey is done based on face-to-face interviews and it follows two stages. In the 
first stage, from the list of the firms, eligible firms are selected using a Screener 
questionnaire. Contact information and some additional control information are 
gathered from those eligible firms via phone. At the second stage, two versions of 
the survey, Manufacturing or Services, is implemented based on the type of the 
eligible firm via a face-to-face interview. There are two kinds of questionnaires: the 
manufacturing questionnaire and the services questionnaire. Most of the questions 
are the same except those that are not relevant to that type of business. For example, 
questions about production and non-production workers are not applicable to retail 
companies. Both the manufacturing and services questionnaires included thirteen 
sections structured by topic: 
 
• Section A: Control Information: Gathered information in the first stage 
of application. 
• Section B :General information: properties of the companies. 
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• Section C: Infrastructure and Services: power, water, transport, and 
communication technologies. 
• Section D: Sales and Supplies: imports, exports, supply and demand 
situations. 
• Section E: Degree of Competition: number of competitors and 
technology. 
• Section F: Capacity.  
• Section G: Land: land ownership, land access issues. 
• Section I: Crime: extent of crime and losses due to crime. 
• Section K: Finance: sources of finance, access to credit. 
• Section J: Business-Government Relations: quality of public services, 
consistency of policy, regulatory compliance costs (management time, 
bribes). 
• Section L: Labour: employment, training, skills. 
• Section M: Business Environment: ranking of general obstacles. 
• Section N: Performance: numbers and figures needed to estimate 
performance or productivity. 
• Section F: Capacity: use of production capacity, hours of operation, is 
a section only contained in the manufacturing questionnaire. 
 
Most of the questions, more than 90%, objectively determine the characteristics of 
the business environment of a country. The remainder of questions, the obstacles to 




As a survey respondent, business owners and top managers have been surveyed for 
each company. When necessary, company accounts and human resource managers 
take part in the survey on behalf of the business owner or top manager to answer 
questions in the sales and labour sections of the survey. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology used for the sampling of the survey is a stratified random 
sampling with replacement method. In random sampling, all members of the 
population have the same probability of being chosen and no weighting of 
observations is needed. As opposed to a simple random sample, a stratified random 
sample divides all population units into homogeneous groups and, within each 
group, simple random samples are chosen. Therefore, this method helps handling 
estimates for each of the strata with a specified level of accuracy, while population 
estimates can also be estimated by properly weighting individual observations. The 
sampling weights deal with the varying probabilities of selection across different 
strata. The strata for the Enterprise Survey are firm size, business sector, and 
geographic region within each country. Firm size is divided into three groups based 
on the number of employees as small firms (5-19), medium firms (20-99), and large 
firms (100+). Sector breakdown is usually manufacturing, retail, and other services, 
while geographic regions within a country are selected based on which cities or 
regions collectively contain the majority of economic activity. 
 
Since the enterprise survey contains more than 100 indicators, computation of a 
minimum sample size is difficult due to the variance of each indicator. Also, the 
time necessary to obtain permission for the quantitative variables, such as number of 
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employees and sales, are limitless; therefore, for practicality, total sales are selected 
to be the most vital quantitative variable in the survey. Due to the highly skewed 
distribution of sales, the essential sample size for interpretations about its mean is 
predictably too large. Hence, to take large variability, the sample size is calculated 
according to the logarithm of sales. For each strata, a minimum sample size is 
computed based on a 7.5% precision on estimate of log of sales. 
 
Most of the indicators in the Enterprise Survey are calculated based on proportions; 
for instance, a percentage of firms that are involved in X activity or chose Y action. 
To simplify the computation of sample size, the variance of proportion is bounded. 
The minimum level of precision is assured by assuming the maximum variance 
(0.5). Assuming maximum variance, the sample sizes are calculated based on the 
estimates of proportions with 5% and 7.5% precision in 90% confidence intervals by 
using Equation 4.1. 
 
            (4.1) 
 
where N is the population size, P stands for the population proportion, Q equals to 1-
P, k is the desired level of precision, and    is the value of the normal standard 
coordinate for a desired level of confidence, 1-. For instance, if the population is 
10,000, then at the 5% precision minimum, the sample size is 270 and at 7.5% 




The generated sample sizes from the surveys are big enough for the selected 
industries to perform statistically robust analyses with levels of precision at a 
minimum 7.5% precision for 90% confidence intervals about estimates of 
population percentage at the industry level and estimates of the mean of log of sales 
at the industry level. A 7.5% precision of an estimate in a 90% confidence interval 
implies that the population parameter is within the 7.5% range of the observed 
sample estimate, except in 20% of the cases. 
 
The major problem of the Enterprise Survey is that the sample represents only firms, 
which are keen to participate in the survey. If a firm refuses to participate in the 
survey, a willing party substitutes it. Only willing firms attend the survey; therefore, 
firms’ systematic refusal to participate might affect the randomness of the sample. 
The refusal to attend the survey might be due to the economic structure since some 
firms may drop out of the market or it may be due to the manager’s reaction. There 
could be couple of reasons for the managers’ reaction. For instance, it could be due 
to low productivity, effects of negative features if the investment climate refuses to 
participate, or due to a previous experience with the survey. 
 
Another problem in Enterprise survey is non-response questions. This is a severe 
problem for the collection of accounting data to analyse the performance of firms, 
such as sales, employment, cost of labour, raw materials, and net book value of fixed 
assets. The sampling strategy for non-response items factors is up to 25% non-
response per stratum; therefore, there are adequate responses to calculate 
performance indicators with the precision indicated in this sampling methodology. 
Consequently, the total number of required interviews per stratum brings it down to 
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160. But, 160 interviews are completed only for the medium and large economies 
since they have enough observations at the industry level and constraints in the 
budget. By using the World Bank Enterprise survey, we create our main data set. In 
the next section, we describe the main sample used in this study. 
 
4.2.1.1. Sample 
From the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the firm level variables used in this study 
are collected. Our data set includes 24 developing countries from five different 
regions. As can be seen from Table 4.1, the countries included are as follows: 
Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia from the African region; 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the East Asia and Pacific region; 
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Peru from the Latin America and Caribbean region; Morocco, Oman, and the Syrian 
Arab Republic from the Middle East and North African region; and Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka from the South Asian region. The dataset includes 
15,201 firms from the above mentioned countries. The firms are omitted from the 
sample if they do not have both total liabilities and total assets. We also exclude 
firms if their leverage ratio is higher than one.7 Therefore, we end up with 10,839 
companies and a total of 27,738 observations. 
 
The total number of firm observation in our sample is 27,738 including 48.1% of 
small firms, 41% of medium firms, and 10.9% of large firms (see Graph 2 in the 
appendices). The Latin America and Caribbean region, with 10,148, has the highest 
number of observations, while the Middle East and North African region, 2,309, has 
                                                 
7 If a firm’s leverage ratio is higher than one, it means that the firm goes bankrupt. That’s why we 
excluded the firms that have already gone bankrupt. 
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the lowest (see Graph 1 in the appendices). Although the Latin America and 
Caribbean region has the highest number of small firm observations, for medium 
and large firms, the South Asian region has the utmost (see Graph 3 in the 
appendices). In contrast, the least observations for small firms, 1,097, is in the East 
Asia and Pacific region, while the lowest for medium, 1,048, and large firms, 103, 
are in the Middle East and North African region. 
 
The African region includes 3,444 observations that contain 47.5% of small firms, 
43.3% of medium firms, and 9.2% of large firms. Ethiopia, with 76.2%, has more 
small firm observations than other countries in the region. Observations for medium 
size firms are at 17.8%, whereas large firms represent 6%. Malawi has 42.1% of 
small firms, 47.6% of medium size firms, and 10.3% of large firms. South Africa 
has more firm observations than other countries in the region with 1,370. It also has 
the highest proportion of medium and large size firm observations when compared 
to other countries in the region. It has 27.2% (59.9%) of small (medium) and 12.9% 
of large firms. Tanzania has 59.4% (36.9%) of small (medium) and 3.7% of large 
firm observations, while Zambia has 31% (59%) of small (medium) and 10% of 
large firm observations. 
 
The East Asia and Pacific region contains 3,487 observations that include 31.5% of 
small, 45.5% of medium, and 23% of large firms. Cambodia with 90.6% has the 
highest proportion of small firm observations as compared to other countries in the 
region. Indonesia has 1,442 firm observations, which include 29.9% (39.4%) of 
small (medium) and 30.7% of large firm observations. The Philippines has 1,864 
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firm observations containing 26.9% (54.1%) of small (medium) and 19% of large 
firms. 
Table 4.1. Firm Observation by Country and Region 
This table presents the composition of firm observations for each country and region in the sample. 
Small reports firms less than 50 employees. Medium employs 50 to 500 employees, while large firms 
have more than 500 employees. Private are privately held companies and listed are publicly held 
firms. AFR stands for the African Region. EAP symbolizes the East Asia and Pacific region, while 
LCR is for the Latin America and Caribbean region. MNA stands for the Middle East and North 
Africa region and SAR is for the South Asian region. 
 
  Years Total Small Medium Large Private Listed 
AFR   3,444 1,636 1,490 318 3,344 100 
Ethiopia  1999-2001 1,091 831 195 65 1,091 0 
Malawi  2003-2004 233 98 111 24 217 16 
South Africa  2000-2002 1,370 373 820 177 1,320 50 
Tanzania  2000-2002 355 211 131 13 344 11 
Zambia  1999-2001 395 123 233 39 372 23 
EAP   3487 1097 1588 802 2928 559 
Cambodia  2001-2002 181 164 11 6 181 0 
Indonesia  2000-2002 1,442 431 568 443 1,286 156 
Philippines  2000-2002 1,864 502 1,009 353 1,461 403 
LCR   10,148 6,065 3,594 489 9,363 785 
Brazil  2000-2002 4,232 2,244 1,795 193 4,056 176 
Chile  2002-2003 1,793 1,000 663 130 1,641 152 
Ecuador  2000-2002 756 437 301 18 348 408 
El Salvador  2000-2002 676 418 222 36 676 0 
Guatemala  2000-2002 751 495 218 38 751 0 
Guyana  2002-2003 273 229 42 2 245 28 
Honduras  2000-2002 717 497 173 47 717 0 
Nicaragua  2000-2002 757 618 121 18 757 0 
Peru  1999-2001 193 127 59 7 172 21 
MNA   2,309 1,158 1,048 103 303 0 
Morocco  2001-2003 2,006 901 1,002 103 NA NA 
Oman  2000-2002 143 100 43 0 143 0 
Syria  2000-2002 160 157 3 0 160 0 
SAR   8350 3387 3653 1310 7656 691 
Bangladesh 1999-2001 780 246 426 108 730 50 
India  1999-2001 3,868 767 2,206 895 3,396 472 
Pakistan  1999-2001 2,764 2,094 625 45 2,674 90 
Sri Lanka  2001-2003 938 280 396 262 856 79 





The Latin America and Caribbean region has the largest amount of firm 
observations with 10,148 as compared to other regions. This region contains 59.8% 
(35.4%) of small (medium) and 4.8% of large company observations. Within this 
region, Brazil has more firm observations than other countries. It has 4,232 firm 
observations that include 53% (42.4%) of small (medium) and 4.6% of large 
companies. After Brazil, Chile has the highest number of observations in the region 
with 1,793 of which 55.8% (37%) of small (medium) and 7.2% of large firms. In 
Ecuador, 57.8% (39.8%) of the firms are small (medium) sized and 2.4% percent are 
large firms, while, El Salvador has 61.8% (32.8%) of small (medium) and 5.4% of 
large firms. Guatemala has 751 firm observations and most of them are small and 
medium sized firms. Guyana has a few large firm observations at 0.7% while small 
(medium) firms are 83.9% (15.4%). The total number of company observations in 
Honduras is 717 that contain 69.3% (24.1%) of small (medium) and 6.6% of large 
firms. Nicaragua has 757 firm observations. Within those observations, small 
(medium) firms have 81.6% (16%) and around 2.4% of large firms. Peru has 65.8% 
(30.6%) of small (medium) and 3.6% of large firms. 
 
The Middle East and North Africa region has 2,309 firm observations that have 
50.1% (45.4%) of small (medium) and 4.5% of large firms. This region includes 
three countries: Morocco, Oman, and Syria. Morocco has 2,006 observations, which 
contain 44.9% (50%) percent of small (medium) and 5.1% of large firms. Oman and 
Syria do not have any large firms. Oman has 69.9% of small and 30.1% of medium 




The South Asian region has 8,350 company observations, which have 40.5% 
(43.8%) of small (medium) and 15.7% of large firms. Bangladesh has 31.5% 
(54.6%) of small (medium) and 13.9% of large firms. India with 75.8% has the 
highest proportion of small firms to total firms, while 22.6% are medium sized and 
1.6% are large firms. The total number of observations in India is 3,868. Pakistan 
has 2,764 firms, which include 75.8% (22.6%) of small (medium) and 1.6% of large 
firms. For Sri Lanka, 29.9% (42.2%) of the firm observations are small (medium), 
whereas 27.9% are large sized firms. 
 
To sum, the majority of the firms in the sample are small and medium sized 
companies. Brazil has the highest number of small firm observations, while India 
has the highest for both medium and large firms. Malawi with 98 has the lowest 
number of observations for small firms, while Oman and Syria do not have any large 
firms. 
 
For privately held and publicly listed firms, the total number of observations in the 
sample is 25,729, which include 92% of privately held and 8% of publicly listed 
firms. The total number of observations for privately held and listed firms are 
23,594 and 2,135, respectively. Some countries in the sample do not have either a 
stock market or an active stock market. That’s why Cambodia, Ethiopia, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Syria do not have publicly listed companies. For other countries, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Oman, our dataset does not contain any publicly held 
companies. India with 472 observations has the highest number for listed 
companies, while Tanzania, with 11, has the lowest number of observations in the 
sample. Alternatively, Brazil, with 4,056, has the highest number of observations for 
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private firms and Oman, with 143, has the lowest number of observations for private 
firms. 
 
As a result, the Latin America and Caribbean region represents the majority of the 
sample, while the Middle East and North African region has the least number of 
observations. Overall, Brazil, with 4,232 observations, has the majority of the 
sample, while Oman, with 143, has the lowest number of observations. 
 
4.2.2. World Development Indicators 
The World Development Indicators database is provided by World Bank. World 
Development Indicators (WDI) covers more than 200 countries and contains 
statistical data on over 700 development indicators including social, economic, 
financial, natural resources, and environmental indicators from 1960 onward. The 
goal of WDI is to provide relevant, high-quality, internationally comparable 
statistics. To achieve this goal, they describe, collect, and disseminate international 
statistics with the help of international and government agencies, as well as private 
and non-governmental organisations. We use the WDI database for our economic 
environment variables. We use annual data for macroeconomic variables since our 
firm level variables are based on the end of year accounting data. 
 
4.2.3. Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Kaufmann et al. (2009) create the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
database by combining 35 different data sources from 33 various institutions around 
the world. The database involves 213 countries and territories starting from the year 
1996. The database has been updated each year. Basically, the database merges the 
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views of various survey respondents including enterprises, citizens, and experts in 
both developed and developing countries and provides data on perceptions of 
governance. 
 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) define governance as “the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them.” Based on this definition, the gathered data is organized 
under six clusters corresponding to the six dimensions of governance that include 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption. Voice and Accountability, and Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism as indicators for the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored, and replaced. Voice and Accountability indicates whether a country’s 
citizens are involved in choosing their government and whether there is freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and free media. Alternatively, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism signify the possibility that a government will be 
destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means, containing politically motivated 
violence and terrorism. Both of them are used to measure the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored, and replaced. 
 
Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality imply the ability of the 
government to successfully create and apply sound policies. Government 
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Effectiveness indicates the views of the quality of public services and civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy 
creation and application, and the trustworthiness of the government’s dedication to 
such policies. Regulatory Quality represents the government’s capability to create 
and apply sound policies and regulations that allow and encourage private sector 
development. 
 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption specify the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that manage economic and social relations among them. Rule of 
Law denotes the views about the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, the courts, and the probability of crime and violence. Control of 
Corruption indicates the opinions as to whether public power is exercised for private 
gain, containing both petty and grand forms of corruption, together with a capture of 
the state by elites and private interests. 
 
All of these six dimensions are interrelated to each other. They are gathered as a set 
of empirical proxies from various sources including surveys of firms and 
households, subjective evaluation of a range of commercial business information 
providers, non-governmental organizations, and a number of multilateral 
organizations and other public sector bodies. For instance, data for corruption are 
gathered from cross country households or firm surveys that provides the 
perceptions and experiences of respondents and NGO or commercial data providers, 
which offer its own corruption appraisal according to its network of respondents. 
Then, those different measures of corruption are combined into a composite 
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indicator that summarizes their common component. The same method applies to 
the other indicators. 
 
Methodology 
The combination of various individual data sources into six aggregate governance 
indicators is accomplished by applying a statistical tool unobserved components 
model. Since each data source provides an imperfect signal of some underlying 
concept of governance that is difficult to notice straightforwardly, this statistical tool 
helps to overcome this signal extraction problem. For each governance indicator, 
they propose that the observed score of country j on indicator k, Yjk is a linear 
function of unobserved governance in country j, gj and error term jk; therefore, 
following model is applied: 
         (4.2) 
 
As a safe selection of units, gj is assumed to be a normally distributed random 
variable with mean zero and variance one. This indicates that aggregate governance 
indicators are a standard normal random variable with zero mean, unit standard 
deviation and varying around -2.5 to 2.5. The error term is assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean and a variance that does not change across countries, but 
alters across indicators,    and independent through sources,    for source m different from source k. The parameters k and k indicate the 
different units to measure governance from different sources. For instance, 
corruption is measured on a scale from 0 to 3 by one data source; whereas, in 
another data source, it might be measured based on a 1 to 10 scale. These 
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differences in explicit and implicit selection of units in the observed data from each 
source are captured by k and k. Following that, estimates of these two parameters 
are used to rescale the data from each source into common units. By using the 
estimates, k, k, 2k from the above equation, the following model is constructed: 
           (4.3) 
 
This conditional mean is used as the governance estimate that is a weighted average 
of the rescaled scores for each country,  . wk refer to weights calculated as      and weights become larger for the sources that provide more 
informative signal of governance. By applying this methodology, the six governance 
indicators are calculated. 
 
For our analysis, we use only the Control of Corruption due to the high correlation 
among other indicators (see Table 1 in the appendices). The corruption indicator is 
measured in units ranging -2.5 to 2.5. The higher values correspond to better 
governance, meaning less corruption in the country. The WGI continues to collect 
data for each year beginning in 1996, but the database does not cover the years 
1997, 1999, and 2001. For the year 1999, we derive averages by using the Control of 
Corruption variable in the years 1998 and 2000, while for 2001, we use 2000 and 
2002. For the other years, we apply the available values from the database since 




4.2.4. Financial Development and Structure Database 
The financial development and structure database is created by Beck et al. (2010). 
The database combines the indicators for financial development and structure across 
countries and over time. The database provides statistics on the size, activity, and 
efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets, such as banks, nonbanks, equity 
markets, and bond markets. Basically, the database attempts to compare the financial 
systems for a given country and over time. Moreover, it also includes various 
indicators of financial globalization containing international bond issues, 
international loans, offshore deposits, and remittance flows. The provided indicators 
in the database cover different dimensions of the financial system. Indicators are 
created based on the raw data from various databases. Indicators on financial 
intermediary development is created using the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics; indicators on the equity market are from the Emerging Market Database 
and indicators on bond market are taken from the BIS. The database includes more 
than 200 countries from 1960-2009. The data for financial institutions and financial 
globalization is collected from the Financial Development and Structure database 
(Beck et al., 2009). As a financial globalization proxy, we use the ratio of offshore 
bank loans relative to GDP and the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank 
deposits as they are the only variables available for all of the countries in the dataset. 
 
4.3. Properties of Data 
In this section, we discuss the descriptive statistics for leverage, debt maturity, firm 
level variables, economic environment variables, and financial environment 
variables. We present the summary statistics both for the overall sample and 
individual countries in the sample. Initially, we discuss leverage and debt maturity. 
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Then, we present the statistics for firm level variables, which are asset tangibility, 
profitability, and size. Following that, we report the averages for economic 
environment variables, GDP per capita, growth, inflation, interest, and tax, 
respectively. Then, we discuss the descriptive statistics of the variables for financial 
environment that include corruption, legal system, financial institutions, and 
financial globalization. Since we have 24 different countries in the sample, we 
conduct an F-test to examine whether the differences in variables across countries 
are statistically significant. 
 
4.3.1. Leverage 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for leverage. The mean (median) of leverage 
for all countries in the sample is 39.09% (37.71%). Leverage is low in our sample 
compared to developed countries. In the U.S. (UK), the mean of leverage is around 
58% (54%) (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Firms in developed countries are more 
highly leveraged than firms in developing countries. 
 
On the country level, we analyse whether the leverage levels of firms demonstrate 
differences among different countries. We apply an F-test to see whether the 
differences across countries are statistically significant. We find that the leverage 
level indicates differences across countries and this difference is statistically 
significant. The mean of leverage varies 5.18% and 59.58%. Firms in Cambodia 
with 5.18% have the lowest leverage compared to firms in other countries in the 
sample. In contrast, firms in Morocco with 59.58% have the highest average 
leverage. The leverage levels of firms in Malawi, Zambia, and Morocco are similar 
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to that of developed countries; however, most of the countries in the sample have 
lower leverage when compared to developed countries. 
 
Table 4.2. Summary Statistics for Leverage8 
 
Leverage Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.3909 0.3771 1.0000 0.0000 0.2218 1.8154 1849.22 0.0000 27738 
Cambodia 0.0518 0.0000 0.6271 0.0000 2.6324 10.1467 594.23 0.0000 181 
Guyana 0.0769 0.0167 0.9650 0.0000 3.0365 13.7256 1728.10 0.0000 273 
Syria 0.1312 0.0538 0.9709 0.0000 2.1316 7.9805 286.53 0.0000 160 
Pakistan 0.2015 0.1304 0.9851 0.0000 1.2367 3.8630 790.31 0.0000 2764 
Nicaragua 0.2034 0.0913 0.9861 0.0000 1.2709 3.6495 217.09 0.0000 757 
Ethiopia 0.2414 0.1332 0.9878 0.0000 0.8634 2.5142 146.29 0.0000 1091 
Bangladesh 0.2549 0.0000 0.9837 0.0000 0.8970 2.2570 122.54 0.0000 780 
Guatemala 0.2647 0.1853 0.9951 0.0000 0.9080 2.8689 103.74 0.0000 751 
Honduras 0.2671 0.1629 0.9997 0.0000 0.9206 2.6199 105.59 0.0000 717 
Indonesia 0.3097 0.1913 0.9996 0.0000 0.5695 1.8480 157.69 0.0000 1442 
Tanzania 0.3804 0.3611 0.9474 0.0000 0.2687 2.0218 18.42 0.0001 355 
Brazil 0.3949 0.3612 0.9994 0.0000 0.3437 2.0077 256.92 0.0000 4232 
Oman 0.4064 0.3849 0.9915 0.0000 0.3256 2.1740 6.59 0.0370 143 
Chile 0.4188 0.4080 0.9998 0.0000 0.2063 2.2238 57.73 0.0000 1793 
El Salvador 0.4334 0.4471 0.9763 0.0000 -0.0589 2.1142 22.49 0.0000 676 
South Africa 0.4371 0.4190 1.0000 0.0000 0.1256 1.7328 95.27 0.0000 1370 
Sri Lanka 0.4421 0.4664 0.9995 0.0000 -0.0156 1.7824 57.98 0.0000 938 
Philippines 0.4720 0.4883 0.9996 0.0000 -0.0751 1.7821 116.96 0.0000 1864 
Ecuador 0.4790 0.4661 0.9893 0.0000 0.0090 2.0910 26.04 0.0000 756 
India 0.5102 0.5588 0.9990 0.0000 -0.4413 2.3317 197.53 0.0000 3868 
Peru 0.5104 0.5218 0.9677 0.0000 -0.1235 2.1295 6.58 0.0372 193 
Malawi 0.5437 0.5702 0.9990 0.0000 -0.2979 2.0284 12.61 0.0018 233 
Zambia 0.5659 0.5650 0.9997 0.0012 -0.1984 2.0296 18.09 0.0001 395 
Morocco 0.5958 0.6290 0.9984 0.0000 -0.4725 2.4156 103.18 0.0000 2006 
F-test (23, 27714) 264.4999 0.0000             
 
 
4.3.2. Debt maturity 
Table 4.3 provides the summary statistics for debt maturity. To proxy debt maturity, 
we use three ratios: long-term debt to total assets, short-term debt to total assets, and 
                                                 
8 Please refer to table 5 in the appendix for the results of F-test for regions. 
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long-term debt to total debt. The mean (median) of long-term debt to total assets is 
14.01% (2.56%) and the mean (median) of short-term debt to total assets is 24.94% 
(18.25%). Alternatively, the average (median) of long-term debt to total debt is 
32.63% (19.73%) for the firms in the sample. We apply an F test to examine 
whether the differences on debt maturity across countries are statistically significant. 
We confirm that long-term debt to total assets levels alter across countries and vary 
between 1.80% and 27.32% in the sample. Firms in Cambodia have the lowest 
average long-term debt to total assets, while firms in India have the highest long-
term debt to total assets. The average long-term debt to total assets in the U.S. (UK) 
is 37% (28%) (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Firms in developed countries have more 
long-term debt to total assets than firms in developing countries. Even the highest 
average is not close to the companies in the U.S.  
 
The average (median) short-term debt to total assets for all firms in the sample is 
24.94% (18.25%). Table 4.3 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics among all 
countries in the sample. The mean of short-term debt to total assets varies between 
2.70% and 53.44%. Guyana has the lowest short-term debt to total assets level with 
2.70%, while Morocco, with 53.44%, has the highest short-term debt to total assets. 
By applying an F test, we analyse whether the differences in short-term debt to total 
assets levels are significant. We confirm that short-term debt to total assets levels 







Table 4.3. Summary Statistics for Debt Maturity 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Long-term Debt to Total Assets 
LTD/TA Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.1401 0.0256 0.9973 0.0000 1.5821 5.0374 16056.11 0.0000 27203 
Cambodia 0.0180 0.0000 0.3009 0.0000 3.5110 15.8268 1612.68 0.0000 733 
Syria 0.0360 0.0000 0.6307 0.0000 3.9788 18.5542 2035.04 0.0000 665 
Ethiopia 0.0492 0.0000 0.9359 0.0000 3.3519 15.2746 5974.13 0.0000 736 
Guyana 0.0499 0.0000 0.9231 0.0000 3.7843 20.8410 4272.27 0.0000 745 
Morocco 0.0614 0.0000 0.8029 0.0000 2.6676 11.0945 7855.60 0.0000 233 
Pakistan 0.0665 0.0000 0.9700 0.0000 2.3848 10.6256 9276.50 0.0000 355 
Nicaragua 0.0808 0.0000 0.9164 0.0000 2.6120 10.1926 2423.42 0.0000 665 
Brazil 0.0931 0.0000 0.9412 0.0000 2.0383 6.9552 5688.89 0.0000 160 
Guatemala 0.1089 0.0004 0.8100 0.0000 1.7560 5.7435 616.51 0.0000 4232 
Indonesia 0.1216 0.0000 0.9973 0.0000 1.9370 6.1609 1501.97 0.0000 780 
Honduras 0.1334 0.0095 0.9905 0.0000 1.8073 5.9295 619.67 0.0000 1442 
Bangladesh 0.1384 0.0000 0.8846 0.0000 1.4766 4.2128 331.27 0.0000 181 
South Africa 0.1497 0.0457 0.9828 0.0000 1.4887 4.4798 631.07 0.0000 143 
Malawi 0.1534 0.0396 0.9024 0.0000 1.5872 4.7590 127.86 0.0000 1370 
Ecuador 0.1546 0.0859 0.9836 0.0000 1.6446 5.5871 485.23 0.0000 2006 
Chile 0.1556 0.0931 0.9806 0.0000 1.3381 4.3982 681.10 0.0000 273 
Tanzania 0.1562 0.0613 0.8001 0.0000 1.2679 3.6505 101.37 0.0000 1864 
Zambia 0.1574 0.0363 0.9382 0.0000 1.4244 4.2123 157.76 0.0000 3868 
Sri Lanka 0.1779 0.0821 0.9835 0.0000 1.4127 4.2788 375.93 0.0000 193 
Oman 0.1814 0.1343 0.9058 0.0000 1.5869 5.3401 92.65 0.0000 1793 
Peru 0.1816 0.1090 0.8893 0.0000 1.4724 4.6600 91.90 0.0000 395 
El Salvador 0.1960 0.1546 0.9362 0.0000 1.1170 4.0619 169.52 0.0000 2752 
Philippines 0.2052 0.0000 0.9956 0.0000 1.1438 3.0715 406.86 0.0000 938 
India 0.2732 0.2871 0.9829 0.0000 0.4840 2.8835 153.19 0.0000 687 
F-test 
(23, 
27185) 169.3847 0.0000             
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Short-term Debt to Total Assets 
 
 
Finally, we present the summary statistics for long-term debt to total debt. The mean 
of long-term debt to total debt is 32.63% for all firms in the sample. The average 
alters between 9.96% and 56.24% among the countries. We conduct an F-test to 
examine whether this difference among the countries is statistically significant. We 
confirm that the difference is statistically significant. Firms in Morocco have the 
shortest maturity of debt, while the firms in Bangladesh have the longest maturity of 
debt. 




Minimum  Skewness  Kurtosis 
 Jarque-
Bera Prob  Obs 
All 0.2494 0.1825 0.9995 0.0000 0.9333 2.9678 3951.10 0.0000 27209 
Guyana 0.0270 0.0108 0.8014 0.0000 7.5496 77.8201 66271.09 0.0000 273 
Cambodia 0.0332 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 2.9939 12.8130 996.61 0.0000 181 
Syria 0.0951 0.0238 0.9709 0.0000 2.7210 12.7481 830.94 0.0000 160 
Ethiopia 0.0997 0.0000 0.9878 0.0000 2.0392 6.5737 898.06 0.0000 733 
Bangladesh 0.1165 0.0000 0.9372 0.0000 1.9740 6.2931 859.01 0.0000 780 
Nicaragua 0.1201 0.0265 0.9861 0.0000 2.1509 7.7877 1270.44 0.0000 736 
Honduras 0.1232 0.0173 0.9714 0.0000 1.9770 6.4568 789.57 0.0000 687 
Pakistan 0.1333 0.0667 0.9851 0.0000 1.9866 6.7233 3399.75 0.0000 2752 
Guatemala 0.1568 0.0920 0.9368 0.0000 1.5322 5.1464 434.50 0.0000 745 
Indonesia 0.1881 0.0151 0.9754 0.0000 1.2740 3.4105 400.18 0.0000 1442 
Tanzania 0.2243 0.1665 0.9368 0.0000 1.0135 3.3665 62.76 0.0000 355 
Oman 0.2250 0.1905 0.8317 0.0000 1.1997 3.9605 39.80 0.0000 143 
El Salvador 0.2333 0.1935 0.9466 0.0000 0.8707 3.2018 85.15 0.0000 665 
India 0.2370 0.2049 0.9966 0.0000 1.0789 3.9374 892.02 0.0000 3868 
Chile 0.2632 0.2250 0.9926 0.0000 1.0016 3.8105 348.84 0.0000 1793 
Sri Lanka 0.2643 0.2057 0.9995 0.0000 0.7198 2.5868 87.68 0.0000 938 
Philippines 0.2668 0.1863 0.9982 0.0000 0.8294 2.5653 228.37 0.0000 1864 
South 
Africa 0.2874 0.2456 0.9679 0.0000 0.5959 2.4740 96.88 0.0000 1370 
Brazil 0.3018 0.2537 0.9981 0.0000 0.7509 2.7826 406.06 0.0000 4232 
Ecuador 0.3115 0.2700 0.9889 0.0000 0.6395 2.6959 47.89 0.0000 665 
Peru 0.3288 0.2972 0.9677 0.0000 0.6631 3.0860 14.20 0.0008 193 
Malawi 0.3903 0.4264 0.9519 0.0000 0.1485 1.9201 12.18 0.0023 233 
Zambia 0.4085 0.3887 0.9945 0.0012 0.3603 2.2394 18.07 0.0001 395 
Morocco 0.5344 0.5598 0.9984 0.0000 -0.2224 2.1596 75.57 0.0000 2006 
F-test 
(23, 




Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Long-term Debt to Total Debt 
LTD/TD Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.3263 0.1973 1.0000 0.0000 0.6207 1.9418 2674.91 0.0000 24127 
Morocco 0.0996 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.4421 9.1810 5184.63 0.0000 2005 
Ethiopia 0.1201 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.2358 6.5036 872.63 0.0000 649 
Brazil 0.1996 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.2630 3.4112 1105.60 0.0000 4051 
Syria 0.2354 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.1556 2.4947 27.52 0.0000 118 
Zambia 0.2361 0.0838 0.9960 0.0000 0.9905 2.6367 66.77 0.0000 395 
Malawi 0.2497 0.0994 1.0000 0.0000 1.0170 2.7053 40.30 0.0000 229 
Ecuador 0.2787 0.1802 1.0000 0.0000 0.8259 2.5428 89.72 0.0000 733 
South 
Africa 0.2846 0.1691 1.0000 0.0000 0.8245 2.4205 151.10 0.0000 1187 
Pakistan 0.3087 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.6220 1.8125 269.53 0.0000 2187 
Cambodia 0.3091 0.3000 1.0000 0.0000 0.6437 2.5816 3.59 0.1662 47 
Guyana 0.3124 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.6527 1.6387 36.02 0.0000 243 
Peru 0.3172 0.2681 1.0000 0.0000 0.7388 2.6246 18.40 0.0001 190 
Chile 0.3314 0.2854 1.0000 0.0000 0.4894 2.0231 139.05 0.0000 1745 
Nicaragua 0.3522 0.0904 1.0000 0.0000 0.5741 1.6362 73.10 0.0000 552 
Guatemala 0.3537 0.2000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5249 1.6910 80.13 0.0000 683 
Tanzania 0.3615 0.2542 1.0000 0.0000 0.5099 1.7611 35.62 0.0000 332 
Philippines 0.3764 0.1886 1.0000 0.0000 0.4606 1.4863 222.01 0.0000 1697 
El Salvador 0.4185 0.4210 1.0000 0.0000 0.1423 1.6608 50.53 0.0000 647 
Sri Lanka 0.4188 0.3384 1.0000 0.0000 0.3380 1.6843 75.40 0.0000 827 
Indonesia 0.4196 0.2920 1.0000 0.0000 0.3258 1.4224 116.89 0.0000 963 
Oman 0.4412 0.4201 1.0000 0.0000 0.1725 1.8278 8.52 0.0141 137 
Honduras 0.4712 0.5000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0522 1.2725 68.39 0.0000 548 
India 0.5343 0.5597 1.0000 0.0000 -0.3306 2.2358 152.24 0.0000 3578 
Bangladesh 0.5624 0.5885 1.0000 0.0000 -0.2558 1.9116 23.14 0.0000 384 
F-test (23, 24103) 171.74 0.0000             
 
4.3.3. Firm-level variables 
In this section, we discuss the descriptive statistics for firm-level variables. We 
present the summary statistics for each country in the sample. We conduct an F-test 
to examine whether the alterations in firm-level variables are statistically significant 





Table 4.4. Summary Statistics for Tangibility 
Tangibility Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.4521 0.4407 1.0000 0.0000 0.2218 1.8154 1269.47 0.0000 27738 
Syria 0.1958 0.1220 0.9706 0.0000 1.2996 4.3024 48.95 0.0000 139 
Cambodia 0.2596 0.1666 0.9715 0.0032 1.0502 3.0107 19.49 0.0001 106 
Oman 0.2790 0.2103 0.9414 0.0014 1.1616 3.7002 31.64 0.0000 129 
Morocco 0.2990 0.2604 0.9937 0.0000 0.6737 2.7167 158.44 0.0000 2006 
Chile 0.3487 0.2983 1.0000 0.0000 0.7033 2.6167 151.42 0.0000 1710 
South 
Africa 0.3631 0.3478 0.9348 0.0000 0.2171 2.0494 60.20 0.0000 1323 
Peru 0.3685 0.3592 0.8704 0.0063 0.1753 1.8053 11.37 0.0034 176 
Philippines 0.4197 0.3710 1.0000 0.0000 0.4379 2.0206 133.42 0.0000 1855 
India 0.4335 0.4732 0.9896 0.0000 -0.0340 2.3146 75.74 0.0000 3832 
Brazil 0.4399 0.4223 1.0000 0.0000 0.2215 2.0640 188.85 0.0000 4227 
Zambia 0.4412 0.4449 0.9706 0.0010 -0.0349 2.1122 13.05 0.0015 395 
Ecuador 0.4654 0.4529 1.0000 0.0000 0.1636 2.1464 25.17 0.0000 723 
El Salvador 0.4785 0.4614 1.0000 0.0000 0.1171 2.0061 29.15 0.0000 671 
Malawi 0.4811 0.4520 1.0000 0.0024 0.1997 1.9401 12.35 0.0021 231 
Pakistan 0.4838 0.4739 0.9915 0.0000 -0.0032 1.9393 129.53 0.0000 2763 
Ethiopia 0.5037 0.5014 1.0000 0.0000 0.0291 1.8612 58.40 0.0000 1078 
Indonesia 0.5165 0.5292 1.0000 0.0000 -0.0654 1.8510 76.12 0.0000 1366 
Tanzania 0.5312 0.5363 1.0000 0.0000 0.0072 1.8759 17.64 0.0001 335 
Sri Lanka 0.5356 0.5777 1.0000 0.0000 -0.3077 1.9531 57.63 0.0000 938 
Guatemala 0.5636 0.5889 0.9964 0.0006 -0.3701 2.2162 36.03 0.0000 744 
Honduras 0.6094 0.6667 1.0000 0.0000 -0.4864 1.9503 59.73 0.0000 700 
Bangladesh 0.6108 0.6447 1.0000 0.0000 -0.4587 2.2595 34.81 0.0000 601 
Nicaragua 0.6310 0.7016 1.0000 0.0000 -0.5574 1.9945 70.53 0.0000 751 
Guyana 0.7886 0.8917 0.9952 0.0000 -1.8707 5.6130 230.82 0.0000 266 
F-test (23, 27041) 140.6766 0.0000             
4.3.3.1. Tangibility 
The mean (median) of asset tangibility of the firms in the sample is 45.21% 
(44.07%). Tangible assets play an important role for the debt financing decisions of 
firms. As tangible assets can be used as collateral, firms with high tangible assets 
should have greater borrowing capacity. Thus, the greater the tangible assets, the 
more debt firms must get. The range for tangibility of assets in the sample alters 
between 19.58% and 78.86%. The firms in Syria have the lowest level of tangible 
assets, while firms in Guyana have the highest level of tangible assets. The level of 
collateral might be one of the reasons why firms in Syria have low levels of debt. 
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The mean of asset tangibility for listed companies in the U.S. (UK) is 39.5% 
(35.6%) (Antoniou et al., 2008). The firms in developing countries must have more 
tangible assets to be financed by debt compared to firms in developed countries. 
 
Table 4.5. Summary Statistics for Profitability 
Profitability Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.3702 0.2197 7.3933 -4.0425 2.2688 15.8356 208828.6 0.0000 27041 
Oman 0.0205 0.0234 1.2811 -2.9019 -2.9517 18.7169 1479.83 0.0000 126 
Syria 0.1219 0.0691 2.5153 -1.8017 2.2011 17.6937 1470.53 0.0000 150 
Zambia 0.1549 0.0835 6.5916 -1.9149 7.3611 94.5567 140814.70 0.0000 393 
Morocco 0.1852 0.1613 6.8393 -1.8612 3.6326 72.3363 405227.70 0.0000 2001 
Peru 0.1885 0.1252 1.6049 -2.6778 -1.1590 17.8795 1823.62 0.0000 193 
Ethiopia 0.1988 0.0682 5.7591 -3.6692 2.5445 18.8511 12379.58 0.0000 1072 
Guyana 0.2169 0.1772 2.5642 -0.7032 3.0698 28.0740 7580.34 0.0000 273 
Cambodia 0.2179 0.1753 2.1950 -3.1190 -0.4186 9.7158 314.89 0.0000 165 
Tanzania 0.2444 0.1480 4.4116 -1.7562 2.0348 17.3838 3221.49 0.0000 346 
South 
Africa 0.2498 0.1340 3.3535 -2.6621 1.4031 11.0304 4091.45 0.0000 1357 
Philippines 0.2843 0.1082 7.3933 -4.0425 2.5525 17.7351 18421.14 0.0000 1818 
Guatemala 0.3010 0.2065 5.5851 -3.9778 1.2877 13.5844 3643.92 0.0000 737 
Nicaragua 0.3015 0.1477 3.6540 -1.7348 1.9565 9.6866 1855.68 0.0000 742 
El Salvador 0.3054 0.1778 5.5542 -3.2466 1.8842 15.1286 4482.92 0.0000 667 
Chile 0.3068 0.2088 5.7963 -3.1258 2.1280 16.9260 15735.69 0.0000 1781 
Ecuador 0.3437 0.2608 5.1958 -3.6680 1.5120 14.7338 4092.81 0.0000 669 
Honduras 0.3754 0.1822 4.8631 -3.2097 1.0826 8.2700 895.37 0.0000 662 
Pakistan 0.3964 0.1644 6.1774 -3.9045 2.3021 13.2354 14202.16 0.0000 2706 
India 0.4294 0.3279 5.6317 -2.8611 2.5957 16.9023 34997.29 0.0000 3814 
Malawi 0.4952 0.3861 4.6236 -3.0193 2.0143 13.3721 1176.19 0.0000 228 
Brazil 0.5113 0.3448 6.5042 -3.5770 1.9301 11.2353 14334.82 0.0000 4159 
Indonesia 0.5151 0.3609 6.7542 -3.6444 1.0285 9.3138 2463.81 0.0000 1341 
Sri Lanka 0.5483 0.3465 6.3548 -2.8708 2.3063 13.2677 4624.61 0.0000 876 
Bangladesh 0.6242 0.3153 6.4745 -0.9174 2.8045 11.8892 3521.51 0.0000 765 
F-test (23, 27017) 37.4567 0.0000             
4.3.3.2. Profitability 
Table 4.5 presents the summary statistics for profitability across countries. The 
average (median) profitability of the sample is 37.02% (21.97%). The profitability in 
the U.S. (UK) is 16% (11.6%) (Antoniou et al., 2008). The profitability levels of 
firms among countries vary between 2.05% and 62.42%. We apply an F test to 
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examine whether the firms’ profitability are different across different countries. We 
find that the profitability levels of firms demonstrate statistically significant 
differences among the countries. Firms in Oman have the lowest average 
profitability, while firms in Bangladesh are the most profitable. The firms in most of 
the countries have higher levels of profit when compared to the U.S. (UK). Since 
external funding options are limited in developing countries, firms prefer to keep 
their profits in the company as an internal funding source. 
 
Table 4.6. Summary Statistics for Size 
 
  Small Medium Large Sale Asset 
India 20% 57% 23% 12.18 12.14 
Philippines 27% 54% 19% 12.99 12.58 
South Africa 27% 60% 13% 15.24 14.67 
Sri Lanka 30% 42% 28% 13.13 13.11 
Indonesia 30% 39% 31% 13.97 13.85 
Zambia 31% 59% 10% 13.50 13.22 
Bangladesh 32% 55% 14% 13.37 12.69 
Malawi 42% 48% 10% 13.45 13.12 
Morocco 45% 50% 5% 13.83 13.85 
Brazil 53% 42% 5% 13.70 13.19 
Chile 56% 37% 7% 7.57 7.55 
Ecuador 58% 40% 2% 13.54 13.31 
Tanzania 59% 37% 4% 12.75 13.03 
El Salvador 62% 33% 5% 15.29 15.15 
Peru 66% 31% 4% 13.71 13.54 
Guatemala 66% 29% 5% 12.77 12.64 
Honduras 69% 24% 7% 12.24 12.13 
Oman 70% 30% 0% 14.68 16.00 
Pakistan 76% 23% 2% 12.52 12.56 
Ethiopia 76% 18% 6% 10.88 11.44 
Nicaragua 82% 16% 2% 11.54 11.50 
Guyana 84% 15% 1% 12.16 12.71 
Cambodia 91% 6% 3% 8.48 8.69 





We use a size dummy variable for small and large firms based on the firms’ number 
of employees. A firm is classified as small if it has less than 50 employees and large 
if it has more than 500 employees. According to this classification, 48% of the firms 
in our sample are small firms, while only 11% of them are large firms. Medium size 
firms account for 41%. The number of small firms varies between 20% and 98% 
among the sample. India has the lowest number of small firms compared to the total 
number of firms in India. Syria has the highest number of small firms with 98%. 
When we look at large companies, the range for large companies is 0%-31%. The 
sample for Oman and Syria does not include any large companies, while Indonesia, 
with 31%, has the highest number of large firms. Table 4.6 also presents the size 
measure based on a logarithm of sales and assets across countries. 
 
4.3.4. Economic environment variables 
This section explains the descriptive statistics for the economic environment 
variables. We also do an F-test to analyze whether the variations in economic 
environment variables are statistically significant across countries. 
 
4.3.4.1. GDP per Capita 
Table 4.7 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for GDP per capita across countries. 
The average (median) GDP per capita for our sample is $1,698 ($996). The average 
GDP per capita among the countries differs between $126 and $8,694. We apply an 
F-test to investigate whether the differences in GDP per capita among countries are 
statistically significant. We confirm that GDP per capita is different among the 
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countries. The richest country in the sample is Oman in 2002 with $8,962, while the 
poorest country is Ethiopia in 1999 with $121. In the same period, the average GDP 
per capita in the U.S. (UK) is $34,852 ($25,359). As can be seen from these figures, 
there is a great wealth difference between even the richest country in the sample and 
developed countries. 
 
Table 4.7. Summary Statistics for GDP per capita 
GDP/Cap Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 1698 996 8962 121 1.2707 4.1841 9084.66 0.0000 27738 
Ethiopia 126 124 131 121 0.2414 1.4160 124.66 0.0000 1091 
Malawi 136 138 138 134 -0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Tanzania 278 278 290 268 0.2844 1.6341 32.38 0.0000 355 
Cambodia 311 317 317 303 -0.1218 1.0148 30.17 0.0000 181 
Zambia 312 310 318 306 0.2730 1.3924 47.44 0.0000 395 
Bangladesh 338 338 349 325 -0.1566 1.5480 71.70 0.0000 780 
India 456 453 469 443 0.0713 1.4870 372.23 0.0000 3868 
Pakistan 531 533 535 526 -0.5450 1.5362 383.60 0.0000 2764 
Nicaragua 777 777 782 771 -0.4378 2.5108 31.72 0.0000 757 
Indonesia 823 818 844 800 0.0378 1.4383 146.87 0.0000 1442 
Sri Lanka 887 879 920 858 0.3081 1.4594 107.60 0.0000 938 
Guyana 994 988 1000 988 0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
Philippines 1001 996 1015 992 0.6426 1.5076 301.28 0.0000 1864 
Honduras 1166 1175 1175 1147 -0.4951 1.4498 101.08 0.0000 717 
Syria 1197 1200 1214 1170 -0.5563 1.6331 20.71 0.0000 160 
Ecuador 1348 1347 1387 1295 -0.3343 1.6074 75.17 0.0000 756 
Morocco 1426 1411 1480 1383 0.4303 1.4750 256.31 0.0000 2006 
Guatemala 1730 1739 1739 1716 -0.3879 1.1654 124.15 0.0000 751 
Peru 2059 2054 2077 2044 0.3533 1.4605 23.07 0.0000 193 
El Salvador 2130 2139 2139 2120 -0.1467 1.0356 111.12 0.0000 676 
South Africa 3068 3046 3128 3020 0.3877 1.3411 191.40 0.0000 1370 
Brazil 3712 3700 3738 3695 0.6363 1.4538 707.17 0.0000 4232 
Chile 5145 5215 5215 5074 -0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
Oman 8694 8800 8961 8271 -0.6622 1.6561 21.21 0.0000 143 
F-test (23, 27714) 2571086 0.0000             
 
4.3.4.2. Growth 
In table 4.8, we demonstrate the summary statistics for the growth rate. The growth 
rate of GDP is 3.26%, on average, and the median is 3.0%, while the growth rate is 
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1.75% (2.40%) in the U.S. (UK). The average growth rate varies 0.40%-7.40%. By 
applying an F-test, we confirm that the differences in the growth rate across 
countries are statistically significant. The majority of the countries in the sample 
have higher growth rates when compared to the U.S. Only Indonesia, Malawi, 
Guyana, and Ecuador grow more slowly than the U.S. The fastest growing country 
in the sample is Cambodia in 2001 at 8.04% and the slowest growing country is 
Indonesia in 2002 with 0.15% growth. 
 
Table 4.8. Summary Statistics for Growth 
Growth Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.0326 0.0307 0.0804 0.0015 0.3157 2.7672 523.51 0.0000 27738 
Indonesia 0.0041 0.0019 0.0099 0.0015 0.8975 1.8151 277.96 0.0000 1442 
Malawi 0.0057 0.0083 0.0083 0.0030 -0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Guyana 0.0071 0.0078 0.0078 0.0064 -0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
Ecuador 0.0145 0.0160 0.0164 0.0101 -0.9301 1.8817 148.39 0.0000 756 
Brazil 0.0185 0.0185 0.0201 0.0171 0.0752 1.5029 399.21 0.0000 4232 
Zambia 0.0231 0.0243 0.0284 0.0156 -0.5403 1.6962 47.20 0.0000 395 
Chile 0.0257 0.0264 0.0264 0.0250 -0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
Syria 0.0264 0.0251 0.0294 0.0235 0.1906 1.2290 21.88 0.0000 160 
South Africa 0.0265 0.0269 0.0280 0.0248 -0.3527 1.5551 147.59 0.0000 1370 
Peru 0.0270 0.0252 0.0365 0.0206 0.5970 1.6795 25.49 0.0000 193 
Honduras 0.0277 0.0265 0.0307 0.0265 0.7107 1.9877 90.98 0.0000 717 
El Salvador 0.0286 0.0268 0.0306 0.0268 0.1364 1.0186 112.68 0.0000 676 
Pakistan 0.0312 0.0327 0.0341 0.0269 -0.5720 1.4662 421.67 0.0000 2764 
Philippines 0.0337 0.0315 0.0396 0.0300 0.6495 1.5079 303.96 0.0000 1864 
Morocco 0.0372 0.0386 0.0418 0.0307 -0.5290 1.5729 263.78 0.0000 2006 
Sri Lanka 0.0372 0.0373 0.0397 0.0348 0.0103 1.5296 84.51 0.0000 938 
Oman 0.0377 0.0359 0.0429 0.0340 0.5293 1.4539 20.92 0.0000 143 
Guatemala 0.0379 0.0373 0.0395 0.0373 0.9524 2.3359 127.33 0.0000 751 
Nicaragua 0.0412 0.0371 0.0503 0.0371 0.8021 2.1848 102.14 0.0000 757 
Ethiopia 0.0437 0.0467 0.0468 0.0384 -0.5737 1.3296 186.68 0.0000 1091 
Tanzania 0.0452 0.0442 0.0516 0.0408 0.5850 1.7331 43.99 0.0000 355 
Bangladesh 0.0519 0.0521 0.0534 0.0501 -0.3389 1.5807 80.40 0.0000 780 
India 0.0584 0.0584 0.0655 0.0538 0.5323 1.8877 382.02 0.0000 3868 
Cambodia 0.0724 0.0654 0.0804 0.0654 0.1218 1.0148 30.17 0.0000 181 






Table 4.9. Summary Statistics for Inflation 
Inflation Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.0695 0.0620 0.3082 -0.0704 0.3157 2.7672 20015.14 0.0000 27738 
Ethiopia 0.0040 0.0066 0.0688 -0.0575 0.0407 1.4448 110.24 0.0000 1091 
Morocco 0.0090 0.0079 0.0115 0.0075 0.6412 1.4523 337.67 0.0000 2006 
Cambodia 0.0162 0.0071 0.0264 0.0071 0.1218 1.0148 30.17 0.0000 181 
El Salvador 0.0219 0.0121 0.0340 0.0121 0.1544 1.0466 110.16 0.0000 676 
Bangladesh 0.0263 0.0186 0.0466 0.0159 0.7977 1.6684 140.35 0.0000 780 
Peru 0.0296 0.0366 0.0394 0.0143 -0.5864 1.3878 31.96 0.0000 193 
India 0.0341 0.0353 0.0380 0.0303 -0.1507 1.4401 406.82 0.0000 3868 
Oman 0.0366 -0.0067 0.1998 -0.0658 0.6783 1.6611 21.64 0.0000 143 
Guatemala 0.0425 0.0645 0.0683 -0.0408 -1.3783 2.9064 238.05 0.0000 751 
Syria 0.0445 0.0456 0.0970 0.0054 0.3412 1.5279 17.55 0.0002 160 
Guyana 0.0500 0.0549 0.0549 0.0451 -0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
Chile 0.0520 0.0623 0.0623 0.0417 -0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
Nicaragua 0.0525 0.0325 0.0857 0.0325 0.3359 1.2590 109.84 0.0000 757 
Philippines 0.0575 0.0634 0.0638 0.0450 -0.7121 1.5085 330.33 0.0000 1864 
Tanzania 0.0703 0.0717 0.0749 0.0630 -0.6777 1.7653 49.72 0.0000 355 
Brazil 0.0862 0.0896 0.1061 0.0620 -0.3247 1.5201 460.56 0.0000 4232 
South 
Africa 0.0907 0.0881 0.1052 0.0767 0.1318 1.3992 150.24 0.0000 1370 
Honduras 0.0911 0.0513 0.3082 0.0513 2.2066 6.0763 864.58 0.0000 717 
Sri Lanka 0.1009 0.1181 0.1366 0.0515 -0.5163 1.4320 137.77 0.0000 938 
Ecuador 0.1150 0.1240 0.2661 -0.0704 -0.3019 1.6840 66.03 0.0000 756 
Malawi 0.1174 0.1451 0.1451 0.0875 -0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Pakistan 0.1291 0.0789 0.2489 0.0586 0.6743 1.4962 469.91 0.0000 2764 
Indonesia 0.1292 0.1430 0.2045 0.0590 -0.0250 1.4437 145.68 0.0000 1442 
Zambia 0.2536 0.2431 0.3004 0.2135 0.3359 1.5154 43.70 0.0000 395 




As shown in table 4.9, the average (median) inflation of the countries in the sample 
is 6.95% (6.20%); whereas, the rate is 2.13% (2.41%) in the U.S. (UK). The average 
inflation varies between 0.40% and 25.36% in the sample. We examine whether this 
variation of the inflation rate is statistically significant. By applying an F-test, we 
find that the differences in the inflation rate across countries are statistically 
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significant. Ethiopia has the lowest average rate of inflation, while Zambia has the 
highest average inflation rate. The majority of the countries have higher inflation 
rates when compared to the U.S. Only Ethiopia, Morocco, and Cambodia have lower 
rates than the U.S. The highest inflation is 30.82% for Honduras in 2000, while the 
lowest rate is -7.04% for Ecuador in 2000. The high inflation makes debt financing 
costly for the firms in developing countries. 
 
4.3.4.4. Interest rate 
Table 4.10 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for interest rate. The mean 
(median) of interest is 21.27% (13.69%). In contract, the interest rate falls to 6.2% 
(4.75%) for the U.S. (UK). All of the countries in the sample have higher interest 
rates than developed countries. The average interest rate changes between 6.96% 
and 18.67%. We test the significance of the difference by applying an F-test 
including all countries in the sample. We confirm that the difference is statistically 
significant. Chile has the lowest interest rate, while Brazil has the highest interest 
rate. The highest interest rate is 62.88% percent for Brazil in 2002 and the lowest is 
6.18% percent for Chile in 2003.9 The higher the interest rate, the more costs firms 
must pay for debt financing in developing countries. As such, the cost of borrowing 






                                                 
9 High inflation due to financial crisis causes interest rates to increase in Brazil. 
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Table 4.10. Summary Statistics for Interest rate 
Interest Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.2127 0.1369 0.6288 0.0618 1.6164 3.9653 13155.81 0.0000 27738 
Chile 0.0696 0.0618 0.0776 0.0618 0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
El Salvador 0.0849 0.0714 0.1074 0.0714 0.3322 1.3618 88.02 0.0000 676 
Syria 0.0900 0.0900 0.0900 0.0900 NA NA NA NA 160 
Oman 0.0925 0.0923 0.1006 0.0855 0.1951 1.5541 13.37 0.0013 143 
Ethiopia 0.1079 0.1087 0.1089 0.1058 -0.8155 1.6952 198.33 0.0000 1091 
Philippines 0.1082 0.1091 0.1240 0.0914 -0.1090 1.4991 178.65 0.0000 1864 
India 0.1227 0.1229 0.1254 0.1208 0.3647 1.7698 329.63 0.0000 3868 
Morocco 0.1297 0.1313 0.1325 0.1256 -0.5854 1.4626 312.11 0.0000 2006 
Pakistan 0.1386 0.1369 0.1451 0.1341 0.5532 1.5366 387.61 0.0000 2764 
Sri Lanka 0.1417 0.1317 0.1939 0.1034 0.4847 1.5711 116.53 0.0000 938 
South Africa 0.1472 0.1450 0.1575 0.1377 0.1935 1.3847 157.49 0.0000 1370 
Bangladesh 0.1519 0.1550 0.1583 0.1413 -0.7044 1.6500 123.73 0.0000 780 
Ecuador 0.1555 0.1546 0.1626 0.1508 0.6012 1.7331 96.10 0.0000 756 
Guyana 0.1566 0.1499 0.1633 0.1499 0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
Cambodia 0.1636 0.1623 0.1650 0.1623 0.1218 1.0148 30.17 0.0000 181 
Guatemala 0.1809 0.1686 0.2088 0.1686 0.7998 2.0281 109.63 0.0000 751 
Nicaragua 0.1834 0.1830 0.1855 0.1814 0.4657 2.0434 56.23 0.0000 757 
Indonesia 0.1867 0.1855 0.1895 0.1846 0.4139 1.2842 218.04 0.0000 1442 
Tanzania 0.1961 0.2026 0.2158 0.1643 -0.7014 1.7737 51.35 0.0000 355 
Honduras 0.2351 0.2269 0.2682 0.2269 1.7885 4.9182 492.19 0.0000 717 
Peru 0.2975 0.3000 0.3506 0.2498 0.0998 1.5453 17.34 0.0002 193 
Zambia 0.4204 0.4052 0.4623 0.3880 0.4202 1.3366 57.16 0.0000 395 
Malawi 0.4264 0.3683 0.4892 0.3683 0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Brazil 0.5915 0.5762 0.6288 0.5683 0.6279 1.4545 699.23 0.0000 4232 
F-test (23, 27714) 131823 0.0000       
 
4.3.4.5. Tax 
Table 4.11 reports the summary statistics for tax. The average (median) corporate 
income tax rate is 29.64% (30%). The tax rate in the U.S. (UK) is 35% (30%). The 
tax rate varies between 12% and 45%. We conduct an F-test to analyse the 
difference in tax rates among the countries and conclude that the alterations in the 
tax rate across countries is statistically significant. Oman has the lowest tax rate, 
while Guyana has the highest. Bangladesh, Morocco, Syria, and Zambia have the 
same tax rate as the U.S. Alternatively, India, Pakistan, and Guyana have higher tax 




Table 4.11. Summary Statistics for Tax 
Tax Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.2964 0.3000 0.4500 0.1200 -0.3499 2.0298 1654.04 0.0000 27738 
Oman 0.1200 0.1200 0.1200 0.1200  NA  NA  NA  NA 143 
Brazil 0.1500 0.1500 0.1500 0.1500  NA  NA  NA  NA 4232 
Chile 0.1625 0.1650 0.1650 0.1600 -0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
Cambodia 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000  NA  NA  NA  NA 181 
Ecuador 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500  NA  NA  NA  NA 756 
El Salvador 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500  NA  NA  NA  NA 676 
Honduras 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500  NA  NA  NA  NA 717 
Nicaragua 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500  NA  NA  NA  NA 757 
Ethiopia 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000  NA  NA  NA  NA 1091 
Indonesia 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000  NA  NA  NA  NA 1442 
Malawi 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000  NA  NA  NA  NA 233 
Peru 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000  NA  NA  NA  NA 193 
South Africa 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000  NA  NA  NA  NA 1370 
Tanzania 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000  NA  NA  NA  NA 355 
Guatemala 0.3100 0.3100 0.3100 0.3100  NA  NA  NA  NA 751 
Philippines 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200  NA  NA  NA  NA 1864 
Sri Lanka 0.3327 0.3500 0.3500 0.3000 -0.6452 1.4163 163.11 0.0000 938 
Bangladesh 0.3500 0.3500 0.3500 0.3500  NA  NA  NA  NA 780 
Morocco 0.3500 0.3500 0.3500 0.3500  NA  NA  NA  NA 2006 
Syria 0.3500 0.3500 0.3500 0.3500  NA  NA  NA  NA 160 
Zambia 0.3500 0.3500 0.3500 0.3500  NA  NA  NA  NA 395 
India 0.3844 0.3955 0.3960 0.3500 -1.1719 2.3740 948.50 0.0000 3868 
Pakistan 0.4300 0.4300 0.4300 0.4300  NA  NA  NA  NA 2764 
Guyana 0.4500 0.4500 0.4500 0.4500  NA  NA  NA  NA 273 
F-test (23, 27714) 137073 0.0000             
 
 
4.3.5. Financial Environment variables 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of financial environment variables. As 
economic environment variables, we apply an F-test to see whether the financial 
environment across countries demonstrates any statistical significant difference. We 
will first discuss corruption and legal system. Next, we focus on the financial 





Table 4.12. Summary Statistics for Corruption 
Corruption Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All -0.3030 -0.4179 1.5075 -1.1274 1.3136 4.8917 12113.04 0.0000 27738 
Tanzania -1.0674 -1.0644 -1.0149 -1.1139 0.1063 1.5796 30.51 0.0000 355 
Indonesia -1.0615 -1.0555 -0.9835 -1.1274 0.1564 1.5190 137.67 0.0000 1442 
Bangladesh -0.9735 -1.0007 -0.8666 -1.0426 0.6440 1.6383 114.18 0.0000 780 
Ecuador -0.9733 -0.9667 -0.8985 -1.0349 0.1783 1.5334 71.76 0.0000 756 
Cambodia -0.9640 -0.9754 -0.9510 -0.9754 0.1218 1.0148 30.17 0.0000 181 
Zambia -0.9427 -0.9390 -0.9275 -0.9585 -0.1763 1.4248 42.89 0.0000 395 
Malawi -0.7906 -0.7610 -0.7610 -0.8225 -0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Honduras -0.7885 -0.8126 -0.7225 -0.8126 0.9348 2.5735 109.87 0.0000 717 
Pakistan -0.7550 -0.7682 -0.7230 -0.7741 0.6695 1.4963 466.93 0.0000 2764 
Nicaragua -0.6403 -0.5173 -0.5173 -0.9162 -0.7705 2.1214 99.26 0.0000 757 
Guatemala -0.6081 -0.6269 -0.5642 -0.6269 0.8395 2.1089 113.06 0.0000 751 
Philippines -0.5326 -0.5326 -0.5170 -0.5482 0.0000 1.5057 173.44 0.0000 1864 
Ethiopia -0.4742 -0.4767 -0.4493 -0.4980 0.1267 1.5514 98.31 0.0000 1091 
Syria -0.4655 -0.4863 -0.3010 -0.6717 -0.2137 1.4609 17.01 0.0002 160 
Guyana -0.4273 -0.4140 -0.4140 -0.4407 -0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
El Salvador -0.4052 -0.4404 -0.3304 -0.4404 0.7070 2.0586 81.28 0.0000 676 
India -0.3938 -0.3959 -0.3538 -0.4179 0.6897 2.0024 467.08 0.0000 3868 
Peru -0.2190 -0.2108 -0.2060 -0.2437 -0.8207 1.7430 34.37 0.0000 193 
Sri Lanka -0.1576 -0.1610 -0.1443 -0.1666 0.5963 1.5870 133.61 0.0000 938 
Morocco -0.0661 -0.0804 -0.0061 -0.1081 0.5519 1.5760 271.33 0.0000 2006 
Brazil 0.0076 0.0092 0.1155 -0.0972 0.0261 1.4995 397.50 0.0000 4232 
South Africa 0.4113 0.4180 0.5218 0.3142 0.1201 1.5033 131.16 0.0000 1370 
Oman 0.8745 0.8708 0.9601 0.7815 -0.0766 1.5292 13.03 0.0015 143 
Chile 1.3532 1.2004 1.5075 1.2004 0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
F-test (23, 27714) 88014 0.0000             
 
4.3.5.1. Corruption 
Corruption is scaled ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values mean better 
governance. Table 4.12 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for corruption across 
countries. The mean (median) of corruption is -0.30 (-0.42) in our sample. The range 
of average corruption among countries is -1.07 to 1.35. By applying an F-test, we 
confirm the difference is statistically significant. The most corrupt country is 
Tanzania and the least corrupt country is Chile. In contrast, the value of corruption 
in the U.S. (UK) is 1.75 (2.06). Corruption seems to be a problem for the countries 
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in our sample. None of them are close to the U.S. This corrupt environment 
increases the costs of external financing. High corruption may be another reason for 
the low leverage and debt maturity of firms in our sample. The most corrupt country, 
with -1.13 in the sample, is Indonesia, while the least corrupt country is Chile with 
1.51. 
 
Table 4.13. Summary Statistics for Legal System 
  Civil Common 
All 60% 40% 
Bangladesh   Yes 
Brazil Yes   
Cambodia Yes   
Chile Yes   
Ecuador Yes   
El Salvador Yes   
Ethiopia Yes   
Guatemala Yes   
Guyana   Yes 
Honduras Yes   
India   Yes 
Indonesia Yes   
Malawi   Yes 
Morocco Yes   
Nicaragua Yes   
Oman Yes   
Pakistan   Yes 
Peru Yes   
Philippines Yes   
South Africa   Yes 
Sri Lanka   Yes 
Syria Yes   
Tanzania   Yes 
Zambia   Yes 
 
4.3.5.2. Legal system 
The majority of the countries in the sample (60%) embrace a civil law legal system, 
while 40% are common law countries. Table 4.13 demonstrates whether the country 
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is based on civil law or common law legal systems. We expect that firms in civil law 
countries use more debt; specifically, short-term debt when compared to firms in 
common law countries. That might be the reason why the firms in our sample have 
more short-term debt than long-term debt. 
 
4.3.5.3. Financial institutions 
This section explains the three proxies for financial institutions. We, first discuss 
deposit money bank assets to central bank assets. Next, we will focus on the stock 
market dummy and stock market turnover, respectively. 
Table 4.14. Summary Statistics for Deposit money bank assets to central bank assets 
Dbacba Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.6215 0.7500 0.9984 0.0036 -0.8990 2.1359 4599.64 0.0000 27738 
Brazil 0.0076 0.0088 0.0103 0.0036 -0.6020 1.5385 632.24 0.0000 4232 
Chile 0.0275 0.0300 0.0300 0.0249 -0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
Zambia 0.1652 0.1514 0.1951 0.1446 0.5097 1.3151 63.82 0.0000 395 
Nicaragua 0.2507 0.2334 0.3700 0.2101 1.5980 3.7853 341.63 0.0000 757 
Syria 0.5434 0.5480 0.5514 0.5345 -0.2662 1.1841 23.87 0.0000 160 
Malawi 0.5778 0.5677 0.5887 0.5677 0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Ethiopia 0.6046 0.6212 0.6261 0.5666 -0.7011 1.5166 189.40 0.0000 1091 
Guyana 0.6639 0.6636 0.6643 0.6636 0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
Pakistan 0.6963 0.6773 0.7409 0.6696 0.6484 1.4620 466.08 0.0000 2764 
Guatemala 0.7110 0.7206 0.7206 0.6888 -0.8561 2.0761 118.44 0.0000 751 
Indonesia 0.7130 0.7061 0.7500 0.6902 0.6748 1.7303 206.30 0.0000 1442 
Tanzania 0.7413 0.7138 0.8228 0.7024 0.8970 1.8447 67.35 0.0000 355 
Cambodia 0.7910 0.8037 0.8037 0.7766 -0.1218 1.0148 30.17 0.0000 181 
Ecuador 0.8179 0.8301 0.8338 0.7834 -0.9252 1.8800 147.38 0.0000 756 
India 0.8567 0.8593 0.8733 0.8275 -0.7862 2.0744 536.56 0.0000 3868 
Honduras 0.8819 0.8693 0.9699 0.8693 2.3180 6.3759 982.55 0.0000 717 
Sri Lanka 0.8883 0.8811 0.9151 0.8667 0.3954 1.4477 118.62 0.0000 938 
El Salvador 0.8914 0.8884 0.9018 0.8884 1.5632 3.6711 287.99 0.0000 676 
Bangladesh 0.8937 0.8930 0.8967 0.8914 0.4119 1.4411 101.04 0.0000 780 
Philippines 0.9092 0.9062 0.9220 0.8993 0.4341 1.4887 235.94 0.0000 1864 
Morocco 0.9456 0.9460 0.9463 0.9445 -0.5702 1.4609 306.70 0.0000 2006 
South Africa 0.9663 0.9843 0.9882 0.9321 -0.5307 1.2963 230.00 0.0000 1370 
Oman 0.9892 0.9925 0.9984 0.9775 -0.4339 1.4660 18.51 0.0001 143 
Peru 0.9917 0.9921 0.9925 0.9903 -0.7350 1.7185 30.58 0.0000 193 




4.3.5.3.1. Deposit money bank assets to central bank assets 
Table 4.14 illustrates the summary statistics for deposit money bank assets to central 
bank assets across countries. The mean (median) of deposit money bank assets to 
central bank assets is 62.15% (75%). Financial development varies between 0.76 
and 99.17 among countries in the sample. By conducting an F-test, we find that the 
alterations among countries are statistically significant. The least financially 
developed country is Brazil, while the most financially developed country is Peru, 
on average. For the U.S. (UK), this ratio is 91.21% (98.35%). The most financially 
developed country is Oman in 2000 with 99.84% and the least financially developed 
country is Brazil in 2000 with 0.36%. If the deposit money banks in a country have a 
larger role in the banking system than central bank, it indicates that the country has 
higher levels of financial development (Beck et al., 2009). Our sample includes 
financially developed countries, but if we look at the average, it seems that most of 
the countries in the sample are not financially developed. 
 
4.3.5.3.2. Stock market dummy 
All countries in the sample do not have a stock market. Table 4.15 presents the 
results for stock market. If a country has a stock market, it is shown as ‘yes’, if a 
country does not have a stock market, it is presented as ‘no’. Eleven percent of the 
countries in the sample do not have either a stock market or an active stock market, 
while 89% of the countries have an active stock market. Based on the sample, the 
countries that do not have a stock market are Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guyana, and 
Syria.10 The countries without an active stock market are Honduras and Nicaragua. 
                                                 
10 The stock market in Guyana opened in 2003. 
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Approximately 14% of the firms (11% of the observations) in the sample are 
operating in countries without a stock market. 
 























South Africa Yes 




4.3.5.3.3. Stock market turnover 
Table 4.16 demonstrates the summary statistics for stock market turnover. The mean 
(median) of stock market turnover is 0.97 (0.16). The stock market turnover changes 
from 0 to 3.52 among the countries. By applying an F-test, we find the difference is 
statistically significant. Guyana has the lowest turnover. Pakistan has the highest 
stock market turnover on average. Stock market turnover in the U .S.(UK) is 1.65 
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(0.88). The country with the highest turnover is Pakistan in 2000 with 5.01, while 
the country with lowest turnover is Guyana in 2003 with 0.0001. In the U.S. (UK), 
stock market turnover is 1.65 (0.88). Guatemala, India, and Pakistan have higher 
stock market turnover when compared to the U.S. High turnover is an indicator of 
low transaction costs (Levine and Zervos, 1998). Therefore, the higher the turnover, 
the more active and liquid the stock market is. It seems that some of the stock 
markets in the sample are illiquid. 
 
Table 4.16. Summary Statistics for Stock Market Turnover 
Turnover Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.8681 0.1179 5.0102 0.0000 1.6086 4.4969 14552.07 0.0000 27738 
Guyana 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
Ecuador 0.0110 0.0110 0.0156 0.0068 0.1375 1.6443 60.27 0.0000 756 
El Salvador 0.0157 0.0159 0.0173 0.0125 -1.0959 3.0918 135.54 0.0000 676 
Malawi 0.0667 0.0391 0.0965 0.0391 0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Chile 0.0675 0.0884 0.0884 0.0464 -0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
Tanzania 0.0752 0.0269 0.1722 0.0201 0.6277 1.4003 61.16 0.0000 355 
Morocco 0.0754 0.0683 0.1071 0.0527 0.5252 1.5729 262.43 0.0000 2006 
Zambia 0.1009 0.0430 0.2090 0.0339 0.5456 1.3058 66.84 0.0000 395 
Brazil 0.1230 0.1179 0.1572 0.0953 0.3436 1.5213 468.81 0.0000 4232 
Peru 0.1282 0.1440 0.1709 0.0763 -0.3905 1.4276 24.79 0.0000 193 
Oman 0.1537 0.1596 0.1697 0.1328 -0.4330 1.4183 19.37 0.0001 143 
Philippines 0.1567 0.0795 0.3157 0.0758 0.7125 1.5085 330.49 0.0000 1864 
Sri Lanka 0.1984 0.1892 0.2837 0.1152 0.0963 1.4884 90.75 0.0000 938 
South Africa 0.4355 0.4270 0.4986 0.3781 0.2168 1.5640 128.45 0.0000 1370 
Indonesia 0.4590 0.4349 0.5333 0.4202 0.8510 1.8002 260.53 0.0000 1442 
Bangladesh 0.7292 0.6475 0.9111 0.6472 0.8203 1.6730 144.72 0.0000 780 
Guatemala 1.8288 3.0700 3.0700 0.0167 -0.3767 1.1419 125.79 0.0000 751 
India 2.5188 2.2582 3.4432 1.5104 0.0795 1.4864 373.31 0.0000 3868 
Pakistan 3.5157 3.0234 5.0102 2.5192 0.5905 1.4956 421.28 0.0000 2764 




4.3.5.4. Financial globalization 
This section discusses the two proxies for financial globalization. First, offshore 
bank loans to GDP will be explained and then offshore deposits to domestic deposits 
will be discussed. 
 
4.3.5.4.1. Offshore bank loans to GDP 
As illustrated in table 4.17, the mean (median) of the ratio of offshore bank loans to 
GDP is 8.54% (7.80%). The ratio varies between 0.78% and 20.26% across 
countries. By applying an F-test, we confirm the statistical significance of the 
difference. Ethiopia has the lowest offshore bank loans, while Indonesia has the 
highest. In the U.S. (UK), this ratio is 16.10% (99.40%). With the exception of 
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Oman, and Indonesia, all other countries have lower 
offshore bank loans when compared to the U.S. As income levels of the countries 
increase, international loans also rise; therefore, offshore banks provide more loans 
to high income countries than low income countries. Since our sample includes 
middle and low income countries, the average is very low when compared to the 
U.S. (UK). Therefore, it is difficult for firms in lower income countries to find 
funding from offshore banks. The country with highest offshore bank loans is 
Indonesia in 2000 with 24.80% and the country with lowest offshore bank loans is 








Table 4.17. Summary Statistics for Offshore Bank Loans to GDP 
Nrbloan Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.0854 0.0780 0.2840 0.0051 0.4568 2.2996 1531.77 0.0000 27738 
Ethiopia 0.0078 0.0069 0.0119 0.0051 0.6245 1.6471 154.12 0.0000 1091 
Bangladesh 0.0086 0.0088 0.0095 0.0073 -0.4706 1.6051 92.02 0.0000 780 
Cambodia 0.0110 0.0107 0.0113 0.0107 0.1218 1.0148 30.17 0.0000 181 
Brazil 0.0137 0.0146 0.0152 0.0114 -0.6058 1.4560 679.26 0.0000 4232 
Syria 0.0238 0.0231 0.0269 0.0220 0.7324 1.7101 25.40 0.0000 160 
Malawi 0.0322 0.0255 0.0394 0.0255 0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Zambia 0.0335 0.0296 0.0434 0.0292 0.8909 1.7963 76.10 0.0000 395 
Tanzania 0.0389 0.0413 0.0440 0.0317 -0.5145 1.4098 53.06 0.0000 355 
India 0.0407 0.0424 0.0451 0.0362 -0.2483 1.3849 460.18 0.0000 3868 
Sri Lanka 0.0533 0.0511 0.0581 0.0509 0.7813 1.6130 170.61 0.0000 938 
Guyana 0.0607 0.0529 0.0685 0.0529 0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
Ecuador 0.0827 0.0693 0.1162 0.0690 0.9414 1.8864 150.73 0.0000 756 
Pakistan 0.0934 0.0918 0.1112 0.0780 0.2212 1.5144 276.71 0.0000 2764 
Honduras 0.1053 0.1032 0.1291 0.0994 2.1567 5.9813 821.37 0.0000 717 
Peru 0.1134 0.1120 0.1328 0.0982 0.3547 1.6126 19.53 0.0001 193 
Guatemala 0.1140 0.1144 0.1244 0.1010 -0.4112 2.5591 27.25 0.0000 751 
South Africa 0.1218 0.1219 0.1321 0.1091 -0.2565 1.5465 135.63 0.0000 1370 
Chile 0.1230 0.1329 0.1329 0.1130 -0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
Morocco 0.1316 0.1331 0.1491 0.1138 -0.0779 1.5076 188.19 0.0000 2006 
El Salvador 0.1328 0.1349 0.1349 0.1302 -0.1500 1.0399 110.76 0.0000 676 
Nicaragua 0.1669 0.1776 0.1776 0.1423 -0.8186 2.2180 103.84 0.0000 757 
Philippines 0.1827 0.1803 0.1899 0.1778 0.5727 1.4859 279.97 0.0000 1864 
Oman 0.1841 0.1855 0.1922 0.1754 -0.1764 1.4782 14.54 0.0007 143 
Indonesia 0.2026 0.2197 0.2480 0.1525 -0.2735 1.3411 183.33 0.0000 1442 
F-test (23, 27714) 27596 0.0000             
 
4.3.5.4.2. Offshore deposits to domestic deposits 
Table 4.18 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for offshore deposits to domestic 
deposits. The mean (median) of offshore deposit to domestic deposits (Offdep) is 
12.23% (6.75%). This ratio alters between 1.19% and 61.68% among the countries 
in the sample. By conducting an F-test, we confirm the difference is statistically 
significant. Bangladesh has the lowest offshore deposits as compared to domestic 
deposits, while Ecuador has the highest average. In the U.S. (UK), this ratio is 
10.64% (16.67%). Offshore bank deposits fall with the income level of the country; 
therefore, this ratio is expected to be higher in low income countries (Beck et al., 
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2009). The lack of confidence and trust in the domestic banking system make 
households and firms prefer offshore banks in those countries. However, it also 
demonstrates financial globalization. Ecuador, in 2000, has the highest offshore 
deposits, while Bangladesh, in 2001, has the lowest offshore deposits when 
compared to domestic deposits. 
 
Table 4.18. Summary Statistics for Offshore Deposits to Domestic Deposits 
Offdep Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
All 0.1223 0.0675 0.8346 0.0107 2.5997 10.1293 89987.63 0.0000 27738 
Bangladesh 0.0119 0.0124 0.0127 0.0107 -0.5763 1.4348 122.80 0.0000 780 
India 0.0254 0.0239 0.0318 0.0227 1.1117 2.3260 869.86 0.0000 3868 
Chile 0.0385 0.0396 0.0396 0.0374 -0.0100 1.0001 298.83 0.0000 1793 
Indonesia 0.0443 0.0447 0.0462 0.0414 -0.5917 1.6972 186.10 0.0000 1442 
Sri Lanka 0.0542 0.0549 0.0562 0.0518 -0.4056 1.4464 120.05 0.0000 938 
Ethiopia 0.0563 0.0555 0.0669 0.0474 0.2626 1.5989 101.78 0.0000 1091 
El Salvador 0.0588 0.0595 0.0595 0.0577 -0.2572 1.1942 99.31 0.0000 676 
Brazil 0.0704 0.0675 0.0765 0.0671 0.6676 1.4519 736.95 0.0000 4232 
Honduras 0.0733 0.0625 0.1038 0.0527 0.8292 1.8355 122.68 0.0000 717 
Morocco 0.0893 0.0884 0.0921 0.0873 0.5312 1.4570 293.32 0.0000 2006 
Philippines 0.0974 0.0985 0.1025 0.0911 -0.3635 1.5035 215.00 0.0000 1864 
Cambodia 0.1079 0.0923 0.1255 0.0923 0.1218 1.0148 30.17 0.0000 181 
South Africa 0.1107 0.1113 0.1463 0.0669 -0.2641 1.5488 136.13 0.0000 1370 
Pakistan 0.1634 0.1679 0.1708 0.1510 -0.6796 1.5426 457.37 0.0000 2764 
Syria 0.2020 0.1975 0.2451 0.1737 0.5531 1.6316 20.64 0.0000 160 
Peru 0.2038 0.1993 0.2462 0.1602 0.0353 1.5266 17.50 0.0002 193 
Guyana 0.2088 0.2075 0.2101 0.2075 0.0073 1.0001 45.50 0.0000 273 
Malawi 0.3111 0.2894 0.3346 0.2894 0.0773 1.0060 38.83 0.0000 233 
Nicaragua 0.3435 0.2778 0.5286 0.2649 1.0256 2.0610 160.52 0.0000 757 
Tanzania 0.3649 0.3661 0.4135 0.3137 -0.0740 1.4118 37.63 0.0000 355 
Guatemala 0.4057 0.3534 0.5581 0.3534 1.2477 2.9047 195.13 0.0000 751 
Zambia 0.5542 0.6323 0.6446 0.3869 -0.6855 1.4777 69.08 0.0000 395 
Oman 0.5971 0.6112 0.6871 0.4807 -0.3975 1.6045 15.37 0.0005 143 
Ecuador 0.6168 0.5560 0.8346 0.5061 0.8678 1.8547 136.20 0.0000 756 





4.4. Stylized Facts 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the impact of size and the existence of a 
stock market on leverage and debt maturity decisions of firms in developing 
countries. By applying a univariate analysis, we compare the averages of leverage 
and debt maturity levels, as well as firm level determinants of small and large firms. 
Then, we apply the same analysis for privately held and publicly listed companies. 
Finally, we investigate the impact of the presence of a stock market on the leverage 
and maturity levels and firm level determinants. We compare our results to those of 
developed countries. In this section, we will answer the following questions: 
 
• Are the leverage and debt maturity levels of small and large firms different 
in developing countries? 
• Are the leverage and debt maturity levels of listed and privately held 
companies different in developing countries? 
• Does the presence of a stock market have an impact on the leverage and debt 
maturity levels of firms? 
 
In the following, Section 4.4.1 presents the analysis for leverage levels. Section 
4.4.2 looks at the debt maturity levels. Then, we compare the asset tangibility levels 





As we demonstrated in the previous section, the firms in our sample are less levered 
than firms in developed countries. The mean of leverage for all countries in the 
sample is 39.09%, while in the U.S. (UK), the mean of leverage is around 58% 
(54%) (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The reason for this might be the limited 
availability of funds to finance companies since all of the countries in the sample are 
developing economies. Additionally, the majority of the firms in the sample are 
small and privately held firms. Since large and listed firms can provide more reliable 
information when compared to small and privately held firms, the available funds 
are generally allocated to large firms or publicly listed companies. For instance, 
leverage for large listed firms in developing countries varies between 30.3% and 
73.4% (Booth et al., 2001). In contrast, the leverage for small firms in the UK is 
42.2% (Michaelas et al., 1999). This figure goes up to 61.41% for the small firms in 
Spain (Sogorb-Mira, 2005). For the other developed countries, Greece, France, Italy, 
and Portugal, the leverage for small firms varies between 52.78% and 76.44% 
(Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008). 
 
Table 4.19 presents the univariate analysis for leverage. The leverage for small firms 
is 30.65% and rises to 50.48% for large firms in the sample. We employ the 
univariate analysis to confirm whether this difference in leverage between small and 
large firms is statistically significant. According to the analysis, the difference is 
statistically significant and we confirm our hypothesis that small firms are less 
levered than large firms. Since small firms have information asymmetry and adverse 
selection problems due to their opaqueness, they have limited access to external 
                                                 




sources; therefore, their leverage is lower when compared to large firms.12 Also, 
when compared to small firms in developed countries, the firms in our sample are 
less levered. 
 
Table 4.19. Univariate Analysis for Leverage 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total asset. Small represents the firms that employ less than 
50 employees, medium firms have 50-500 employees, and large firms employ more than 500 
employees. Private represents the privately held companies and listed is for publicly listed firms. 
Stockmarket represents the firms in countries with a stock market and without stockmarket reports 
the firms in countries without stock market. * indicates significance at the 10%, ** presents 
significance at 5% level, and *** represents significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Leverage Levels of Firms 
Small Large t-test 
0.3065 0.5048 34.2562*** 
Small Medium t-test 
0.3065 0.4597 -41.8051*** 
Medium Large t-test 
0.4597 0.5048 7.8335*** 
Listed Privately held t-test 
0.4629 0.367 14.4227*** 
 
We apply the same statistical analysis for privately held and listed companies. The 
leverage of privately held companies is 36.70%, while the leverage of listed firms is 
46.29%. As we expected privately held companies have lower leverage than listed 
firms. This difference is statistically significant. As large firms, publicly listed 
companies are more transparent and they have less information asymmetry and 
adverse selection problems as compared to privately held companies. Lenders prefer 
to fund listed companies as the quality of information provided by them is more 
reliable than privately held firms. Therefore, they have better access to external 
                                                 
12 We also report the results for medium-sized firms. But our main focus is on the differences 
between small and large firms. Therefore, we only discuss the results for small and large firms. 
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funding resulting in higher leverage. Alternatively, the financial environment of a 
country might trigger higher debt levels in listed firms since raising equity funding 
might prove difficult. A possible reason may be the limited availability of equity 
funds due to the lack of developed stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Since some of the countries in the sample do not 
have either a stock market or an active stock market, the debt financing decisions of 
those firms might show some differences among countries. For instance, Cambodia, 
Guyana, and Syria do not have a stock market and firms in those countries have the 
lowest leverage in the sample. 
 
We conduct a univariate analysis to test whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between the leverage of the firms in countries with a stock market and in 
countries without a stock market. Table 4.19 Panel B presents these results. The 
mean of leverage in the countries with a stock market is 41.27%. The mean of those 
countries without a stock market is 21.37%. This result indicates that there is a huge 
difference between firm leverage in countries with a stock market and those without 
a stock market. This difference is statistically significant. We confirm our 
hypothesis that firms in countries with a stock market are more levered than the 
firms in countries without a stock market. Since the stock market is another source 
for firms to raise financing, its existence increases funding opportunities, as well as 
sources within the country. Even if the firms in developing countries have lower 
leverage when compared to firms in developed countries, the presence of an active 
stock market enable firms to improve their debt levels compared to firms in 






Panel B: Leverage of Firms with and without Stock Market 
 Stockmarket Without stockmarket t-test 
 All 0.4127 0.2137 35.6184*** 
Small  0.3381 0.1606 27.8122*** 
Medium 0.4615 0.4216 3.1525*** 
Large 0.5125 0.3418 7.2005*** 
 
We apply the same univariate analysis and compare the small firms in countries with 
and without a stock market and large firms with and without a stock market. 
Average leverage for small firms in countries with stock market is 33.81%; 
however, this ratio falls to 16.06% for small firms in countries without a stock 
market. Also, the average leverage for large firms in countries with stock market is 
51.25%; whereas, it is 34.18% for large firms in countries without stock market. The 
mean of leverage for large firms in countries with an active stock market is close to 
the average leverage in developed countries. Therefore, having an active stock 
market in developing countries is important for firms searching for external 
financing. Alternatively, even in countries with a stock market, small firms are less 
levered than large firms. This also confirms the limited financing available for small 
firms. 
 
Per our previous discussion, small firms have less debt when compared to other 
firms and they have even lower debt in countries without a stock market. Therefore, 





4.4.2. Debt maturity 
For debt maturity, we use three proxies: long-term debt to total assets, short-term 
debt to total assets, and long-term debt to total debt. As we discussed in the previous 
section, firms in the sample have shorter maturity as compared to firms in developed 
countries. In the sample, the mean of long-term debt to total assets is 14.01%, the 
mean of short-term debt to total assets is 24.94%, and the average of long-term debt 
to total debt is 32.63%. On the other hand, the average long-term debt to total assets 
in the U.S. (UK) is 37% (28%) (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The range for long-term 
debt to total assets of large listed firms in developing countries is between 9.7% and 
49.4% (Booth et al., 2001). Since most of the firms in our sample are small and 
privately held companies, the average long-term debt to total assets is lower when 
compared to large listed companies, even in developing countries. The reason for the 
low long-term debt to total assets in our sample might be the information asymmetry 
due to the size of the companies. In contrast, the average for long-term debt to total 
assets for small firms in the UK is 11.9% (Michaelas et al., 1999), while the range 
for other developed countries is between 2.06% and 28.46% (Hall et al, 2004). 
Moreover, for short-term debt, the range for developed countries varies between 
38.22% and 62.96% (Hall et al., 2004) and for Spain, it is 52.45% (Sogorb-Mira, 
2005). 
 
As leverage, we also examine whether the debt maturity decisions indicate 
differences among different sizes and the presence of a stock market. Table 4.20 
demonstrates the univariate analysis for debt maturity. First, we discuss the 
univariate analysis of long-term debt to total assets. The average long-term debt to 
total assets for small firms is 9.60%, while it increases to 21.41% for large firms. 
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This difference is statistically significant and confirms our hypothesis that small 
firms have lower long-term debt when compared to large firms. As we discussed in 
the previous section, it is difficult to find debt financing for small firms due to their 
opaqueness. However, to be financed by long-term debt is much lower when 
compared to short-term debt. Alternatively, the average long-term debt to total 
assets for privately held and listed firms is 14.05% and 21.19%, respectively. Listed 
companies have higher long-term debt to total assets than private companies, in part, 
due to better information disclosure. 
 
Table 4.20. Univariate Analysis for Debt Maturity 
LTD/TA is the ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets. STD/TA is the ratio of short-term 
liabilities to total assets. LTD/TD presents the ratio of long-term liabilities to total liabilities. Small 
presents those firms that employ less than 50 employees, medium firms have 50-500 employees, and 
large firms employ more than 500 employees. Private represents the privately held companies and 
listed is for publicly listed firms. Stockmarket represents the firms in countries with a stock market 
and without stockmarket reports those firms in countries without stock market. * reports significance 
at 10% level, ** presents significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Long-term Debt to Total Assets 
Small Large t-test 
0.096 0.2141 -31.5683*** 
Small Medium t-test 
0.096 0.1716 30.7989*** 
Medium Large t-test 
0.1716 0.2141 -9.8788*** 
Listed Privately held t-test 
0.2119 0.1405 15.4740*** 
 
Underdeveloped financial systems may cause firms in developing countries to have 
lower long-term debt to total assets since some of the countries in the sample do not 
have an active stock market. For instance, Cambodia, Syria, and Guyana do not have 
a stock market and the firms in these countries have the lowest average long-term 
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debt to total assets. The mean of long-term debt to total assets for firms in countries 
with stock market is 14.69%, while it is 7.70% for firms in countries without a stock 
market. The presence of a stock market increases the amount of long-term 
investment available in the country. Since the existence of stock market aids in 
boosting the available investment in a country, firms in a country with a stock 
market can access more long-term debt. We also test whether the small and large 
firms can acquire longer debt if they are in countries with a stock market than those 
without a stock market. The average long-term debt to total assets of large firms in 
countries with a stock market is 21.64%, but the average falls to 15.43% for firms in 
countries without a stock market. As large firms, small firms in countries with a 
stock market (10.29%) have higher average long-term debt to total assets than small 
firms in countries without a stock market (6.09%). Thus, financial institutions are 
important for firms to access external financing, but size still has a greater impact on 
long-term borrowing decisions. To conclude, smaller firms and the firms in a 
country without a stock market have lower levels of long-term debt. Size and access 
to a stock market play an important role in the long-term borrowing decisions of 
firms. 
 
Panel B: Long-term Debt to Total Assets for Firms with and without a Stock Market 
 Stockmarket Without Stockmarket t-test 
All 0.1469 0.077 17.2286*** 
Small 0.1029 0.0609 10.1117*** 
Medium 0.1727 0.1427 2.8358*** 
Large 0.2164 0.1543 2.9486*** 
 
As long-term debt to total assets, large firms have more short-term debt to total 
assets than small size firms. The average short-term debt to total assets for small and 
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large firms is 20.76% and 29.18%. When comparing long-term debt to total assets, 
short-term debt to total assets is higher for small firms as they have limited access to 
long-term debt financing. Since the probability of bankruptcy is higher for small 
firms, lenders may not prefer to provide long-term funding. In contrast, it seems that 
there is not much difference between privately held and listed firms in terms of short 
term debt financing. The average short-term debt to total assets for private and listed 
firms is 22.47% and 24.98%, respectively. Hence, publicly listed firms have longer 
maturity than privately held firms. 
 
Panel C: Short-term Debt to Total Assets 
Small Large t-test 
0.2076 0.2918 16.9843*** 
Small Medium t-test 
0.2076 0.2868 -25.0884*** 
Medium Large t-test 
0.2868 0.2918 0.9959 
Listed Privately held t-test 
0.2498 0.2247 4.7074*** 
 
Panel D: Short-term debt to total assets for firms with and without stock market 
STD/TA Stockmarket Without Stockmarket t-test 
All 0.2651 0.1031 32.5063*** 
Small 0.234 0.0725 28.6908*** 
Medium 0.2881 0.2485 3.1613*** 
Large 0.2963 0.1749 5.2150*** 
  
As long-term debt to total assets, firms in countries with a stock market have a 
higher mean of short-term debt to total assets than firms in those countries without a 
stock market, 26.51% and 10.31%, respectively. The average short-term debt to total 
assets for large firms in countries with a stock market is 29.63%, while it is 17.49% 
for large firms in countries without a stock market. For small firms, the mean of 
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short-term debt to total assets is 23.40% in countries with a stock market and drops 
significantly to 7.25% in countries without a stock market. Due to information 
asymmetries, it is hard to access to financing for firms in developing countries. 
Generally, large firms have a greater advantage since they have access to 
international financial markets. It seems that presence of an active stock market 
affects the small firms’ debt level more than large firms. 
 
Panel E: Long-term Debt to Total Debt 
Small Large t-test 
0.2808 0.4138 -17.6246*** 
Small Medium t-test 
0.2808 0.3494 14.2910*** 
Medium Large t-test 
0.3494 0.4138 -9.0023*** 
Listed Privately held t-test 
0.42 0.3397 9.5816*** 
 
Finally, we employ a univariate analysis for long-term debt to total debt. The 
average long-term debt to total debt for small firms is 28.08%, while it rises to 
41.38% for large companies. As expected, large firms have longer maturity than 
small firms. As large firms, listed firms (42%) have longer maturity as compared to 
privately held companies (33.97%). Basically, as firms get larger, their maturity 
becomes longer. 
Panel F: Long-term Debt to Total Debt for Firms with and without a Stock Market 
LTD/TD Stockmarket Without Stockmarket t-test 
All 0.3287 0.2999 3.5355*** 
Small 0.2762 0.3104 -3.3467*** 
Medium 0.3533 0.2677 5.4083*** 




Next, we investigate the impact of the existence of a stock market. The average 
long-term debt to total debt for firms in a country with a stock market is 32.87% and 
it is 29.99% for firms in a country without a stock market. As expected, the presence 
of a stock market lengthens the maturity of large firms. However, surprisingly, it has 
an opposite impact on small firms. Small firms shorten their maturity in a country 
with a stock market. Since a stock market is another source of financing, small firms 
might prefer equity financing rather than long-term debt financing in countries with 
a stock market. 
 
4.4.3. Tangibility 
In the previous section, we demonstrate that the mean of asset tangibility of the 
firms in the sample is 45.21%. The average asset tangibility for the large listed firms 
in developing countries varies between 32.8% and 67.5% (Booth et al., 2001). The 
difference between them might be due to the size of the companies in our sample 
since the majority of the sample is comprised of small and privately held companies. 
Small and privately held firms have more tangibility than the large and listed firms. 
Since small and privately held firms are more opaque when compared to large and 





Table 4.21. Univariate analysis for Tangibility 
Tangibility is measured as net fixed assets to total assets. Small represents the firms that employ less 
than 50 employees, medium firms have 50-500 employees, and large firms employ more than 500 
employees. Private represents the privately held companies and listed is for publicly listed firms. 
Stockmarket represents those firms in countries with a stock market and without stockmarket 
represents firms in countries without stock market. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** 
presents significance at the 5% level, and *** reports significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Tangibility 
Small Large t-test 
0.4817 0.4143 11.6595*** 
Small Medium t-test 
0.4817 0.428 -15.1732*** 
Medium Large t-test 
0.428 0.4143 2.6541*** 
Listed Privately held t-test 
0.4337 0.4671 -5.3647*** 
 
Table 4.21 demonstrates the results for tangibility. The mean of tangibility for small 
firms is 48.16%, while for large firms it is 41.44%. Even if small firms have higher 
tangible assets, they have lower leverage and debt maturity compared to large firms. 
The same is true for privately held and listed companies. The average tangible assets 
for privately held firms is 46.07% and it is 43.37% for listed companies. The mean 
of asset tangibility for listed companies in the U.S. (UK) is 39.5% (35.6%) 
(Antoniou et al., 2008). Moreover, the asset tangibility for small firms in developed 
countries alters between 19.8% and 56.3% (Hall et al., 2004). This figure changes to 
35.3% for the UK (Michaelas et al., 1999). The firms in developing countries must 
have more tangible assets to be financed by debt compared to firms in developed 
countries. Additionally, small and privately held companies must have higher levels 





Panel B: Tangibility for Firms with and without Stock Market 
Tangibility Stockmarket Without Stockmarket t-test 
All 0.4402 0.5513 -20.9460*** 
Small 0.4614 0.5774 -17.3679*** 
Medium 0.427 0.4486 -1.8942* 
Large 0.4102 0.5016 -4.2134*** 
 
When we look at the impact of a presence of a stock market, we find that firms in a 
country with a stock market (44.02%) have lower tangible assets than firms in a 
country without a stock market (55.13%). Both small and large firms have higher 
levels of tangible assets in a country without a stock market. The average tangible 
assets for small firms in a country with a stock market is 46.14%, while it rises to 
57.745 for the small firms in a country without a stock market. Since the existence 




The firms in developing countries have higher levels of profit when compared to the 
U.S. (UK). The average profitability of the sample is 37.02%, while it is 16% 
(11.6%) in the U.S. (UK) (Antoniou et al., 2008). Since external funding options are 
limited in developing countries, firms prefer to keep their profits in the company as 
an internal funding source. Small firms’ profitability is 32.91%, on average. The 
average profitability of large firms is 48.39%. On average, privately held firms at 
38.67% are more profitable than listed firms at 36.55%. However, we could not find 




Table 4.22. Univariate Analysis for Profitability 
Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. Small 
represents those firms that employ less than 50 employees, medium firms have 50-500 employees, 
and large firms employ more than 500 employees. Private represents the privately held companies 
and listed is for publicly listed firms. Stockmarket represents those firms in countries with a stock 
market and without stockmarket reports those firms in countries without a stock market. *, **, and 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Profitability 
Small Large t-test 
0.3291 0.4839 -10.3529*** 
Small Medium t-test 
0.3291 0.3884 6.5479*** 
Medium Large t-test 
0.3884 0.4839 -6.5608*** 
Listed Privately held t-test 
0.3655 0.3867 -1.2625 
 
Panel B: Profitability for Firms with and without Stock Market 
 Stockmarket Without stockmarket t-test 
All 0.3829 0.2653 8.4633*** 
Small 0.3443 0.2592 5.1749*** 
Medium 0.3937 0.2728 3.8679*** 
Large 0.4892 0.3557 1.7974* 
 
When we compare the firms in countries with a stock market and without it, we find 
that firms in countries with a stock market (38.29%) have higher profitability than 
firms in countries without a stock market (26.53%). As expected, large firms are 
more profitable than small firms in countries with and without a stock market. The 
average profitability of small firms in countries with a stock market is 34.43%, 
while it declines to 25.92% in countries without a stock market. Large firms are 
more profitable in countries with a stock market (48.92%) than without a stock 
market (35.57%). Since external funding options are limited in developing countries, 
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This chapter explained the data sources and properties of data. First, we discuss our 
data sources, present the summary statistics of variables across countries, and apply 
univariate analysis to test whether size and listing status have an effect on the 
leverage and debt maturity levels of firms. Moreover, we investigate the impact of 
the presence of a stock market on the leverage and debt maturity levels of firms. To 
our knowledge, this is the first thesis to use the World Bank Enterprise Survey to 
analyse the leverage and maturity levels of firms. Since this is the first thesis to use 
the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the properties of the data and preliminary 
analysis are the contributions of this chapter. 
 
In this chapter, we also presented the descriptive statistics and univariate analysis. 
We find that leverage and debt maturity are lower for firms in developing countries 
than firms in developed countries. Moreover, the debt level of small and privately 
held firms is much lower as compared to the large and listed firms in the sample. We 
have discussed the level of leverage and term maturity in countries with and without 
a stock market. We find that firms in a country with a stock market can use more 
leverage and higher debt maturity than firms in a country without a stock market. 
This difference is higher especially for small firms. In contrast, the average leverage 
of large firms in countries with an active stock market is close to the average 
leverage in developed countries. Therefore, the presence of an active stock market is 
important for the external financing of firms in developing countries. Moreover, we 
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analyze the difference between privately held and listed firms. Privately held firms 
are less levered than listed firms; but the leverage of listed firms is still lower than 
those in developed countries. 
 
We also discuss the economic and financial environments of the countries in the 
sample. Countries in the sample are not as rich as developed countries. They have 
higher uncertainty and interest rates. Also they fail to provide a business friendly 
environment for firms. The countries in the sample have higher corruption and they 
do not have developed financial institutions. All of these factors make external 
financing difficult for the firms in our sample. We also apply an F-test for country 
differences and find that the economic and financial environments of countries are 
not the same; therefore, we justify the use of economic and financial environment 
variables in our analysis in the following chapters. Since each country provides a 
different environment for its firms, they should have an impact on their external 
financing decisions. Hence, in the Chapters 5 and 6, we will investigate their effects 











The purpose of this chapter is to investigate capital structure decisions of small and 
privately held firms in developing countries. The previous literature has mainly 
focused on the large listed firms in both developed and developing countries. For 
example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine the determinants of capital structure 
across G-7 countries and conclude that the factors are the same across countries. 
Booth et al. (2001) analyse the capital structure choice of large firms in ten 
developing countries and find that decisions are affected by the same variables as in 
developed countries, but with persistent differences across countries, which could be 
due to the impact of different institutional features on capital structure. Large firms 
are not, however representative of firms in developing countries. About 90% of our 
sample is small and medium sized firms, which characterise the corporate sector in 
developing countries much more accurately. The workforce employed in the SMEs 
in our sample varies between 27.60% and 86.50% (Ayyagari et al., 2005). Work on 
small and medium sized firms has been limited due to a lack of data. Some studies 
have examined some European countries where the economic and financial 
environments are similar. There are a number of studies that examine the capital 
structure decisions of SMEs (Ang, 1991; Holmes and Kent, 1991; Cosh and Hughes, 
1994; Acs and Isberg, 1996; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 
2008). But they either examine a small sample of countries (for cross country studies 
see Hall et al., 2004; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008) or 
a single country in Europe (for single country studies see Van der Wijst and Thurik, 
1993; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2005; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Therefore, it could be 
misleading to generalise the results of these studies. Only Beck et al. (2008) have 
examined small firms for a number of both developed and developing countries. 
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However, their data provide limited firm level financial information, which did not 
allow them to replicate the firm level controls used in capital structure papers. 
Financing patterns are given in terms of proportions of investment, not as debt to 
asset ratios, as is common in the literature.13 They focus instead on how financial 
and institutional development affects the financing of firms using a broad spectrum 
of financing sources including leasing, suppliers, development, and informal 
finance. However, their data do not allow them to test for the capital structure theory 
as in studies for developed countries. In contrast, our rich database allows us to do 
that. Our study helps answer the following questions: 
 
1. Is there any difference in corporate financing decisions due to the size or 
listing status of the firms? 
2. Does the economic and financial environment of a country have an impact 
on the capital structure decisions of firms? 
 
We use the World Bank Enterprise survey and investigate the determinants of the 
capital structure of firms from 24 developing countries covering all regions 
including Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, the Middle 
East and North Africa, and South Asia. We find that capital structure theories hold 
in developing countries. We confirm that small firms have lower leverage. The 
economic and financial environment has a significant impact on the financing 
decisions of small firms, while for large firms, most of the variables become 
statistically insignificant and do not add much to the explanation of the variability of 
our dependent variable. 
                                                 




Section 5.2 discusses the empirical results and Section 5.3 concludes this chapter. 
 
5.2. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the regression results for the determinants of capital 
structure in developing countries. We first report our results for all of the firms in 
the 24 countries. We find that large firms have higher leverage than small firms. To 
examine whether the capital structure theories are portable to small firms, we split 
the sample based on the size of the firms as small, medium, and large. We present 
the results for medium firms too but we will only discuss the results for the 
determinants of capital structure for small and large firms. We confirm that capital 
structure theories are portable to small firms. The main difference between small 
and large firms is derived from the impact of the economic and financial 
environment of the country. For the robustness of our results, we use different 
definitions of size and we confirm that our results are robust to different definitions 
of size. Since most of the previous studies examine the determinants of capital 
structure for listed companies, we divide our sample based on privately held and 
listed firms and analyze whether the determinants of private and listed firms are 
different. We find that firm level, economic, and financial environment determinants 
have a significant impact on the leverage and debt maturity decisions of privately 
held firms, while most of the variables do not have a significant effect on listed 




5.2.1. Determinants of capital structure 
We have estimated the leverage against firm level, economic, and financial 
environment variables. The functional form of the equation estimated and the 
expected signs of the variables are as follows: 
                (5.1) 
i = 1, 2, ...,10,839; t = 1999,…,2004 
 
Leverage is total liabilities to total assets for the ith firm at time t. Fi,j,t indicates the 
firm level variables, asset tangibility, profitability and size, while Ei,k,t represents the 
economic environment variable, GDP per capita, growth, inflation, interest, and tax 
at time t. Fini,l,t presents the financial environment variables, corruption, legal 
system, deposit money bank assets to central bank assets, stock market dummy, 
stock market turnover, offshore bank deposits to GDP, and offshore bank deposits to 
domestic bank deposits at time t.  
 
Table 5.1 presents the results of leverage for the overall sample. The coefficient for 
tangibility is negative for leverage indicating that as collateral increases, firms 
borrow less as opposed to our expectation. According to the trade-off and agency 
theories, as tangibility increases, collateral increases and firms should be able to find 
more debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988). The pecking 
order theory also supports this positive relation since collateral relieves the 
information asymmetry problem. Alternatively, some studies have found an inverse 
relationship and explain it with the maturity matching principle (Booth et al., 2001). 
We observe the same in opposition to our expectations. We will discuss the maturity 
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matching principle in Chapter 6 when we discuss the results for debt maturity. 
Hence, firms with higher tangible assets prefer equity financing to debt financing. 
Table 5.1. Leverage 
This table presents the regressions of leverage on firm level, economic, and financial environment variables. 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Tangibility is measured as net fixed assets to total assets. 
Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Small and Large are 
included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 employees, small takes the value 
of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 500 employees and zero 
otherwise. GDP/Cap is the GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP. Inflation is 
measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate shown on the schedule 
of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the perceptions of corruption in a 
country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a civil law legal system and zero for common 
law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets plus central 
bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a stock market and zero otherwise. 
Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is the ratio of offshore bank loans 
relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. The reported R2 is the 











































The coefficient for profitability is negative indicating that as profitability increases, 
leverage decreases. We confirm our hypothesis that leverage is negatively related to 
profitability. This provides support for the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Firms use retained earnings first and then move to external sources of 
financing. This negative correlation also supports the existence of asymmetric 
information. Since managers of the firms know better than outside investors about 
the company’s value, prospects, and risks, outside investors increase the cost of 
borrowing to compensate for information asymmetry. Therefore, to reduce the cost 
of borrowing, firms prefer to be financed by internal funds first. In accordance with 
Booth et al. (2001), this result proposes that external financing is costly; as a result, 
firms avoid it. The size dummy for small firms has a negative coefficient and the 
dummy for large firms has a positive coefficient. Leverage is higher for large firms 
and lower for small firms. As firms’ size increases, they become more diversified 
and have more stable cash flow. They are less often bankrupt when compared to 
small firms (Pettit and Singer, 1985). Since they are more mature firms, they have 
better status in the debt market. Therefore, the agency cost of debt is lower for those 
firms, so that they can afford higher levels of leverage. Booth et al. (2001) also 
supports this positive relationship between leverage and firm size. Therefore, we 
confirm our hypothesis that larger firms have higher leverage. 
 
Looking now at the macroeconomic variables, we find that GDP per capita is 
negative; however, we expected a positive relation between leverage and GDP per 
capita. Firms in rich countries might prefer equity financing to debt financing. As 
increases in GDP per capita define the economic development of a country, more 
financing and financing options become available for firms. Therefore, firms in 
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economically developed countries prefer equity financing. GDP growth has a 
positive coefficient. In countries with a relatively higher rate of economic growth, 
firms are eager to take on higher levels of debt to finance new investment (Bartholdy 
and Mateus, 2008). The coefficient for inflation is positive implying that firms boost 
their debt financing in an inflationary environment which opposes our expectations. 
Increases in inflation lead to a higher value of tax deductions on debt (Taggart, 
1985). As a result, firms are inclined to use more debt financing in an inflationary 
environment. Frank and Goyal (2007) also find the same positive association. 
According to them, firms have an incentive to borrow more as inflation increases if 
managers can time their debt. In that way, they can lower their cost of borrowing 
when inflation is higher than the current interest rate. The impact of interest on 
leverage is positive suggesting that firms continue to borrow despite the increases in 
the cost of interest. We expected negative relationship between leverage and interest 
as increases in the interest rate boost the cost of borrowing. However, firms continue 
to borrow despite the increases in interest. This may be due to the fact that in most 
developing countries, interest rates rise when ceilings are abolished as a result of 
financial liberalisation and funds become available (Bekaert et al., 2003). The 
coefficient for tax is positive for leverage in accordance with our hypothesis. As 
taxes increase, firms borrow more. In accordance with the trade-off theory, firms 
prefer to be financed by debt as interest payments are tax deductible. By using the 
Miller tax term, Booth et al. (2001) find the same positive impact on leverage. 





Next, we discuss the regression results on the impact of the financial environment 
variables on firm leverage. First, we analyze the impact of corruption on firm 
leverage. The coefficient for corruption is positive for leverage. We confirm our 
hypothesis that firms increase their debt financing in better governed countries. As 
the exercise of public power for private gain decreases, financial systems become 
more transparent and, as such, more trustable. The more transparent and trustable 
the financial system is the more loans and investments become available. Since the 
countries in the sample are relatively poor compared to European countries, 
corruption is one of the largest obstacles making investment and borrowing costly. 
Therefore, the lower the corruption, the more funding firms are able to find. 
 
Additionally, we examine the effect of the legal system on firm leverage. The 
coefficient for the civil law dummy is positive for leverage implying that firms in 
the countries with civil law legal systems can borrow more. Since countries with 
civil law legal systems have weaker property and investor rights, firms in those 
countries prefer debt financing, specifically short-term debt financing (Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). We will analyze the impact of debt maturity in the 
Chapter 6. 
 
Furthermore, we investigate the effect of financial institutions on leverage. The 
coefficient for deposit money bank assets to central bank assets is positive for 
leverage in accordance with our expectations. When the deposit money banks play a 
larger role than the central bank in the banking system, we could say that financial 
institutions in the country are highly developed (Beck et al., 2009). The developed 
banking system provides more funds; therefore, the debt financing of firms 
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increases. The coefficient for the stock market dummy is positive for leverage. We 
confirm our hypothesis that in countries that have a stock market, firms have access 
to more external financing. As banks, the stock market is another option for firms to 
raise funds. Stock markets signify the use of equity markets in raising capital, but it 
also encourages greater use of bank financing in developing countries (Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 1996). The existence of a stock market offers better diversification 
and increased liquidity; therefore, the amount of investments available in a country 
is expected to amplify (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Obstfeld, 1994). With 
stock markets, bank loans rise. As a result, firms have access to more external 
funding. The coefficient for stock market turnover is negative for leverage 
suggesting that as turnover increases, firms prefer equity financing. Since high 
turnover decreases the transaction costs and raises the liquidity of the market, 
funding in the stock market becomes cheaper (Levine and Zervos, 1998). Therefore, 
firms may prefer to borrow less debt and shift their financing choices from debt 
financing to equity financing. Financial institutions play an important role in 
supplying available funds to firms. Financially developed countries create more 
external financing opportunities, while an active and more liquid stock market 
allows firms to elect equity financing over debt financing. The existence of a stock 
market amplifies the available funding in the financial system; therefore, firms’ 
borrowing increases. 
 
Finally, we explore the effects of financial globalization on firm leverage. Offshore 
bank loans to GDP do not have a significant impact on the leverage. 14  The 
coefficient for offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits is positive for 
                                                 
14 We find a positive relationship when we do the robustness test. We discuss the effect in the 
robustness test section. 
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leverage. As offshore bank deposits increases, the debt level of firms also amplifies. 
The lack of trust in the domestic banking system may force firms to prefer offshore 
banking. We expected a negative correlation between offshore banking and leverage 
since available funds become unavailable within the domestic banking system. 
However, as we see this variable as a proxy for financial globalization, we find a 
positive relationship. Financial globalization makes local markets more open and 
connected to the international financial markets. As the financial system integrates 
to international financial markets, more funds become available in the domestic 
system. Therefore, the debt funding of firms is enhanced. 
 
In conclusion, the firms in our sample follow the theories in their debt financing 
decisions. Firm level variables have an impact on their leverage decisions, as well as 
the economic and financial environment of the country. 
 
5.2.2. Are the determinants of capital structure portable for Small Firms? 
In this section, we analyse whether the determinants of capital structure are portable 
to small firms. Table 5.2 presents the results for Small, Medium and Large firms. 
Tangibility is negatively related to leverage in opposition to our expectations. Both 
small and large firms borrow less when they have higher collateral. Daskalakis and 
Psillaki (2008) find the same negative relationship between leverage and asset 
tangibility for SMEs. They explain it as firms with higher tangible assets already 
have a steady source of income. This income helps firms to generate more internal 
funds; therefore, firms are less reluctant to use external financing. Alternatively, the 
reason for this negative association might be the maturity matching principle (Booth 
et al., 2001) that will be discussed in Chapter 6. Large firms follow the pecking 
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order when they utilize internal funding. However, we could not find any significant 
relationship between the profitability and leverage of small firms as opposed to our 
expectation. Therefore, the debt financing decisions of small firms is dependent only 
on collateral. Internal sources do not have any impact on their debt decisions. If 
small firms have enough resources, they would not look for external financing. 
 
The main difference between small and large firms comes from the impact of the 
macroeconomic and financial environment variables. Most of the economic and 
financial factors become insignificant for large firms. The richness of the country 
lowers the debt financing of small and large firms. In opposition to our hypothesis, 
both types of firms shift from debt financing to equity financing as the country gets 
richer. Economic growth boosts the debt financing of small firms, while uncertainty 
in the economy encourages their borrowing. Unlike small firms, large firms are not 
affected by growth, inflation, and taxes, but only by the GDP per capita and interest 
rates. Large firms continue to borrow debt in spite of the increases in interest rates. 
Hence, the results indicate that the effects that we have seen for the overall sample 
chiefly demonstrate the capital structure decisions of small firms. In accordance with 










Table 5.2. Leverage for Small, Medium and Large Firms 
This table presents the regressions of leverage on firm level, economic, and financial environment variables for 
small, medium, and large firms. Column 1 reports the regression for leverage of small firms, Column 2 presents 
the results for medium firms, and Column 3 is for large firms. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. Tangibility is measured as net fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before 
interest and taxes divided by total assets. Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If 
the firm employs less than 50 employees, small takes a value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of 
one if the firm has more than 500 employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. 
Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending 
rate. Tax is the highest tax rate shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. 
Corruption measures the perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
country has civil law legal systems and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money 
bank assets to deposit money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the country has a stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market 
capitalization. Nrbloan is the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank 
deposits to domestic bank deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
 
Leverage Small Medium Large 
Tangibility -0.1783*** -0.1770*** -0.1083*** 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.033) 
Profitability -0.0003 -0.0357*** -0.0232** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.011) 
GDP/Cap -0.0425*** -0.1022*** -0.0510* 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.028) 
Growth 2.2893*** 4.4984*** 1.1692 
(0.369) (0.437) (0.901) 
Inflation 0.2307*** 0.1488*** 0.0434 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.140) 
Interest 0.4514*** 0.5096*** 0.3225** 
(0.050) (0.055) (0.129) 
Tax 0.3018*** -0.0195 -0.3029 
(0.104) (0.130) (0.309) 
Corruption 0.1721*** 0.1493*** -0.0025 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.037) 
Civil 0.0790*** 0.1265*** -0.0482 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.037) 
Dbacba 0.2326*** 0.1785*** 0.0624 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.064) 
Stockmrk 0.1801*** 0.1320*** 0.1655*** 
(0.013) (0.021) (0.051) 
Turnover -0.0327*** -0.0151*** -0.0196* 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) 
Nrbloan 0.1801* 0.0816 0.2415 
(0.094) (0.129) (0.276) 
Offdep 0.2164*** 0.1259*** -0.1234 
(0.032) (0.035) (0.079) 
C 0.1223* 0.7243*** 0.7376*** 
(0.072) (0.093) (0.217) 
Observation 12626 10927 2866 
R2 0.1934 0.1119 0.0338 
 
The impact of the financial environment on leverage decisions among different sizes 
of firms indicates some differences. Like the economic environment, most of the 
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financial environment variables become insignificant for large firms. A civil law 
legal system and a less corrupt environment aid small firms’ borrowing. We confirm 
our hypothesis that small firms borrow more in civil law and better governed 
countries. Financial institutions are an important factor for small firms, whereas 
large firms do not consider them for their leverage decisions. The effect of the 
financial institutions stays the same for small firms. They prefer debt financing 
when the country has a developed banking system and a stock market. A highly 
liquid stock market makes small firms shift from debt financing to equity financing. 
In contrast, although large firms boost their debt financing in countries with a stock 
market, they prefer equity financing when stock market turnover is high. Therefore, 
we confirm our hypothesis that both small and large firms prefer debt financing in 
countries with a stock market and they prefer equity financing when the stock 
market turnover is high as the cost of equity financing becomes cheaper. 
 
Financial globalization increases the external financing of small firms, but it does 
not significantly affect large firms. With financial globalization, firms gain access to 
developed financial markets. This access makes more funding available for firms; 
therefore, small firms can increase their external financing in accordance with our 
expectations. Alternatively, we could find no significant correlation between 
financial globalization and leverage for large firms. Since large firms have already 
had access to the international financial markets, it does not matter to them whether 
the country’s financial system is engaged in the international financial markets or 
not. Hence, for large firms, the presence of an active stock market and turnover are 
the only factors that have an impact on the debt financing decisions among the 




In sum, no matter what the size of the firm, firm level variables have an important 
impact on their debt financing decisions. Only for small firms, could we not find any 
significant correlation for profitability. We confirm that small firms are more 
exposed to the shocks and changes in the economic and financial environment of the 
country than large firms since most of the variables become insignificant for large 
firms. The reason for this could be large firms’ access to the international financial 
markets. Large firms only consider increases in the cost of borrowing and the 
existence of a stock market in their debt financing decisions. As expected, liquidity 
of the stock market encourages them use equity financing. In contrast, changes in 
the local economy and financial environment alter the debt financing decisions of 
small firms. Thus, the external financing of small firms is more dependent upon the 
economic and financial development of the country. 
 
5.2.3. Are results different for different measures of size? 
We test the robustness of our results by using different definitions of size. First, we 
use the logarithm of sales and then the logarithm of assets to proxy size, 
respectively, in Table 5.3. When we examine Table 5.3, we observe that the results 
are very similar to those reported in Table 5.1. Leverage is higher for large firms. 
Larger firms usually have more stable cash flows and lower bankruptcy risk (Pettit 
and Singer, 1985). They also have access to the international capital markets; 
therefore, being a large firm increases leverage. We confirm that firms in the sample 
follow the theory. The impact of macroeconomic determinants also remains the 
same. The richness of the country reduces the firms’ borrowing, while economic 
growth increases leverage. Firms continue to borrow despite uncertainties in the 
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economy and the higher cost of borrowing. We could not find any significant 
association between tax and leverage, as opposed to our previous results. 
 
When we look at the financial environment variables, there is no significant change 
from the previously reported results. The only exception is offshore bank loans to 
GDP. We find a positive relation between this ratio and leverage as opposed to the 
insignificant relationship noted previously. The higher the offshore loans, the more 
leverage firms have. Since offshore bank loans provide more available funds into the 
domestic financial system, firms can borrow more. Developed banking systems and 
active stock markets boost the leverage of firms, while higher stock market turnover 
decreases leverage. 
 
In summary, our results are robust to different definitions of size. Regardless of the 
various definitions of size we used based on the number of employees, sales, and 
total assets of the company, we find that leverage is higher for larger firms. Large 












Table 5.3. Leverage with Different Size Proxies 
This table presents the regressions of leverage on firm level, economic, and financial environment variables by 
using different size proxies. Column 1 presents the regression with the logarithm of sales and Column 2 reports 
the regression results with a logarithm of assets. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Tangibility 
is measured as net fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets. Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs 
less than 50 employees, small takes a value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has 
more than 500 employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual 
growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the 
highest tax rate shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption 
measures the perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a 
civil law legal system and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets 
to deposit money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country 
has a stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. 
Nrbloan is the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to 
domestic bank deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates a 
level of significance at 1%, ** a level of significance at 5%, and * a level of significance at 10%. 
 
Sale Asset 
Tangibility -0.1647*** -0.1733*** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Profitability -0.0188*** -0.0057 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Size 0.0211*** 0.0174*** 
Log(sale) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP/Cap -0.0889*** -0.0841*** 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Growth 4.1455*** 4.1583*** 
(0.258) (0.259) 
Inflation 0.1670*** 0.1682*** 
(0.030) (0.030) 
Interest 0.2872*** 0.3295*** 
(0.036) (0.036) 
Tax -0.0381 -0.0297 
(0.075) (0.076) 
Corruption 0.1455*** 0.1406*** 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Civil 0.0781*** 0.0735*** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Dbacba 0.1035*** 0.1202*** 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Stockmrk 0.2479*** 0.2502*** 
(0.010) (0.011) 
Turnover -0.0272*** -0.0292*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Nrbloan 0.2583*** 0.2805*** 
(0.071) (0.071) 
Offdep 0.0668*** 0.0654*** 
(0.023) (0.023) 
C 0.3383*** 0.3287*** 
(0.055) (0.055) 
Observation 26390 26419 





5.2.4. Are the determinants of capital structure different for privately held 
firms? 
We perform other estimations to check the robustness of our results. Since most of 
the previous studies focus on listed firms, we split our sample into two subsamples 
based on firms that are privately held and publicly listed. Table 5.4 reports the 
results for leverage of privately held and listed companies. The impact of firm level 
variables stays the same for privately held firms, while for listed firms, profitability 
and large become insignificant. For listed firms, internal funds and being a larger 
firm are not important factors in debt financing decisions. The effect of economic 
environment variables on privately held and listed firms stays the same in 
accordance with the results of small and large firms, except for growth and tax. 
Although growth does not have any significant impact on large firms, listed firms 
boost their debt financing as the economy grows. Tax has a negative impact on 
listed firms, while it has no effect on large firms. The opposite relationship is true 
for private and small firms. We could not find any significant association between 
tax and leverage for private firms, but small firms increase their leverage as tax rates 
increase. 
 
Column 1 in Table 5.4 presents the results for leverage of privately held firms. Firm 
level determinants of capital structure for privately held firms stays the same in 
accordance with our previous findings in the above sections. Privately held 
companies also prefer internal financing as asset tangibility and profitability boost. 
Being a large firm increases the debt financing of a firm, while smaller firms have 
lesser debt. Privately held firms also consider the economic environment of a 
country in their debt financing decisions. The richness of the country decreases the 
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leverage of privately held firms, while growth in the economy increases the debt 
financing of privately held firms, as well as uncertainties in the economy. Privately 
held firms continue to use debt financing in spite of the increases in interest, while 
tax does not have any significant effect on their leverage decisions. Privately held 
firms consider corruption, financial institutions, and financial globalization in their 
leverage decisions. They use more debt financing in countries with better 
governance, developed financial institutions, and financial globalization since 
developed financial environments increase the available funding opportunities in the 
country. 
 
Column 2 in Table 5.4 reports the estimations for leverage of publicly listed firms. 
As opposed to our previous findings, we could not find all of the firm level 
determinants significant. Listed firms also prefer internal financing as tangibility 
increases and being a small firm decreases debt financing. Alternatively, 
profitability and large do not have any significant effect on the leverage decisions of 
listed firms. Moreover, most of the economic environment variables become 
insignificant. The richness of the country decreases debt financing, while economic 
growth increases the leverage of listed firms. Inflation does not have a significant 
impact on the debt financing decisions of listed firms. Interest has a positive and tax 
has a negative impact on leverage. In contrast, as large firms, listed firms can find 
external funding in both domestic and international markets; therefore, the 
development of the financial environment does not affect their capital structure 
decisions. Thus, the debt financing decisions of privately held firms are more 





Table 5.4. Leverage for Privately Held and Listed Firms 
This table presents the regressions of leverage on firm level, economic, and financial environment variables for 
private and listed firms. Tangibility is measured as net fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as 
the earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Small and Large are included as dummy variables 
to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 employees, small takes a value of one and zero otherwise. 
Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 500 employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per 
capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. 
Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable 
income of corporations. Corruption measures the perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the country has civil law legal systems and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba 
is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the country has a stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total 
shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the 
ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. *** indicates a level of significance at 1%, **a  level of significance at 5%, and * a level of 
significance at 10%.  
 
Leverage Private Listed 
Tangibility -0.1788*** -0.1253*** 
(0.011) (0.042) 
Profitability -0.0138*** -0.0088 
(0.004) (0.013) 
Small -0.1326*** -0.0716*** 
(0.006) (0.026) 
Large 0.0866*** -0.0076 
(0.010) (0.023) 
GDP/Cap -0.0152** -0.1086*** 
(0.007) (0.037) 
Growth 2.5446*** 3.5022*** 
(0.307) (1.344) 
Inflation 0.0966** -0.0412 
(0.038) (0.069) 
Interest 0.3885*** 0.2242* 
(0.046) (0.129) 
Tax -0.1433 -0.7224** 
(0.108) (0.324) 
Corruption 0.0894*** 0.0355 
(0.013) (0.043) 
Civil -0.0108 0.1202* 
(0.013) (0.067) 
Dbacba 0.1559*** 0.0859 
(0.018) (0.070) 
Turnover -0.0083*** -0.0122 
(0.003) (0.012) 
Nrbloan 0.2022** 0.0796 
(0.083) (0.287) 
Offdep 0.0925*** 0.0045 
(0.025) (0.077) 
C 0.4135*** 1.2530*** 
(0.067) (0.315) 
Observation 22409 2006 






This section examined the determinants of capital structure decisions of firms in 
developing countries. The main focus of the previous literature is mainly on large 
listed firms. Since large listed firms have also access to the international markets, it 
can be misleading to generalize their results for SMEs. In contrast to earlier studies, 
our main focus is on small and privately held firms in developing countries. About 
90% of private firms and about 70% of the listed firms in our sample are small and 
medium sized. We use survey data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, which 
has not been used before. As indicated in the previous chapter, leverage is lower for 
private and small firms despite their higher asset tangibility and profitability. We 
attribute this to their limited access to financing. 
 
Size is an important factor in the level of leverage a firm holds. We confirm our 
hypothesis that as firms become larger, they increase their leverage in their capital 
structures. Larger companies are usually more diversified and their risk of failure is 
reduced. As a result, they can have higher leverage. Small firms have lower 
leverage. Both small and large firms do not prefer debt financing when they have 
higher collateral as opposed to our expectation. Daskalakis and Psilliaki (2008) find 
the same inverse relation for SMEs. Firms with high tangible assets have a more 
stable source of return; therefore, they can generate more internal funds and prefer 
less external financing. On the other hand, we could not find any significant relation 
between profitability and leverage for small firms as opposed to previous studies 
(Daskalis and Psillaki, 2008). Due to information asymmetries and high inflation in 
developing countries, small firms face higher interest rate costs. Also, they are 
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financially more risky when compared to large firms. As a result, debt financing 
becomes expensive for small companies. 
 
The economic environment of each country influences the debt decisions of firms 
differently. GDP per capita, economic growth rates, inflation, and interest rates are 
important for small and privately held firms. Since large and listed firms have easy 
access to both domestic and international financial markets, not all economic 
environment factors are significant as opposed to our expectations. As with the 
economic environment, the financial environment influences leverage decisions of 
small and privately held firms. Leverage of large firms is only affected by the 
existence of a stock market and turnover; whereas, listed companies increase their 
leverage in countries with civil law legal systems. Therefore, the main difference 
between small, privately held and large, listed firms comes from their sensitivity to 
the economic and financial environment of the country. Since small and privately 
held firms cannot access international financial markets, the decisions taken by local 
governments on economic policies and the financial environment have a direct 
impact on the external financing decisions of small and privately held firms. Since 
small firms are vital for economic growth, local governments must consider small 
firms before making any policy decisions. They should take small firms into 
consideration when they prepare fiscal and monetary policies and any regulations 










This chapter investigates the determinants of debt maturity structure of firms in 
developing countries. By using various databases, such as the World Bank 
Enterprise survey, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the Financial 
Development and Structure database, we analyze the determinants of debt maturity 
structures of small and large firms. Most of the previous studies on the debt maturity 
structures of firms focus on large listed companies in both developed and developing 
countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou et 
al., 2006). But the work on small and medium size enterprises is limited to European 
countries where the economic and financial environments are alike (Michaelas et al., 
1999; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Gianetti, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Bartholdy and 
Mateus, 2005; 2008; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008). Therefore, 
it could be misleading to accept their findings and generate them for all types of 
firms in developing countries. Hence, to fill this gap, we investigate the effect of 
firm level, economic, and financial environment variables on the debt maturity of 
companies, specifically small firms in developing countries. 
 
This chapter follows Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). They analyze the 
relation between the financing choices of firms and the level of financial market 
development in 30 developed and developing countries. They also examine this 
relationship for both large and small firms. However, the firms included in the study 
are publicly listed companies. This means that the small firms contained in their 
sample are relatively large, especially for developing countries. Unlike their study, 
the majority of firms in our sample are SMEs, which constitute 90% of the firms. In 
addition to the difference in the size of the firms, we also include the effect of 
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corruption and financial globalization in our analysis. Since the countries in the 
sample are relatively poor compared to other countries, corruption can be the biggest 
obstacle for firms’ external financing. Furthermore, since small firms in developing 
countries have difficulty accessing international financial markets, we include a 
financial globalization variable to demonstrate the effect of engagement of the 
financial system of a country into international financial markets on the capital and 
debt maturity structures of firms. We are looking for the answers to following 
questions: 
 
• Is there a size effect on debt maturity decisions of firms? 
• Are the determinants of debt maturity different for small firms? 
• Do economic and financial environment of a country affect the debt maturity 
decisions? 
 
Small firms have different characteristics compared to large firms. Small firms are 
more opaque and they have information asymmetry problems. That’s why accessing 
external financing is a big problem. As we indicated in Chapter 3, the descriptive 
statistics section, small firms have shorter maturity when compared to large firms. 
Therefore, we try to determine whether the determinants of debt maturity structure 
are also different due to their different characteristics. For that purpose, we analyze 
the effect of firm level, economic, and financial environment variables on debt 
maturity. We find that larger firms have longer debt maturity. Small firms are more 
sensitive to the changes in the economic and financial environment of the country. 
Therefore, the economic and financial environment of a country is very important 




The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the 
empirical results for the determinants of debt maturity. Section 6.3 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
6.2. Empirical results 
In this section, we present the regression results for the determinants of debt 
maturity of firms. At first, we use long-term and short-term debt to total assets as the 
dependent variable and estimate our model. Additionally, we use long-term debt to 
total debt as a dependent variable and estimate the model including leverage as a 
firm level variable. For both sections, we first report the results for all the firms in 
24 countries. Then, we examine whether the determinants of debt maturity are 
different for small firms by dividing the sample based on the size of the firms 
delineating them as small, medium, and large. We report the results for medium 
firms. Since most of the difference will come between small and large firms, we will 
not discuss the results of medium firms. Next, we test the robustness of our results 
by using different definitions of size. Finally, we analyze the debt maturity decisions 
of privately held and publicly listed companies. 
 
6.2.1. The determinants of long-term and short-term debt to total assets 
decisions of firms  
Our empirical model is debt maturity against firm level, economic, and financial 
environment variables. As we outlined the empirical models in the Chapter 3, we 
use two models in this section. We use long-term debt to total assets as debt maturity 
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and we apply short-term debt to total assets as a dependent variable. The functional 
form of the equation estimated is the following: 
 
               (6.1)                 (6.2) 
i = 1, 2, ...,10,839; t = 1999,…,2004 
 
Long-term debt to total assets is long-term liabilities to total assets for the ith firm at 
time t and short-term debt to total assets is short-term liabilities to total assets for the 
ith firm at time t. Fi,j,t indicates the firm level variables, asset tangibility, profitability 
and size, while Ei,k,t represents the economic environment variable, GDP per capita, 
growth, inflation, interest and tax, at time t. Fini,l,t presents the financial environment 
variables, corruption, legal system, deposit money bank assets to central bank assets, 
stock market dummy, stock market turnover, offshore bank deposits to GDP, and 
offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits at time t. 
 
Table 6.1 Column 1 presents the coefficients for long-term debt to total assets, while 
Column 2 reports the results for short-term debt to total assets for the overall 
sample. First we discuss the results for long-term debt to total assets. The coefficient 
for tangibility is positive for long-term debt to total assets. A firm with more 
tangible assets uses more long-term debt in accordance with the maturity matching 
principle (Booth et al., 2001). According to the trade-off and pecking order theories, 
as tangibility increases, collateral increases and firms are able to find more long-
term debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Therefore, we 
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confirm our hypothesis that firms with higher tangible assets have longer maturity. 
Profitability has a negative coefficient. We confirm our hypothesis that as 
profitability increases, long-term debt to total assets decreases. Booth et al. (2001) 
find the same inverse relation. Firms prefer to be financed internally if they have 
enough internal sources (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The coefficient for small is 
negative, while the coefficient for large is positive. As firms get larger, they use 
more long-term debt financing in accordance with Booth et al. (2001). 
 
Macroeconomic coefficients have also influenced long-term debt financing 
decisions. The coefficient for GDP per capita is negative for long-term debt to total 
assets as opposed to our expectations. As income of the country increases, more 
financing options become available. As a result, firms prefer equity financing. The 
coefficient for GDP growth is positive implying that as countries grow, firms prefer 
to be financed by long-term debt. The impact of inflation on long-term debt to total 
assets is negative in accordance with our hypothesis. Booth et al. (2001) also find 
the same inverse relation. Higher inflation introduces higher uncertainty in the 
environment and amplifies the cost of borrowing (Fan et al., 2011). Therefore, firms 
are able to borrow against real, but not inflationary growth prospects (Booth et al., 
2001). Uncertainty in the economy makes firms prefer short-term rather than long-
term debt financing. Interest has a negative coefficient indicating that as interest 
rates increase, firms avoid financing themselves with long-term debt due to the 
higher cost of interest expense. We confirm our hypothesis that increases in interest 
rates make firms prefer shorter maturity. The coefficient for tax is negative 
indicating that firms in countries with higher tax rates use less long-term debt. This 
result is difficult to interpret. Higher tax rates provide incentives for firms to borrow 
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more due to tax shield. However, at the same time, this high borrowing increases the 
risk of bankruptcy and financial distress costs. Bankruptcy costs are very important 
for small firms since they have higher business risk and greater probability of 
failure. Also, this higher probability of failure decreases the value of the firm. 
Therefore, increases in the probability of failure and decreases in the value of the 
firm may cause firms in developing countries to avoid the trade-off theory for long-
term debt financing. Alternatively, Booth et al. (2001) find a positive relation 
between tax and long-term debt to total assets. Since the firms included in that study 
are large listed companies, the probability of failure is very low. However, our 
results indicate that tax has a positive impact on short-term debt to total assets. 
Therefore, firms benefit from tax shields via short-term debt rather than long-term 
debt. This is a unique feature for developing countries. 
 
The effect of the financial environment on long-term debt financing decisions of 
firms demonstrates some differences when compared to their leverage decisions. 
Firms in highly corrupt countries increase their use of long-term debt financing as 
opposed to our expectations. According to the efficient grease hypothesis, paying 
bribes enables firms to reach cheaper credit. That way, firms can save time, as well 
as overcome troublesome regulations. As a result, they can lower the cost of capital 
(Kaufmann and Wei, 2000). Firms in the countries with civil law legal systems 
borrow less long-term debt as they prefer short-term debt financing. Since protection 
to external investors is better in common law legal systems than civil law legal 
systems, firms in civil law countries prefer to be financed by less long-term debt 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999).  
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Table 6.1. Long-term and Short-term Debt to Total Assets 
This table presents the regressions of long-term and short-term debt to total assets on firm level, economic, and 
financial environment variables for private and listed firms. Column 1 presents the results for long-term debt to 
total assets, while Column 2 provides results for short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility is measured as net 
fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total 
assets. Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 
employees, small takes a value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 
500 employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate 
of GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate 
shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the 
perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has civil law legal 
systems and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit 
money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a 
stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is 
the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank 
deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates a level of 
significance at 1%, ** a level of significance at 5%, and *a  level of significance at 10%. 
 
All LTD/TA STD/TA 
Tangibility 0.0394*** -0.2160*** 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Profitability -0.0122*** -0.0031 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Small -0.0589*** -0.0462*** 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Large 0.0374*** 0.0231*** 
(0.007) (0.008) 
GDP/Cap -0.0079* -0.0370*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Growth 2.0818*** 1.5959*** 
(0.181) (0.211) 
Inflation -0.0549** 0.1944*** 
(0.023) (0.026) 
Interest -0.1437*** 0.5671*** 
(0.025) (0.029) 
Tax -0.6741*** 0.8893*** 
(0.050) (0.063) 
Corruption -0.0254*** 0.1349*** 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Civil -0.0616*** 0.1372*** 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Dbacba 0.0193* 0.1308*** 
(0.011) (0.013) 
Stockmrk 0.0714*** 0.1391*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Turnover 0.0017 -0.0291*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Nrbloan 0.1227** 0.0816 
(0.052) (0.059) 
Offdep -0.0390** 0.1610*** 
(0.015) (0.018) 
C 0.3210*** -0.0705 
(0.037) (0.046) 
Observation 25935 25935 
R2 0.1051 0.2139 
 
As expected, developed banking systems and the existence of a stock market boost 
the long-term funding of firms since they lower the cost of acquiring and processing 
200 
 
information. In developed and efficient financial systems, more external financing 
opportunities become available; thus, firms can ameliorate their debt financing, 
specifically long-term funding. We could not find any significant relation between 
stock market turnover and long-term debt to total assets. Globalization of financial 
markets also has an impact on the long-term financing decisions of firms. As 
offshore banking loans increase, more funds become available in the financial 
system. As a result, firms can use more long-term debt. Alternatively, increases in 
offshore bank deposits as compared to domestic bank deposits decrease the available 
funding. Accordingly, long-term debt to total assets lessens.  
 
Table 6.1 Column 2 presents the results for estimations using short-term debt to total 
assets as the dependent variable. Results reported here complement the results for 
estimations for long-term debt to total assets. As asset tangibility increases, firms 
reduce short-term debt and move toward long-term debt. Internal funds do not have 
a significant effect on short-term debt financing decisions. For long-term financing, 
the larger the firm, the more short-term funding firms can access. 
 
When we look at the effect of the economic environment, firms borrow less short-
term debt as the GDP per capita increases as opposed to our hypothesis. Firms in 
richer countries prefer equity financing to debt financing. As the economy grows, 
short-term debt financing of firms rises. They continue to borrow in spite of the 
increases in inflation and interest. As previously mentioned, if managers borrow at 
the right time, when inflation is higher than interest rate, they can lower their cost of 
borrowing. They can also benefit more from the tax shields. Therefore, they borrow 
more short-term in an inflationary environment. They continue to borrow short-term 
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in spite of the increases in the interest rate. Tax has a positive impact on the short-
term debt to total assets indicating that to benefit more from tax shields, firms in our 
sample use more short-term debt financing. Therefore, firms in the sample benefit 
from tax shields through short-term debt and they avoid long-term debt due to the 
bankruptcy risk. 
 
Civil law legal systems and better governance (less corruption) encourages firms to 
use more short-term debt. Since common law legal systems offer better protection to 
investors, firms in those countries use more long-term debt and equity financing, 
while the firms in countries with civil law legal systems use more short-term debt 
financing. In accordance with our results, firms in countries with civil law legal 
systems have shorter-term debt. Developed banking sectors and the presence of an 
active stock market provide more available funding into the financial system; 
therefore, firms can increase their short-term borrowing. Liquid stock markets 
encourage firms to prefer equity financing due to the lower cost of equity capital. 
For short-term borrowing, firms in our sample do not consider offshore loans. Yet 
they increase their short-term borrowing with the globalization of financial markets. 
 
Thus, firm level variables are important both for long-term and short-term financing. 
The impact of the variables is the same, except profitability. The economic 
environment alters firms’ decisions about financing. In an inflationary environment, 
firms prefer to use short-term debt financing rather than long-term. Increases in the 
cost of borrowing force firms to choose either short-term funding or equity 
financing. Due to the bankruptcy risk of borrowing, firms avoid selecting long-term 
funding as tax increases, but they benefit from tax shields by using short-term 
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financing. Good governance (less corruption) improves short-term borrowing, while 
it causes firms to shift from long-term financing to equity financing. Firms use more 
long-term debt financing in common law legal systems, while they borrow more 
short-term debt in civil law legal systems. The developed banking sector and 
presence of a stock market increases both long-term and short-term debt financing, 
while liquid stock markets allow firms to shift from debt financing to equity 
financing. Hence, if a country provides better economic and financial environments 
to firms by improving the economic environment and providing better governance 
and developed, efficient financial markets and globalized financial systems, the 
long-term financing increases. 
 
6.2.1.1 Are the determinants for long-term and short-term financing different 
for small firms? 
In the previous section, we demonstrated that larger firms have longer debt. This 
may be due to their easy access to international markets. On the other hand, the 
reason for smaller firms to hold short-term debt could be their close nature. In this 
section, we analyse whether the determinants of long-term and short-term debt 
structures are different for small firms as compared to large firms. Table 6.2 presents 
the results for debt financing decisions of small, medium, and large firms. For long-
term debt to total assets, we confirm that both small and large firms follow the trade-
off theory. Since lenders do not have as much information as managers of small 
firms, they prefer to provide long-term funding if they can secure their debt. Lenders 
secure their debt financing through collateral. Therefore, we confirm our hypothesis 
that the higher the collateral, the longer the debt firms can hold. Hall et al. (2004) 
find the same positive relation between tangibility and long-term debt to total assets 
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for UK small firms. However, small firms do not consider internal funds for their 
long-term debt financing decisions, while large firms follow the pecking order 
theory. Chittenden et al. (1996) also find no significant relation between profitability 
and long-term debt to total assets of small UK firms. They conclude that collateral is 
important for small firms’ access to long-term debt, not profitability. 
 
Most of the economic environment variables become insignificant for large firms. 
Only growth of the economy increases long-term debt financing of large firms. For 
small firms, growth also has a positive impact on long-term funding, while interest 
and tax have a negative effect on the long-term debt to total assets financing 
decision of small firms. As the cost of borrowing rises, small firms prefer short-term 
debt financing. Due to the bankruptcy risk, small firms borrow less long-term debt 
and select short-term funding as tax rates increase. Large firms do not consider the 
GDP per capita, inflation, interest, and tax in their long-term financing in opposition 
to our expectations. 
 
The impact of financial environment variables on long-term financing indicates 
some differences between small and large firms. Corruption does not have any 
significant effect on small firms, while large firms prefer equity financing in a 
country with better governance as opposed to our expectations. Both small and large 
firms have less long-term debt in the countries with civil law legal systems. We 
confirm our hypotheses that the developed banking sector and the presence of a 
stock market ameliorate the long-term debt financing of small firms, while 
development of financial institutions does not have any significant impact on the 
long-term debt financing decisions of large firms in conflict with our expectations. 
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Since stock market complements the banks, the development of a banking system 
and the existence of stock markets help small firms to access long-term debt 
financing. As large firms already have access to national and international markets, 
developments in the national financial markets do not have any significant impact on 
their long-term debt financing decisions. Financial globalization affects the long-
term funding of only large firms. Offshore bank loans increase, while offshore 
deposits to total deposits decrease long-term debt financing. Therefore, the 
developed banking system and the presence of an active stock market are very 
important for small firms to ameliorate long term external financing. 
 
Table 6.2 Panel B reports the regression results for short-term debt to total assets of 
small, medium, and large firms. The results for short-term debt to total assets 
integrate with the long-term debt to total assets. Small and large firms match their 
short-term assets with the maturity matching principle. Both Chittenden et al. (1996) 
and Hall et al. (2004) find the same inverse relationship between tangibility and 
short-term debt to total assets for UK small companies. Small firms with less fixed 
assets can provide lower levels of collateral; therefore, they need to use more short-
term debt financing. Both small and large firms do not consider profitability in their 
short-term funding decisions as opposed to our expectations. As GDP per capita and 
growth increases, small firms borrow more. However, increases in growth 
encourage large firms to prefer long-term debt rather than short-term debt. Small 
and large firms increase their short-term borrowing in spite of the increases in 
inflation and the interest rates. Small firms benefit from tax shields, while large 




Table 6.2. Long and Short-term Debt to Total Assets for Small, Medium and Large 
Firms 
This table presents the regressions of long-term and short-term debt to total assets on firm level, economic, and 
financial environment variables for small, medium, and large firms. Panel A presents the results for long-term 
debt to total assets and Panel B provides results for short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility is measured as net 
fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total 
assets. Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 
employees, small takes a value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 
500 employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate 
of GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate 
shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the 
perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has civil law legal 
systems and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit 
money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a 
stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is 
the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank 
deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates a level of 
significance at 1%, ** a level of significance at 5%, and * a level of significance at 10%.  
 
Panel A: Long-term Debt to Total Assets for Small, Medium, and Large Firms 
LTD/TA Small Medium Large 
Tangibility 0.0165** 0.0578*** 0.0910*** 
(0.008) (0.013) 0.029 
Profitability -0.0047 -0.0229*** -0.0175** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
GDP/Cap 0.0094 -0.0530*** -0.0099 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.019) 
Growth 0.6932*** 3.2670*** 2.5369*** 
(0.256) (0.330) (0.750) 
Inflation -0.0278 -0.0120 -0.1592 
(0.032) (0.039) (0.120) 
Interest -0.1790*** -0.0265 0.0725 
(0.034) (0.039) (0.093) 
Tax -0.6985*** -0.9599*** -0.3382 
(0.063) (0.098) (0.228) 
Corruption -0.0061 -0.0019 -0.0505* 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.028) 
Civil -0.0953*** -0.0311*** -0.0902*** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.030) 
Dbacba 0.0602*** 0.0503*** -0.0827 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.051) 
Stockmrk 0.0363*** 0.0734*** 0.0193 
(0.010) (0.018) (0.041) 
Turnover -0.0031 0.0136*** 0.0036 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) 
Nrbloan 0.0476 0.3063*** 0.5814** 
(0.066) (0.104) (0.229) 
Offdep 0.0052 -0.0386 -0.1109** 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.055) 
C 0.2423*** 0.5933*** 0.2900** 
(0.046) (0.074) (0.143) 
Observation 12330 10768 2837 





Panel B: Short-term Debt to Total Assets for Small, Medium, and Large Firms 
STD/TA Small Medium Large 
Tangibility -0.2060*** -0.2356*** -0.1995*** 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.029) 
Profitability 0.0048 -0.0135*** -0.0063 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) 
GDP/Cap -0.0303*** -0.0616*** -0.0448** 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.023) 
Growth 2.1777*** 1.1281*** -1.4517** 
(0.288) (0.394) (0.736) 
Inflation 0.2729*** 0.1689*** 0.1998* 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.116) 
Interest 0.6366*** 0.5554*** 0.2437** 
(0.042) (0.045) (0.108) 
Tax 1.0631*** 0.9475*** 0.0088 
(0.089) (0.108) (0.253) 
Corruption 0.1564*** 0.1668*** 0.0511* 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.030) 
Civil 0.1524*** 0.1655*** 0.0443 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.028) 
Dbacba 0.1512*** 0.1329*** 0.1491*** 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.043) 
Stockmrk 0.1509*** 0.0495*** 0.1447*** 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.037) 
Turnover -0.0326*** -0.0294*** -0.0231*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) 
Nrbloan 0.2501*** -0.2345** -0.3636* 
(0.076) (0.117) (0.219) 
Offdep 0.2002*** 0.1557*** -0.0058 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.069) 
C -0.3020*** 0.2233** 0.4867*** 
(0.060) (0.088) (0.183) 
Observation 12330 10768 2837 
R2 0.2556 0.1776 0.0647 
 
When we look at the financial environment variables, both small and large firms 
increase their short-term financing in countries with better governance and 
developed financial institutions. Increases in offshore loans allow small firms to 
borrow more in the short term, while large firms prefer long-term financing. 





As a result, small and large firms follow the trade-off theory and maturity matching. 
However, the determinants are different in terms of the impact of the 
macroeconomic and financial environment variables of the country on small and 
large firms. Small firms are more sensitive to changes in the economic environment 
of the country than large firms. Alterations in the local economic environment of a 
country influence the small firms, but we could not find any significance for large 
firms except for growth. Since it is difficult for small firms to reach long-term debt 
financing, some of the financial environment variables become insignificant. A 
developed and efficient banking sector and the presence of a stock market are 
important for their long-term debt financing. Alternatively, the better governed, 
developed financial institutions and globalization boost their short-term borrowing. 
Unlike small firms, large companies have access to the international capital markets. 
Therefore, they can protect themselves against the shocks or changes in the local 
economy. That’s why the policies instituted by local governments have a direct 
impact on small firms. 
6.2.1.2. Are the results different for different size measures? 
We test the robustness of our results by using different definitions of size. First, we 
use the logarithm of sales and then employ the logarithm of assets to proxy size. 
When we examine Table 6.3, we observe that results are very similar to those 
reported in Table 6.1. Larger firms have higher long- and short-term financing. We 
confirm that firms in the sample follow the theory. They match their long-term debt 






Table 6.3. Long and Short-term Debt to Total Assets with Different Size Proxies 
This table presents the regressions of long-term and short-term debt to total assets on firm level, economic, and 
financial environment variables by using different size proxy. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with the 
logarithm of sales and assets for long-term debt to total assets, while Columns 3 and 4 report the results for the 
logarithm of sales and assets for short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility is measured as net fixed assets to total 
assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. Small and Large 
are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 employees, small takes a 
value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 500 employees and zero 
otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP. Inflation is 
measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate shown on the schedule 
of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the perceptions of corruption in a 
country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has civil law legal systems and zero for common 
law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets plus central 
bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a stock market and zero otherwise. 
Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is the ratio of offshore bank loans 
relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. The reported R2 is the 
adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates a level of significance at 1%, ** a level of 
significance at 5%, and * a level of significance at 10%. 
 
 LTD/TA STD/TA 
Sale Asset Sale Asset 
Tangibility 0.0404*** 0.0389*** -0.2094*** -0.2170*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Profitability -0.0132*** -0.0066** -0.0055* 0.0009 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Size 0.0090*** 0.0101*** 0.0119*** 0.0069*** 
Log(sale) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP/Cap -0.0249*** -0.0241*** -0.0533*** -0.0486*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Growth 2.5395*** 2.6077*** 2.0324*** 1.9867*** 
(0.182) (0.182) (0.209) (0.211) 
Inflation -0.0415* -0.0375 0.2093*** 0.2069*** 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
Interest -0.1905*** -0.1915*** 0.4914*** 0.5366*** 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) 
Tax -0.7830*** -0.7828*** 0.8002*** 0.8107*** 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.063) (0.064) 
Corruption -0.0145** -0.0145** 0.1485*** 0.1427*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Civil -0.0698*** -0.0702*** 0.1353*** 0.1305*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Dbacba -0.0057 -0.0095 0.0908*** 0.1118*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Stockmrk 0.0991*** 0.0995*** 0.1583*** 0.1605*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Turnover -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0292*** -0.0310*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nrbloan 0.2160*** 0.2219*** 0.1372** 0.1564*** 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.059) (0.059) 
Offdep -0.0768*** -0.0780*** 0.1331*** 0.1326*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) 
C 0.3243*** 0.3045 -0.0906** -0.0839* 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.046) (0.046) 
Observation 25912 25935 25912 25935 
R2 0.0881 0.0909 0.2146 0.2079 
 
The macroeconomic determinants also stay the same. The richness of the country 
allows firms to choose equity financing rather than long- or short-term funding, 
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while economic growth increases both long- and short-term borrowing. 
Uncertainties in the economy initiate shorter debt. Higher interest allows firms 
continue to borrow in the short-term, but they avoid acquiring long-term debt. Also, 
we confirm that firms follow the trade-off theory in their short-term debt financing 
decisions. However, they decrease their long-term debt financing as tax increases 
due to the high probability of failure. 
 
The results for the financial environment variables are also robust to different 
definitions of size. We observe that the results are very similar to the previously 
reported ones. The only exception is offshore bank loans to GDP. We find a positive 
relation between this ratio and short-term debt to total assets as opposed to the 
insignificant association that we found previously. The higher the offshore loans, the 
more short-term debt firms undertake. Since offshore bank loans funnel more 
available funds into the domestic financial system, firms can borrow more. Firms 
prefer long-term debt financing in countries with a corrupt environment, while firms 
in countries with civil law legal systems acquire more short-term funding. We could 
not find any significant relationship between the developed banking system and 
long-term financing. 
 
6.2.1.3. Are the determinants of long and short-term debt to total assets 
different for privately held firms? 
We divide our sample into two subsamples according to firms that are privately held 
and publicly listed. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.4 reports the results for long-term 
debt to total assets of privately held and listed firms. We confirm the importance of 
firm level determinants for privately held firms for long-term debt to total assets. We 
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also find that the presence of small firms is inversely related with long-term debt to 
total assets for both privately held and listed firms as we expected. Both the 
privately held and listed firms are sensitive to changes in the economic environment 
of the country. Economic growth increases the long-term debt of privately held and 
listed firms, whereas uncertainty of the economy causes listed firms to prefer short-
term debt to total assets. Privately held firms continue to be financed by long-term 
debt in spite of high interest rates. We could not find any significant relationship for 
GDP per capita and tax in both types of firms as opposed to our expectations. Long-
term debt financing decisions of listed firms are affected by the legal system of the 
country. As opposed to what we discovered previously, listed firms in countries with 
civil law legal systems prefer long-term debt rather than equity. Better governance, 
developed banking systems, and financial globalization ameliorate the long-term 
funding of privately held firms. Hence, privately held firms are more sensitive to 
changes in the financial environment than listed firms. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6.4 report the outcome of short-term debt to total assets 
for privately held and listed firms. The results of short-term debt to total assets 
complement the results of long-term debt to total assets. Privately held and listed 
firms continue to be financed by short-term debt to total assets in spite of the 
uncertainties in the economy. Privately held firms only consider inflation and the 
interest rate in their short-term debt financing decisions. However, financial 
environment variables have a greater impact on the short-term debt funding of 
privately held firms compared to listed firms. Listed firms consider only stock 
market turnover for their short-term debt financing decisions. As stock markets 
become more liquid, they may prefer equity markets rather than debt markets to 
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raise funding. On the other hand, the only thing that does not affect the short-term 
debt funding decisions of privately held firms is the legal system. 
Table 6.4. Long and Short-term Debt to Total Assets for Privately Held and Listed 
Firms 
This table presents the regressions of long-term and short-term debt to total assets on firm level, economic, and 
financial environment variables for private and listed firms. Columns 1 and 2 presents the results for long-term 
debt to total assets, while Columns 3 and 4 reports the results for short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility is 
measured as net fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets. Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs 
less than 50 employees, small takes a value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has 
more than 500 employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual 
growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the 
highest tax rate shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption 
measures the perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has 
civil law legal systems and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets 
to deposit money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country 
has a stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. 
Nrbloan is the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to 
domestic bank deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates a 
level of significance at 1%, ** a level of significance at 5%, and * a level of significance at 10%.  
 
 LTD/TA STD/TA 
Private Listed Private Listed 
Tangibility 0.0246*** 0.0305 -0.2091*** -0.1595*** 
(0.008) (0.035) (0.009) (0.032) 
Profitability -0.0127*** -0.0056 -0.0012 -0.0028 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) 
Small -0.0626*** -0.0441** -0.0698*** -0.0233 
(0.004) (0.021) (0.005) (0.021) 
Large 0.0406*** -0.0176 0.0495*** 0.0121 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) 
GDP/Cap 0.0070 -0.0309 -0.0083 -0.0788*** 
(0.005) (0.024) (0.005) (0.029) 
Growth 2.6724*** 3.9173*** 0.3571 -0.4016 
(0.220) (1.099) (0.247) (1.183) 
Inflation -0.0157 -0.1734*** 0.1176*** 0.1170* 
(0.028) (0.056) (0.031) (0.065) 
Interest 0.0618* 0.1512 0.3432*** 0.0813 
(0.033) (0.104) (0.038) (0.106) 
Tax -0.0778 0.2331 -0.0167 -0.9550*** 
(0.079) (0.257) (0.087) (0.279) 
Corruption 0.0174* 0.0019 0.0573*** 0.0341 
(0.009) (0.035) (0.010) (0.037) 
Civil -0.0166 0.1478*** -0.0112 -0.0306 
(0.010) (0.051) (0.011) (0.054) 
Dbacba 0.0665*** -0.0037 0.0698*** 0.0857 
(0.012) (0.060) (0.014) (0.064) 
Turnover -0.0022 0.0176* -0.0077*** -0.0302*** 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) 
Nrbloan 0.1561*** 0.1307 0.1565** -0.0199 
(0.058) (0.236) (0.067) (0.233) 
Offdep -0.0330* -0.0176 0.1112*** 0.0200 
(0.017) (0.055) (0.020) (0.067) 
C 0.0077 0.1138 0.2851*** 1.1474*** 
(0.048) (0.216) (0.055) (0.256) 
Observation 21961 1970 21961 1970 




6.2.2. The determinants of long-term debt to total debt decisions of firms 
As we discussed in the Chapter 3, we use long-term debt to total debt as a dependent 
variable for debt maturity. The estimated equation is the long-term debt to total debt 
against firm level, economic, and financial environment variables. As a firm level 
variable, we also include leverage in the equation as an independent variable. The 
functional form of the equation estimated and the expected signs of the variables are 
as follows: 
               (6.3) 
i = 1, 2, ...,10,839; t = 1999,…,2004 
 
LTD/TDi,t is long-term liabilities to total liabilities for the ith firm at time t. Fi,j,t 
indicates the firm level variables, leverage, asset tangibility, profitability, and size, 
while Ei,k,t represents the economic environment variable, GDP per capita, growth, 
inflation, interest, and tax at time t. Fini,l,t presents the financial environment 
variables, corruption, legal system, deposit money bank assets to central bank assets, 
stock market dummy, stock market turnover, offshore bank deposits to GDP, and 
offshore bank deposits, to domestic bank deposits at time t. 
 
Table 6.5 presents the regression results for the impact of firm level, economic, and 
financial environment variables on debt maturity. The coefficient for leverage is 
positive indicating that the higher the debt, the longer the maturity of the firm. The 
higher levels of leverage increase the liquidity risk. Firms with more leverage have 
no incentive to borrow short-term; thus, as increases in leverage amplifies the 
liquidity risk, firms with higher leverage are expected to borrow more long-term 
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debt (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Tangibility has a positive impact on the long-term 
debt to total debt. As discussed in the trade-off and pecking order theories, tangible 
assets can be used as collateral. The higher the tangible assets, the more long-term 
debt firms can borrow (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988) since 
collateral mitigates the moral hazard problem caused by the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover, this 
positive relationship is also supported by the maturity matching principle. A firm 
with more tangible assets uses more long-term debt to match their long-term 
liabilities with long-term assets (Booth et al., 2001). Thus, we confirm our 
hypothesis that higher tangible assets lengthen the duration of the debt. 
 
The coefficient for profitability is negative indicating that as profitability increases, 
long-term debt to total debt decreases. In accordance with the pecking order theory, 
profitable firms have less incentive to borrow especially in the long term as they can 
use their internal sources for financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Booth et al. 
(2001) find the same inverse relation. Therefore, the duration of debt shortens as the 
profitability of the firms improves. The size of the firm also has an impact on the 
debt duration. We find small being inversely related, while large is positively related 
with debt maturity. Small firms use more short-term debt to reduce the flotation 
costs of issuing long-term debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Thus, we confirm our 







Table 6.5. Determinants of Long-term Debt to Total Debt 
This table presents the regressions of long-term debt to total debt on firm level, economic and financial 
environment variables. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total asset. Tangibility is measured as net fixed 
assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. 
Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 employees, 
small takes a value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 500 
employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate of 
GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate 
shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the 
perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has civil law legal 
systems and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit 
money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a 
stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is 
the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank 
deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates a level of 










































Macroeconomic coefficients have also influenced the debt maturity decisions of 
firms. The coefficient for GDP per capita is positive for long-term debt to total debt 
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indicating that as the income of a country increases, firms extend the maturity of 
their debt. As countries become richer and economically more developed, they can 
offer longer maturity to firms in accordance with our expectations. The coefficient 
for GDP growth is positive implying that as countries grow, firms can use more 
long-term debt financing. Wealth, economic development, and higher growth help 
firms to finance with more mature debt. The impact of inflation on long-term debt to 
total debt is negative suggesting that increases in inflation shorten the debt maturity. 
Booth et al. (2001) find the same relationship between inflation and long-term debt. 
As the uncertainty in the economy increases, borrowing becomes more costly, 
especially in the long term and lenders are keen to provide short-term funding. 
Therefore, we confirm our hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between 
uncertainty in the economy and debt maturity. Interest has a negative coefficient 
indicating that as interest rates rise, firms avoid financing themselves with long-term 
debt due to the higher cost of interest expenses. Because of the adverse selection 
issue, lenders ask for higher rates to overcome the default risk (Sarkar, 1999). As 
expected, the higher the risk, the higher the interest rate. As such, firms experience 
shorter maturity. 
 
The coefficient for tax is negative proposing that firms in countries with higher tax 
rates use shorter maturity as opposed to our expectations. This result is difficult to 
interpret. Higher tax rates provide incentives to firms to borrow more due to tax 
shields. However, at the same time, increased borrowing heightens the risk of 
bankruptcy and financial distress costs. Bankruptcy costs are very important for 
small firms as they have greater business risk and a higher probability of failure. 
Also, the higher probability of failure decreases the value of the firm. Therefore, 
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increases in the probability of failure and decreases in the value of the firm may 
cause firms in developing countries to deviate from the trade-off theory for debt 
maturity decisions. In contrast, Booth et al. (2001) find a positive relationship 
between tax and long-term debt. Since the firms included in that study are large 
listed companies, the probability of failure is very low. Our results confirm that 
firms shorten their maturity due to the bankruptcy risk of debt. 
 
The financial environment also has an impact on the debt maturity decisions of 
firms. The coefficient for corruption is negative indicating that as corruption 
increases debt maturity also increases as opposed to our expectation. Firms in 
developing countries follow the efficient grease hypothesis. Since it is difficult to 
find long-term debt financing in developing countries, firms may pay bribes to have 
access to long-term funding. Therefore, firms in countries with high corruption have 
longer maturity of debt. Firms in those countries with civil law legal systems have 
shorter debt maturity. Since civil law legal systems do not provide better protection 
to external investors than common law legal systems, firms in countries with civil 
law legal systems have shorter maturity. Financial institutions also have an effect on 
the debt maturity decisions of firms. Surprisingly, developed banking systems cause 
firms to have shorter maturity. Since most of the firms in our sample are small and 
medium sized enterprises, it is difficult to find long-term financing even if the 
country has a developed banking system. The existence of a stock market does not 
have any effect on the debt maturity decisions of firms. The coefficient for stock 
market turnover is positive suggesting that as stock market turnover increases, debt 
maturity of firms also rises. As discussed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), 
stock market development also encourages greater use of bank financing. Therefore, 
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as stock markets become more liquid, firms have access to longer maturity of debt. 
As offshore banking loans increase, more funds become available and firms can 
extend their maturity of debt. Alternatively, increases in offshore bank deposits 
when compared to domestic bank deposits decreases the available funding. As a 
result, long-term debt decreases. 
 
6.2.2.1. Are the determinants of debt maturity different for small firms? 
In the previous section, we demonstrated that larger firms have longer debt maturity. 
The reason for this could be their easy access to international markets. Since small 
firms are opaque and have important adverse selection problems, lenders may not 
want to provide funding, especially long-term financing in the amount that they 
offer to large firms. Therefore, the determinants of debt maturity may indicate 
differences for small firms. This difference could be due to either firm-specific 
characteristics or because of the environment in which they run their business. In 
this section, we analyse whether the determinants of the debt maturity structure are 
different for small firms as compared to large firms. Table 6.6 presents the results 
for long-term debt to total debt of small, medium, and large firms. The coefficient 
for tangibility is positive for both small and large firms. In accordance with the 
trade-off and pecking order theory, the greater the tangible assets, the longer the 
debt maturity firms may access. Since collateral mitigates the moral hazard problem, 
lenders are willing to offer longer maturity to these firms. Small firms borrow less 
long-term debt when they have enough internal resources to finance in accordance 
with the pecking order theory. Profitability does not have a significant impact on the 
debt maturity decisions of large firms. Since small firms are opaque and have 
important adverse selection problems, they have high information costs. To 
218 
 
compensate for these information costs, lenders ask for higher borrowing rates. 
Therefore, we confirm our hypothesis that small firms prefer internal financing to 
avoid high borrowing costs.  
Table 6.6. Long-term Debt to Total Debt for Small, Medium, and Large Firms 
This table presents the regressions of long-term debt to total debt on firm level, economic, and financial 
environment variables. Column 1 (2) presents the results for small (medium) firms and Column (3) reports the 
results for large firms. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total asset. Tangibility is measured as net fixed 
assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. 
Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 employees, 
small takes a value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 500 
employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate of 
GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate 
shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the 
perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has civil law legal 
systems and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit 
money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a 
stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is 
the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank 
deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates level of 
significance at 1%, ** a level of significance at 5%, and * a level of significance at 10%.  
LTD/TD Small Medium Large 
Leverage 0.2116*** 0.1712*** 0.0529 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.042) 
Tangibility 0.2362*** 0.2313*** 0.2298*** 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.045) 
Profitability -0.0141** -0.0227*** -0.0025 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) 
GDP/Cap 0.1034*** 0.0358** 0.0801** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.034) 
Growth 2.2009*** 2.8912*** 4.2248*** 
(0.637) (0.614) (1.205) 
Inflation -0.1336** -0.2354*** -0.3437* 
(0.058) (0.063) (0.177) 
Interest -0.6806*** -0.6199*** -0.1980 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.137) 
Tax -1.6898*** -1.4701*** 0.0830 
(0.144) (0.167) (0.374) 
Corruption -0.2016*** -0.2277*** -0.1746*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.045) 
Civil -0.3091*** -0.1923*** -0.1833*** 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.046) 
Dbacba -0.0207 -0.1675*** -0.3443*** 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.075) 
Stockmrk -0.0913*** 0.0921*** -0.0591 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.073) 
Turnover 0.0151** 0.0338*** 0.0262** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) 
Nrbloan 0.2468 0.5429*** 1.0760*** 
(0.165) (0.174) (0.343) 
Offdep -0.1794*** -0.2768*** -0.2320** 
(0.043) (0.040) (0.093) 
C 0.1825 0.4425*** -0.1456 
(0.117) (0.120) (0.255) 
Observation 10350 10164 2745 




The economic environment also affects the debt maturity decisions of small and 
large firms. The only difference between them is the impact of interest and tax since 
we found no significant relationship between interest and debt maturity and tax and 
debt maturity for large firms. The impact of the other macroeconomic variables 
stays the same as the overall results. Therefore, the richer the country, the longer the 
debt maturity available to both small and large firms. Economic growth increases, 
while inflation shortens the maturity of debt for both types of firms. As interest and 
tax increase, small firms borrow less long-term debt. Since increases in the interest 
rate make borrowing more costly for small firms, they shorten the debt maturity. 
Alternatively, as suggested by the trade-off theory, firms borrow more to benefit 
from tax shields. However, there is a trade-off between the benefits of tax and 
bankruptcy costs. Since small firms are more likely to go bankrupt, they avoid 
lengthening their debt due to the bankruptcy risk. Therefore, the economic stability 
of a country is an important aspect in long-term debt financing for both small and 
large firms. Small firms are more sensitive to the changes in the interest and tax 
rates. 
 
The impact of the financial environment also demonstrates some differences 
between small and large firms. Corruption and the legal system have the same 
inverse effect on the debt maturity decisions of firms. Both small and large firms 
have shorter maturity in countries with civil law legal systems, while greater 
corruption increases their long-term debt. A developed banking sector has no 
significant impact on the maturity decisions of small firms, while the development 
of the banking sector shortens the debt maturity of large firms. The existence of a 
stock market in a country shortens the debt maturity of small firms. Small firms 
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prefer equity financing rather than debt financing in countries with efficient 
financial markets. Large firms do not consider the existence of a stock market in 
their maturity decisions as they have access to international financial markets. 
Financial globalization affects the maturity decisions of both small and large firms. 
We could find no significant relation between offshore banks loans and debt 
maturity for small firms, while it is positively related to debt maturity for large 
firms. In contrast, offshore deposits to total deposits decrease debt maturity of both 
types of firms. 
 
6.2.2.2. Are the results different for different size measures? 
We test the robustness of our results by using different definitions of size. First, we 
use the logarithm of sales and then the logarithm of assets to proxy size in Table 6.7. 
Our results are robust for the different definitions of size. We confirm that larger 
firms have longer debt maturity. Larger firms usually have more stable cash flows 
and lower bankruptcy risk (Pettit and Singer, 1985). They also have access to 
international capital markets. Therefore, being a large firm extends the maturity of 
debt. We confirm that firms in the sample follow the theory. They borrow more 
long-term debt when they have higher collateral and follow the pecking order. If 
they have enough internal resources, they prefer to be financed by them. 
 
The impact of the economic environment variables stays the same. The richness of 
the country and economic growth allows firms to lengthen their debt maturity, while 





Table 6.7. Long-term Debt to Total Debt with Different Size Proxy 
This table presents the regressions of long-term debt to total debt on firm level, economic, and financial 
environment variables. Column 1 presents the results for logarithm of sales and Column 2 reports the results for 
the logarithm of assets. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total asset. Tangibility is measured as net fixed 
assets to total assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. 
Small and Large are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 employees, 
small takes a value of one and zero otherwise.. Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 500 
employees and zero otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate of 
GDP. Inflation is measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate 
shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the 
perceptions of corruption in a country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has civil law legal 
systems; and zero for common law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit 
money bank assets plus central bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a 
stock market and zero otherwise. Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is 
the ratio of offshore bank loans relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank 
deposits. The reported R2 is the adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates a level of 
significance at 1%, ** a level of significance at 5%, and * a level of significance at 10%. 
 
Sale Asset 
Leverage 0.1933*** 0.1901*** 
(0.013) (0.013) 
Tangibility 0.2365*** 0.2395*** 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Profitability -0.0145*** -0.0101** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Size 0.0027* 0.0093*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
GDP/Cap 0.0619*** 0.0616*** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Growth 3.3452*** 3.5577*** 
(0.388) (0.388) 
Inflation -0.1987*** -0.1919*** 
(0.040) (0.040) 
Interest -0.6594*** -0.7015*** 
(0.045) (0.045) 
Tax -1.5197*** -1.5097*** 
(0.104) (0.104) 
Corruption -0.2171*** -0.2126*** 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Civil -0.2381*** -0.2365*** 
(0.013) (0.013) 
Dbacba -0.1294*** -0.1593*** 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Stockmrk 0.0081 0.0088 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Turnover 0.0202*** 0.0214*** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Nrbloan 0.4677*** 0.4751*** 
(0.109) (0.109) 
Offdep -0.2499*** -0.2477*** 
(0.028) (0.028) 
C 0.3004*** 0.2316*** 
(0.079) (0.080) 
Observation 23234 23259 





We find the same effect of financial environment variables on the debt maturity 
decisions of firms when we use different definitions of size. Corruption helps firms 
lengthen their debt maturity, while firms in countries with civil law legal systems 
have shorter debt maturity. A developed banking sector cuts the debt, while turnover 
helps firms increase their debt maturities. The existence of a stock market does not 
have any significant impact on their maturity decisions. Increases in offshore 
banking loans extend the debt maturity, while a rise in offshore bank deposits 
shortens the maturity of debt. 
 
Our results are robust to different definitions of size. Regardless of the size 
definitions we used, based on the number of employees, sales, and total assets of the 
company, we find that debt maturity is longer for larger firms. 
6.2.2.3. Are the determinants of debt maturity different for privately held 
firms?  
We divide our sample into two subsamples according to firms that are privately held 
and publicly listed. We confirm the importance of firm level determinants for 
privately held firms. The higher debt levels increase the maturity of debt both for 
privately held and listed firms. Both privately held and listed firms follow the trade-
off theory. As collateral increases, they lengthen the maturity. We could not find any 
significant relationship among the other firm level variables for listed firms. 
Alternatively, private firms prefer shorter maturity when they have enough internal 
funds and when the size of the firm is small. Since privately held firms are less 
transparent and have more information asymmetry issues when compared to 
publicly listed companies, they use internal financing. If they are smaller firms, then 
it becomes difficult to access long-term debt financing. 
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Table 6.8. Long-term Debt to Total Debt for Privately Held and Listed Firms 
This table presents the regressions of long-term debt to total debt on firm level, economic, and financial 
environment variables. Column 1 presents the results for private firms and Column 2 reports the results for listed 
firms. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total asset. Tangibility is measured as net fixed assets to total 
assets. Profitability is calculated as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. Small and Large 
are included as dummy variables to proxy for size. If the firm employs less than 50 employees, small takes a 
value of one and zero otherwise. Large takes a value of one if the firm has more than 500 employees and zero 
otherwise. GDP/Cap is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP. Inflation is 
measured based on a GDP deflator. Interest is the lending rate. Tax is the highest tax rate shown on the schedule 
of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corruption measures the perceptions of corruption in a 
country. Civil is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has civil law legal systems; and zero for common 
law legal systems. Dbacba is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets plus central 
bank assets. Stockmrk is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a stock market and zero otherwise. 
Turnover is the ratio of total shares traded to market capitalization. Nrbloan is the ratio of offshore bank loans 
relative to GDP. Offdep is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. The reported R2 is the 
adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates a level of significance at 1%, ** a level of 
significance at 5%, and * a level of significance at 10%.  
 
Private Listed 
Leverage 0.2025*** 0.1815*** 
(0.015) (0.048) 
Tangibility 0.2330*** 0.1434*** 
(0.015) (0.051) 
Profitability -0.0168*** 0.0015 
(0.005) (0.017) 
Small -0.0303*** -0.0220 
(0.008) (0.034) 
Large 0.0139 -0.0269 
(0.013) (0.028) 
GDP/Cap 0.0746*** 0.0558 
(0.010) (0.035) 
Growth 4.3167*** 3.4378* 
(0.445) (1.792) 
Inflation -0.0972** -0.2427*** 
(0.048) (0.088) 
Interest -0.3875*** -0.0724 
(0.058) (0.153) 
Tax -0.5196*** 1.6790*** 
(0.161) (0.501) 
Corruption -0.1528*** -0.0487 
(0.017) (0.056) 
Civil -0.1172*** 0.1827** 
(0.020) (0.079) 
Dbacba -0.0503** -0.2447** 
(0.024) (0.096) 
Turnover 0.0066 0.0646*** 
(0.004) (0.015) 
Nrbloan 0.3337*** 0.0232 
(0.123) (0.389) 
Offdep -0.1886*** -0.0434 
(0.031) (0.092) 
C -0.2058** -0.6954** 
(0.101) (0.352) 
Observation 19381 1875 




Privately held firms are more sensitive to changes in the economic environment of 
the country than listed firms. The richness of the country and economic growth help 
privately held firms extend their long-term financing, while uncertainty and the cost 
of borrowing shorten it. Privately held firms in countries with high inflation and 
high interest rates avoid borrowing long-term debt. We could not find any 
significant relationship between GDP per capita and interest with debt maturity for 
publicly listed firms. Tax has the opposite impact on long-term debt to total debt 
decisions of privately held and listed firms. For private firms, tax has a negative 
relation due to bankruptcy costs, while for listed firms, it has a positive impact from 
the benefit from tax shields. 
 
Some of the financial environment variables become insignificant for listed firms. 
Corruption and financial globalization do not significantly influence the long-term 
debt to total debt decisions of listed firms. Listed firms in countries with civil law 
legal systems have longer maturity, while privately held firms in those countries 
have shorter maturity. A developed banking sector has a negative impact on the 
long-term debt to total debt, while turnover increases the maturity of listed firms. 
Privately held firms do not consider stock market turnover in their debt maturity 
decisions. Unlike listed firms, financial globalization has an impact on the long-term 
debt to total debt decisions of private firms. Increases in offshore loans lengthen the 
debt maturity of privately held firms, while increases in offshore deposits shorten it. 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the determinants of the debt maturity structure of firms in 
developing countries. Previous studies have mainly focused on large listed 
225 
 
companies. However, it is not possible to accept their results for small and privately 
held companies. As opposed to previous research, we investigate the determinants of 
debt maturity structures in developing countries, specifically for small and privately 
held firms. About 90% of privately held companies and about 70% of listed firms 
are small and medium sized enterprises in our sample. We use survey data from the 
World Bank Enterprise Survey. Unlike the previous literature, our main focus is on 
small firms in developing countries.  
 
We see that firms in a country with a stock market have higher leverage and debt 
maturity than firms in a country without a stock market. This is especially true for 
small firms. Therefore, size has an important impact on the debt maturity decisions 
of firms. Being a small firm shortens the maturity of debt. Larger companies have 
longer debt maturity as they are more diversified and have a lower probability of 
failure. On the other hand, information asymmetry, high inflation, and the cost of 
interest cause small firms to have a shorter debt maturity. Hence, small firms are 
more sensitive to economic environment alterations than large firms. 
 
We find that corruption, legal systems, financial institutions, and financial 
globalization have an impact on the debt maturity decisions of firms. Firms use more 
debt financing in countries with a civil law legal system and a less corrupt 
environment. Alternatively, corruption increases the long-term debt financing of 
firms. Firms in countries with developed banking systems and stock markets have 
higher debt financing, while firms in countries with an active and liquid stock 
market prefer equity financing. Financial globalization increases funding in the 
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domestic financial system of a country; therefore, external financing of firms 
ameliorates.  
 
Small and large firms are differently affected by the institutional environment. The 
presence of a stock market is the only factor that affects the debt financing decisions 
of large firms. In contrast, financial development and the existence of a stock market 
encourage small firms to increase long-term debt financing. The impact on 
corruption, the legal system, financial institutions, and financial globalization on 
short-term debt financing stays the same for small firms in accordance with the 
overall results. Financial institution is the only factor that affects the long-term debt 
financing decisions of large firms. Hence, the financial environment of a country has 
a direct impact on the financing decisions of firms, especially small firms. In order 
to meet the external financing needs of small firms, governments should provide 
better governed, efficient, and developed banking systems and stock markets, as 
well as globalized financial markets to give firms a chance to find external sources. 
 
In conclusion, debt maturity structure theories are portable for small firms. The main 
difference between small and large firms can be found in the economic and financial 
environments. Since small firms are more opaque and have information asymmetry 
problems, they do not have access to international markets; therefore, they are more 
exposed to changes in the local economic environment. That’s why local 
governments should be careful when establishing local economic policies that have 











The purpose of the chapter is to summarize the main findings, emphasize the 
limitations of the thesis and provide policy implications. The thesis examined the 
external financing decisions of firms, specifically small and privately held 
companies in developing countries by using World Bank Enterprise Survey. To our 
knowledge, this is the first thesis to use the Enterprise Survey to examine the 
leverage and debt maturity levels and determinants of capital structure and debt 
maturity of firms. Unique feature of the database is its coverage of SMEs. About 90 
percent of our sample is small and medium size enterprises and about 92 percent is 
the privately held companies. As opposed to previous studies, our main focus is on 
the small and privately held firms in developing countries, which are more 
representative of the corporate sector in those countries. 
 
Previous studies do the analysis on either large listed companies in developed and 
developing countries or they focus on the SMEs in European countries (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008). Therefore, it could be misleading to generalize their results for the 
small and privately held firms. By using World Bank Enterprise Survey, we 
analysed the leverage and debt maturity levels and determinants of capital structure 
and debt maturity of firms in developing countries. We examined the difference 
between small and large firms and privately held and listed companies.  
 
We find that small firms are less levered and have shorter maturity than large firms. 
Previous studies discuss whether the impact on external financing is due to the firm-
specific factors or country variables. The results are mixed. Some studies, such as 
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Daskalakis and Psillaki conclude that differences in capital structure is due to firm-
specific factors; while, Hall et al. (2004) discuss that the reason might be the country 
factors. We conclude that the reason for different capital structure and debt maturity 
is the economic and financial environment of a country. If the countries can provide 
stable, reliable and developed environment, it becomes easier for small firms to 
access the external funding. If smaller firms can easily reach the external financing, 
they start behaving in accordance with the capital structure and debt maturity 
theories.  
  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 summarizes the 
main findings. Section 7.3 provides the policy implications and section 7.4 presents 
the limitations and further research. 
 
7.2. Summary and conclusion 
In the stylized facts chapter, we examine the properties of data since this is the first 
thesis to use World Bank Enterprise Survey. We first try to answer whether the 
leverage and debt maturity levels are different for small and large companies. We 
find that small firms are less levered and shorter maturity than large firms in 
developing countries. Secondly we examine the differences in levels for privately 
held and listed companies and we show that listed firms have higher leverage and 
longer maturity than privately held companies. Next, we investigate the impact of 
presence of a stock market on leverage and debt maturity levels. We conclude that 
firms in countries with stock market have higher levels of leverage and longer 
maturity levels than firms in countries without a stock market. This difference is 




In the determinants of capital structure and debt maturity chapters, we investigate 
the determinants of capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms in 
developing countries. We first look at the answer to the following question; Is there 
a size effect on the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms? We 
confirm that size has a significant impact on the external financing choices and firms 
in the sample follow the capital structure and debt maturity theories. Secondly we 
analyze whether the determinants of capital and debt maturity structure different for 
small firms. Both small and large firms follow the maturity matching principle. They 
match their long-term assets with long-term debt. We find that long-term debt 
financing boosts with higher levels of collateral. Booth et al. (2001), Chittenden et 
al. (1996), Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) and Hall et al. (2004) also find the same 
inverse relation. The firms follow the pecking order theory for the sample and we 
expected to have the same relation for small firms. Surprisingly we could not find 
any significant relation between profitability and leverage, long-term debt and short-
term debt to total assets for small firms. Chittenden et al. (1996) find the same 
insignificant relation by using long-term debt to total assets as dependent variable. 
They conclude that the vital factor for long-term debt is collateral, not profitability 
for small firms. Moreover, Bartholdy and Mateus (2005) could not find any 
significant relation between profitability and leverage. They infer that pecking order 
theory is applicable for the large market financed firms rather than small bank-
financed companies. This relation is also supported by Frank and Goyal (2003). 
They also find that pecking order theory is more likely for large firms than small 
firms in the US. Hence, unlike most studies (Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Hall et 
al., 2004), we conclude that small firms do not follow the pecking order. On the 
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other hand, when we use long-term debt to total debt as a dependent variable in debt 
maturity model, we find that small firms follow the pecking order. Therefore, when 
the external financing is accessible, small firms behave according to the pecking 
order theory if there are enough internal funds.  
 
Thirdly we examine the impact of economic environment on the financing decisions 
of firms and we find that it has effect on the leverage and debt maturity decisions of 
firms. The fiscal and monetary policy decisions of firms have an impact on the 
external financing decisions of firms. This effect is higher for small firms. Finally 
we investigate the effect of financial environment on the capital and debt maturity 
decisions of firms. We show that the financial environment has significant impact on 
the external financing decisions. Firms in a country with less corruption and civil 
law legal systems have more external financing. Moreover, developed banking 
systems and the existence of a stock market boosts the debt financing of firms. The 
efficient stock markets make firms to prefer equity financing rather than debt 
financing. Financial globalization enables firms to have more debt financing. Thus, 
if the countries can decrease corruption, adopt business friendly legal systems and 
establish financial markets they can provide more funding and longer maturity to 
their businesses. The important thing is that small firms benefit much more than 
large firms.  
 
In conclusion, the main difference between small and large firms derives from the 
economic and financial environment of the country. Small firms are more sensitive 
to the changes in their local economic and financial environment than large firms. 
Hence, the inefficiencies in the economic environment and underdeveloped financial 
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environment can be seen as the main reasons for small firms’ lower external 
financing. For large firms, firm-level factors are important in their leverage and debt 
maturity decisions. Economic and financial environments do not have much impact 
on large firms.  
 
7.3. Policy implications 
This research concludes that the main difference between the small and large firms 
derives from the economic and financial environment of a country. Since large firms 
have access to international financial markets, they are less exposed to the shocks in 
the local environment as opposed to small firms. Uncertainties in the economy cause 
small firms to borrow less while they continue to borrow despite increases in the 
cost of borrowing but they avoid long-term financing. Increases in the tax rate boost 
the short-term borrowing but due to the probability of failure they decrease their 
long-term financing. Therefore, governments’ decisions on fiscal and monetary 
policies have influenced the debt financing of small firms more than large firms. 
Hence, to be able to increase the external financing of small firms, governments by 
using fiscal and monetary policies should provide stability in the economy.  
 
As economical environment, the financial environment of the country influences the 
external financing decisions of firms. Corruption, legal system, development of 
financial institutions and financial globalization has an impact on the external 
financing decisions of small firms. The inefficiencies and underdeveloped financial 
environment in a country reduce the debt financing of small firms. Thus, 
governments should improve the financial environment by providing better 
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governance mechanisms; developing banking system and stock market as well as 
globalizing their financial markets.  
 
7.4. Limitations and further research 
We try to discuss and explain the determinants of capital structure and debt maturity 
decisions of firms by referring to the capital structure theories. But the proxies that 
we generate can be used to test more than one theory. For example, we use asset 
tangibility to proxy collateral levels of firms. All theories, trade-off, agency and 
pecking order, assume positive relation. We find this positive relation for long-term 
debt financing. But we cannot differentiate among the theories, just using one proxy. 
Therefore, it is not possible to identify the differences among the theories by using 
our empirical results. This is one of the limitations of this thesis.  
 
Another limitation of this study is the application of a static panel model. Most of 
the recent studies use the dynamic models to test the capital structure and debt 
maturity decisions of firms. Since the sample includes firm-level data for two or 
three years, it is not possible to apply the dynamic model. Therefore, we use the 
static model due to data limitations. Another limitation is that we could not find 
appropriate small firm benchmark. Due to unavailability of the data, we could not 
compare our sample for small firms to small firms in developed countries. We tried 
to do the comparisons with previous studies but it is not possible to find the perfect 
match. There are differences in the definitions of variables, especially for leverage 
and debt maturity ratios. Some of the determinants applied in the model, have not 
been used in the other SME studies.  As a future research, since Orbis database is 
now available, we may do the same analysis for developed countries. We could not 
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apply the database to compare the sample in the thesis and developed countries 
because it is not possible to match the sample based on the years. Orbis database 
includes the firm-level data for the last five years.  
 
As we have already found, the developed and efficient financial institutions are 
important for small firms to access the external financing. Therefore, as a further 
research, we may investigate whether it is easy to access to the banking system in a 
country. In the literature, it is believed that increases in number of banks and 
branches decrease the information asymmetries and transaction costs. Therefore, the 
availability of credit to local firms boosts with increases with physical proximity; as 
a result of that, more funding opportunities become available especially for small 
firms. Thus, we may investigate the effect of physical proximity in a country or 
region on the capital structure decisions of small firms.  
 
In addition to that, it could be interesting to analyze the effect of the recent financial 
crisis on the external financing decisions of small firms. We have found that the 
economic environment of a country has affected the debt financing decisions of 
small firms more than large firms. We can expect that the impact of the recent 
financial crisis on small firms should be more than large firms. Therefore, as a 
further research, we may investigate the impact of the recent financial crisis on the 
external financing decisions of small firms. 
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Graph 1. Firm Observation by Region 
The chart below illustrates the number of firm observations based on the regions. 
AFR symbolises African region. EAP is the East Asia and Pacific region. LCR 
stands for the Latin America and Caribbean region. MNA is the Middle East and 
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Graph 2. Firm Observations Based on Size/Listed or Unlisted 
The charts below illustrate the total number of firm observations. The first chart is 
based on size demonstrating whether the firms are small, medium, or large sized. 
Small firms employ less than 50 employees. Medium firms have 50 to 500 
employees, while large firms have more than 500 employees. The second chart 
presents the number of observations belonging to listed or unlisted firms. Listed are 
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Graph 3. Firm Observations Based on Size/Listed or Unlisted by Regions 
The charts below illustrate the number of observations based on size/listed/unlisted by 
regions. Small indicates those firms having less than 50 employees. Medium is for medium 
size firms with 50 to 500 employees, while Large are those firms that employ more than 500 
employees. Listed are those firms that are publicly held. Unlisted are those firms that are 
privately owned. AFR symbolises the African region. EAP represents the East Asia 
and Pacific region. LCR is the Latin America and Caribbean region. MNA is the 
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Table 1. Governance Indicators 
This table reports the Pearson correlation statistics among the governance indicators. 
Voiceacc is an abbreviation for the governance indicator of Voice and 
Accountability; Politstab is the abbreviation for Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence; Goveff represents Government Effectiveness; Reg stands for Regulatory 
Quality; Rulaw is an abbreviation for Rule of Law and Corrup stands for Corruption. 
*** indicates a level of significance at 1%, ** is a level of significance at 5%, and * 
indicates a level of significance at 10%. 
 
Correlation Voiceacc Politstab Goveff Reg Rulaw Corrup 
Voiceacc 1.0000      
Politstab 0.6109*** 1.0000     
Goveff 0.7941*** 0.6986*** 1.0000    
Reg 0.8095*** 0.7814*** 0.9257*** 1.0000   
Rulaw 0.7043*** 0.6444*** 0.8635*** 0.7860*** 1.0000  
Corrup 0.6644*** 0.7837*** 0.9184*** 0.8719*** 0.8552*** 1.0000 
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Table 2. Leverage with Firm and Country Fixed Effects 
This table presents the estimations with firm fixed effects and country fixed effects. 
Leverage Firm Fixed Effects Country Fixed Effects 
Constant 0.7364** 0.6656*** 0.1592 
  0.371 0.021 0.472 
Tangibility -0.0255 -0.1667*** -0.1667*** 
  0.023 0.010 0.010 
Profitability -0.0073** -0.0205*** -0.0205*** 
  0.003 0.004 0.004 
Small -0.0001 -0.0924*** -0.0923*** 
  0.013 0.006 0.006 
Large 0.0267 0.0537*** 0.0538*** 
  0.018 0.009 0.009 
GDP/Cap -0.0424  0.0937 
  0.052  0.081 
Growth -0.8972***  0.0694 
  0.296  0.366 
Inflation 0.0189  -0.0081 
  0.018  0.020 
Interest 0.1656***  0.2095*** 
  0.056  0.063 
Tax -0.1332  -0.3417*** 
  0.092  0.126 
Bangladesh  -0.2303*** -0.1853*** 
   0.030 0.037 
Brazil  -0.1414*** -0.4787** 
   0.022 0.208 
Cambodia  -0.4890*** -0.4903*** 
   0.026 0.038 
Chile  -0.1323*** -0.3840* 
   0.023 0.224 
Ecuador  -0.0505* -0.1666 
   0.026 0.120 
El Salvador  -0.0957*** -0.2411 
   0.025 0.154 
Ethiopia   -0.2708*** -0.1407* 
   0.025 0.085 
Guatemala  -0.2457*** -0.3715*** 
   0.025 0.136 
Guyana  -0.3726*** -0.3890*** 
   0.024 0.091 
Honduras  -0.2186*** -0.3380*** 
   0.025 0.107 
India  -0.0676*** -0.0336 
   0.022 0.042 
Indonesia  -0.2318*** -0.2904*** 
   0.025 0.081 
Malawi  0.0137 0.0656 
   0.035 0.081 
Morocco  0.0219 -0.0604 
   0.023 0.120 
Nicaragua  -0.2823*** -0.3544*** 
   0.024 0.075 
Oman  -0.1594*** -0.4837* 
   0.045 0.271 
Pakistan  -0.3076*** -0.2727*** 
   0.022 0.049 
Peru  -0.0084 -0.1787 
   0.034 0.156 
Philippines  -0.0970*** -0.1535 
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   0.024 0.094 
South Africa  -0.1544*** -0.3299* 
   0.025 0.184 
Sri Lanka  -0.1074*** -0.1529* 
   0.026 0.084 
Syria  -0.4058*** -0.4643*** 
   0.035 0.110 
Tanzania  -0.1388*** -0.1015*** 
   0.029 0.037 
Observation 26415 26415 26415 





Table 3. Leverage for Small Firms with Firm and Country Fixed Effects 
This table reports the firm and country fixed effects estimations for leverage of 
small firms. 
Small Leverage Firm Fixed Effects Country Fixed Effects 
Constant 0.3322 0.6175*** -0.5043 
  0.547 0.040 0.670 
Tangibility -0.0020 -0.1540*** -0.1540*** 
  0.029 0.013 0.013 
Profitability -0.0025 -0.0030 -0.0030 
  0.004 0.004 0.004 
GDP/Cap -0.0001  0.1679 
  0.076  0.113 
Growth -0.8180**  -0.2939 
  0.407  0.509 
Inflation 0.0094  -0.0270 
  0.020  0.026 
Interest 0.0885  0.1660* 
  0.086  0.096 
Tax -0.0527  0.2815 
  0.179  0.296 
Bangladesh  -0.3457*** -0.3124*** 
   0.051 0.060 
Brazil  -0.2098*** -0.6002** 
   0.041 0.291 
Cambodia  -0.5440*** -0.4449*** 
   0.042 0.068 
Chile  -0.1540*** -0.5105 
   0.041 0.315 
Ecuador  -0.0565 -0.2325 
   0.045 0.172 
El Salvador  -0.1463*** -0.3847* 
   0.044 0.217 
Ethiopia   -0.3604*** -0.1427 
   0.042 0.121 
Guatemala  -0.3029*** -0.5358*** 
   0.042 0.194 
Guyana  -0.4349*** -0.6162*** 
   0.042 0.138 
Honduras  -0.3016*** -0.4618*** 
   0.043 0.153 
India  -0.1542*** -0.1741** 
   0.043 0.068 
Indonesia  -0.3840*** -0.4992*** 
   0.045 0.118 
Malawi  -0.0137 0.1289 
   0.061 0.120 
Morocco  0.0347 -0.1681 
   0.042 0.172 
Nicaragua  -0.3609*** -0.4420*** 
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   0.042 0.110 
Oman  -0.1935*** -0.6310* 
   0.064 0.379 
Pakistan  -0.3543*** -0.4209*** 
   0.040 0.080 
Peru  -0.0789 -0.3664* 
   0.051 0.219 
Philippines  -0.1918*** -0.3261** 
   0.046 0.137 
South Africa  -0.0911* -0.4153 
   0.047 0.260 
Sri Lanka  -0.2221*** -0.3396*** 
   0.050 0.125 
Syria  -0.4523*** -0.6242*** 
   0.048 0.157 
Tanzania  -0.1837*** -0.1086* 
   0.049 0.059 
Observation 12625 12625 12625 




Table 4. Leverage for Large Firms with Firm and Country Fixed Effects 
This table presents the firm and country fixed effects for the leverage of large firms. 
Large Leverage Firm Fixed Effects Country Fixed Effects 
Constant 1.1501 0.7061*** 3.6643* 
  1.577 0.059 1.968 
Tangibility -0.1362* -0.1153*** -0.1145*** 
  0.072 0.033 0.033 
Profitability -0.0111 -0.0273** -0.0273** 
  0.012 0.011 0.011 
GDP/Cap -0.0796  -0.5287 
  0.225  0.341 
Growth -0.4723  0.5113 
  1.166  1.736 
Inflation 0.0557  0.0779 
  0.113  0.113 
Interest 0.1039  0.1122 
  0.181  0.195 
Tax -0.1209  0.0317 
  0.268  0.417 
Bangladesh  -0.0777 -0.0012 
   0.077 0.115 
Brazil  -0.1040* 1.1954 
   0.062 0.865 
Cambodia  -0.2943*** -0.2901** 
   0.059 0.133 
Chile  -0.2581*** 1.2434 
   0.064 0.928 
Ecuador  -0.1595* 0.6487 
   0.082 0.497 
El Salvador  -0.1808** 0.8745 
   0.089 0.632 
Ethiopia   -0.2442*** -0.6785* 
   0.077 0.351 
Guatemala  -0.2829*** 0.6423 
   0.092 0.555 
Guyana  -0.3168*** 0.3064 
   0.056 0.370 
Honduras  -0.2850*** 0.4263 
   0.094 0.438 
India  -0.1029* 0.1302 
   0.058 0.149 
Indonesia  -0.1072* 0.4390 
   0.061 0.331 
Malawi  -0.1982** -0.6820** 
   0.097 0.320 
Morocco  -0.1603** 0.6563 
   0.065 0.484 
Nicaragua  -0.1987* 0.3041 
   0.107 0.311 
Pakistan  -0.3773*** -0.0588 
   0.067 0.193 
Peru  0.1929*** 1.2227* 
   0.063 0.633 
Philippines  -0.1402** 0.5097 
   0.060 0.378 
South Africa  -0.1432** 1.0954 
   0.065 0.761 
Sri Lanka  -0.0912 0.4662 
   0.063 0.331 
Tanzania  -0.1819** -0.2254* 
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   0.080 0.121 
Observation 2865 2865 2865 





Table 5 Summary Statistics for Regions 
  AFR EAP LCR MNA SAR F-test Prob 
Leverage 0.3912 0.3831 0.3686 0.5519 0.3765 194.16 0.0000 
LTD?TA 0.1278 0.1609 0.1188 0.0671 0.1816 216.93 0.0000 
STD?TA 0.2588 0.2221 0.2475 0.4848 0.1946 701.05 0.0000 
LTD/TD 0.2458 0.3906 0.2867 0.1274 0.4514 531.63 0.0000 
Tangibility 0.4422 0.4544 0.4723 0.2916 0.4755 235.20 0.0000 
Profitability 0.2386 0.3741 0.3942 0.1719 0.4495 103.11 0.0000 
GDP/Cap 1333.998 891.45 3033.37 1860.032 518.50 6282.81 0.0000 
Growth 0.0321 0.0234 0.0238 0.0364 0.0464 4800.00 0.0000 
Inflation 0.0816 0.0850 0.0706 0.0132 0.0723 596.47 0.0000 
Interest 0.1900 0.1436 0.3298 0.1247 0.1328 2733.12 0.0000 
Tax 0.3057 0.3055 0.2036 0.3358 0.3905 16470.18 0.0000 
Corruption -0.2582 -0.7737 -0.0214 -0.0355 -0.5410 2095.07 0.0000 
Civil 0.3168 1.0000 0.9731 1.0000 0.0000 38550.98 0.0000 
Dbacba 0.7104 0.8219 0.2987 0.9204 0.8106 6732.05 0.0000 
Stockmrk 0.6832 0.9481 0.8413 0.9307 1.0000 824.69 0.0000 
Turnover 0.1971 0.2736 0.2029 0.0750 2.4210 10069.65 0.0000 
Nrbloan 0.0609 0.1820 0.0746 0.1274 0.0566 5524.07 0.0000 








Table 6 Review of the SMEs literature 
                                                 
15 Totalloans equal long-term bank loans plus short-term bank loans plus creditors plus other current liabilities over the book value of assets. 
16 Longbankloans is defined as the book value of total long-term bank loans over book value of total assets 
17 Bankloans is the book value of both total short and long-term bank debt to total assets 
18 Shortbankloans is the book value of total short-term bank loans over book value of total assets 
Bartholdy 2005 totalloans15 longbankloans16 bankloans17 shortbankloans18 Years Database 
Portugal 14.40 7.04 17.27 10.23 1990-2000 Bank of portugal statistical department 
  non-listed companies 
    
Bartholdy 2008 totalloans 1994-2004 Amadeus 
All Small Large non-listed 
Austria 43.82 55.41 41.73   
Belgium 32.93 32.08 37.88   
Denmark 43.26 41.30 46.37   
Finland 33.84 31.81 33.91   
France 23.49 23.64 24.39   
Germany 39.25 42.28 36.22   
Greece 22.24 20.40 26.95   
Ireland 27.56 28.11 32.40   
Italy 24.30 25.80 23.80   
Netherlands 17.91 19.41 14.59   
Norway 15.86 16.25 15.78   
Portugal 26.76 26.24 26.62   
Spain 22.38 21.83 24.03   
Sweden 28.74 28.95 28.25   
Switzerland 11.07 24.67 9.49   
UK 39.09 36.76 41.79   
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19 TL/TA is the total liabilities to total assets 
20 LTD/TA is defined as long-term debt to total assets. Long-term debt includes long-term bank loans and other long-term liabilities repayable beyond one year, such as 
directors’ loans, hire purchase and leasing obligations. 
21 STD/TA is the short-term debt to total assets. Short-term debt contains bank overdraft, bank loans payable within a year and other current liabilities. 
All 28.17 26.88 31.51   
    
Daskalakis and Psillaki 2008 TL/TA19 1997-2002 Amadeus 
Greece 59.58 SMEs<250 employees 
France 52.78   
Italy 76.44   
Portugal 59.85   
    
Daskalakis and Psillaki 2008 1997-2002   
Greece 60   
France 53   
    
France 98 55   
Greece 98 60   
France 99 54   
Greece 99 58   
France 00 53   
Greece 00 59   
France 01 52   
Greece 01 60   
France 02 50   
Greece 02 61   
    
Hall et al 2004 LTD/TA20 STD/TA21   
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22 TL/TA is defined as total liabilities to total assets. 
23 CL/TA is the ratio of current liabilities to total asssets 
Belgium 14.11 44.81 Dun and Bradstreet for 1995 
Germany 28.46 38.22 SME<200 
Spain 15.45 49.79   
Ireland 12.25 47.51   
Italy 14.53 62.96   
Netherlands 2.06 46.32   
Portugal 11.78 48   
UK 9.74 48.31   
    
Michaelas 1999 TD/TA LTD/TA STD/TA 1988-1995 
Lotus one-source database of UK small 
firms 
UK 42.2 11.9 30.3 small<200 
1988 40.1 9.5 30.6   
1989 41.2 9.9 31.3   
1990 41.7 10.3 31.4   
1991 43.8 11.8 32   
1992 44.2 13.2 31   
1993 43.2 13.3 29.9   
1994 42.3 13.1 29.2   
1995 40.3 11.8 28.5   
    
Pettit and Singer 1985 TL/TA22 CL/TA23   
Large   
1966-68 48 20   
1978-80 58 30   



















1966-68 57 37   
1978-80 67 43   
    
    
Sogorb-Mira 2005 TD/TA LTD/TA STD/TA SABE 
Spain 61.41 8.95 52.45   1994-1998 SME<250 
251 
 
Table 7 The relationship between leverage and debt maturity and firm level factors 
  Tangibility Profitability Size 
Bartholdy 2005   
Long term bank loans + 0 + 
Short term bank loans - - 0 
Total loans + + - 
Bartholdy and Mateus 
2008 + - + 
Small + - + 
Large + - + 
Daskalakis and Psillaki 
2008 - - + 
Hall et al 2004   
LTD model + 0 + 
STD model - - - 
Michaelas 1999   
Total debt + - + 
Short term debt + - - 
Long term debt + - + 
Sogorb-Mira 2005   
Total debt + - + 
Long term debt + - + 
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